An architecture of exclusion: instrumentalization of the stateless Bidoon in Kuwait
By Felix Birke
The Kuwaiti State’s architecture of exclusion has enabled the instrumentalization of
statelessness against the Bidoon population since its inception. Despite their existence vastly
predating the Kuwaiti State in the Arabian Peninsula, the Bidoon remain without nationality,
socio-culturally tied to a land they have no political rights in. Kuwait’s treatment of the group
has transformed statelessness into a weapon of social and political exclusion, enabling the
marginalisation of the Bidoon through the restriction of access to public resources. The
following critical analysis of Kuwait’s historical treatment of the Bidoon and their structural
ostracization will demonstrate that statelessness has become a formal mechanism of societal
bifurcation.
I. Contextualisation
The Bidoon are a stateless Arab minority from the North-Eastern Arabian Peninsula, today
primarily found in Kuwait (UK Home Office, 2024), where an estimated 106,000 currently
reside (European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, n.d.). Their name originates from
bidoon jinsiya, meaning ‘without nationality’ in Arabic, and is also spelt as Bedoon, Bidun,
and Bedun. The Bidoon are classified as stateless, because Kuwait does not recognise them as
members of their population, and they thus are not citizens of any state. Statelessness is
defined as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its
law’ (Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954, art. 1; Rabuffetti & Wills,
2025). Additionally, there is the in-practice development of ‘de facto statelessness’, where
national status is afforded, but without protection of the state. In this case, effective nationality
is lacked (Rabuffetti & Wills, 2025), as the social contract (in the Hobbesian sense) between
the authority providing security for the surrendering of some natural rights by the populace is
ruptured (Hobbes, 1651). In contrast to the Kuwaiti Government’s claim of the Bidoon being
foreign, the group has inhabited today’s Kuwait since before the global conception of the
modern ‘state’ (Rabuffetti & Wills, 2025). Utilising the classification of Kuwaiti society
between bedu (Bedouin and nomadic) and hadhar (settled), the Bidoon are bedu.
With the emergence of Kuwait out of British Protectorate and ensuing growth of political
autonomy, the 1959 Nationality Law afforded citizenship to ‘those persons who were settled
in Kuwait prior to 1920’ (Nationality Law, 1959, art. 1) and to ‘any person born in, or outside,
Kuwait whose father is a Kuwaiti national’ (Nationality Law, 1959, art. 2). This law grounded
citizenship in hadhar status, with Bedouins being offered ‘naturalisation’ in return for
military service – a path the Bidoon never took. This law set the fundamental framework for
the structural exclusion of Bedouin populations in Kuwait. Consequently, a program
systematically targeting the Bidoon population through bureaucratic exclusion from the State
and its structures as well as violent ethnic cleansing began (End Statelessness Foundation,
2019). In 1985, there was an assassination attempt on the then-Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-
Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, which was blamed on the Bidoon despite the Islamic Jihad
Organisation taking responsibility (UK Home Office, 2024). The Amiri Decree 41/1987
officially reclassified the Bidoon from ‘Bedouins of Kuwait’ to ‘Illegal Residents’, stripping
them and any of their kin from their previous access to state services and benefits (UK Home
Office, 2024), intentionally solidifying state exclusion of the group.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait, using claims of financial debt based on
protection of the region’s Sunni monarchies, Iranian expansionism, and an oil dispute to
justify their advance (Imperial War Museums, n.d.). During the conflict, approximately
10,000 Bidoon were coercively expelled, accused of being Iraqi accomplices despite the
Bidoon constituting up to one third of those killed by the Iraqi army (Refugees International
& Open Society Justice Initiative, 2011). This clear example of wartime scapegoating
demonstrates the long-term denial of citizenship and rights for the Bidoon, and their position
as a pawn between regional contenders. During the conflict and its aftermath an estimated
130,000 to 160,000 Bidoon fled the country, primarily to Iraq because they were unable to
reach Saudi Arabia. After attempting to return to Kuwait upon its liberation in 1991, most
Bidoon were denied re-entry, not holding legal citizenship (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In
the following eight months, thousands of Bidoon sought refuge in camps along the Iraqi-
Kuwait border, and the Bidoon population in Kuwait was counted at 125,000, half of its pre-
war size (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In the year 2000, the Kuwaiti government passed the
(seemingly) progressive Law no. 20, permitting the naturalization of Bidoon with an annual
cap of 2000, a mechanism of controlled inclusion rather than positive reform. This
naturalisation maximum was never reached, with citizenship being granted to 1,800 Bidoon in
2005, 400 in 2006, 574 in 2007, and 573 in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Further Kuwaiti institutionalization of surveillance tools and administrative containment of
the Bidoon is evident in the introduction of the ‘Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’
Status’ in November 2010. Inspired by citizen uprisings across the Middle East in the Arab
Spring, the Bidoon began peaceful protests for State recognition in February 2011.
Interestingly, the protests were exhortative of the Emir and Kuwait, non-confrontationally
calling for inclusion in an admirable system (Minority Rights Group International, n.d.). In
March, Kuwait announced a package of 11 rights for the Bidoon, including the right to civil
documentation (Human Rights Watch, 2011). However, the reforms failed to be implemented,
and protests continued into 2014 when Kuwaiti authorities pursued an aggressive crackdown,
utilizing tear gas and rubber bullets on crowds to halt demonstrations (UK Home Office,
2024). This trend evokes a pattern of promised reform to ease international pressure without
concrete action - enabling and reinforcing the weapon of statelessness against the Bidoon.
2015 saw the introduction of a revolutionary plan to solve the issue of Bidoon statelessness,
with the Kuwaiti government’s ‘Comoros Solution’, proposing the granting of Comorian
citizenship for the Bidoon in return for financial investment in Comoros (Rabuffetti & Wills,
2025). This plan will be further explored later in this article. In April 2017, the Kuwaiti
government opened armed force entry for descendants of Bidoon Kuwaiti Army Veterans
(European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, n.d.); a powerful demonstration of
instrumentalization as the stateless were welcomed to sacrifice their lives for the country
which denied them their rights. The concrete effects of such instrumentalized statelessness on
repressed populations is evoked with the suicide of Aye Hamad Moudath in 2019, in response
to governmental denial of the 20-year-old’s civil documentation needed for public services
and employment. His suicide sparked reactive protests which were swiftly quelled by
authorities (UK Home Office, 2024).
In 2022, the weapon of statelessness was critically sharpened for the Kuwaiti government,
with the Court of Cassation closing any final avenue of legal challenge against citizenship
restriction with its ruling that questions of nationality would henceforth solely be under the
executive’s purview (Minority Rights Group International, n.d.). This reform embodies the
trend of democratic erosion in Kuwait, which was significantly propelled with the Emir
Mishal al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al-Sabah dissolving parliament and suspending constitutional
checks on executive power (UK Home Office, 2024). This centralisation of power was
quickly followed by the Decree-Law No. 116/2024 which amended the 1959 Nationality Law
to expand the executive’s discretionary authority over citizenship, enabling the further
weaponisation of statelessness (UK Home Office, 2024). Accompanied by this new power, a
wave of government-driven denaturalisation began with 50,000 Kuwaitis to be stripped of
nationality by August 2025 (Beaugrand, 2011), powerfully illustrating the weaponisation of
citizenship by the government to craft a population which replicates the Kuwaiti elite’s
ideological conception of the national People. The entire history of Kuwait’s construction of
statelessness for the Bidoon is thus proved not as an anomalous case, but a template for
crafted exclusion.
II. Instrumentalization
The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides a powerful framework through which to
deconstruct the instrumentalization of stateless populations, specifically the Bidoon. During
the conflict, Kuwait accused the Bidoon of collaborating with the Iraqi army, framing them as
traitors, despite Iraqi occupation authorities ordering all non-Kuwaiti residents to join their
forces under penalty of death. This coerced nature is neglected in the Kuwaiti claim,
demonstrating their use of the Bidoon as a wartime scapegoat (Human Rights Watch, 1995;
Human Rights Watch, 1993). This was achieved through the attribution of collective guilt,
conflating the individual extorted compliance which occurred to justify and enable
exclusionary measures (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1993; Minority
Rights Group International, 2008). Moreover, the significant Bidoon portion of the Kuwaiti
army was blamed for the military collapse during the invasion (Minority Rights Group
International, 2008), evidencing how the Bidoon role during the invasion was dually painted
for political exclusionary purposes. In the invasion’s aftermath and the liberation of Kuwait,
the Bidoon were labelled as ‘illegal immigrants’ (Beaugrand, 2018) originating from Iraq.
Their tribal origins in the region were bisected by the construction of the Iraq-Kuwait border
(UK Home Office, 2024), setting the basis for their classification as Iraqi by the Kuwaiti
government, their method of exclusion through bureaucratic violence (Bloom, 2022). This
‘illegal immigrant’ label was reinforced by mass military dismissal and prosecution for
alleged collaboration in the aftermath of liberation (Minority Rights Group International,
2008; Human Rights Watch 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1992).
Within the Bidoon population, particularly amongst activist circles, internal division on
reaction to Kuwait’s construction of statelessness evoked the difficulty of resisting the
instrumentalization of such a label (Beaugrand, 2018; Refugees International & Open Society
Justice Initiative, 2011). The dilemma centres around accepting the international legal label of
‘stateless’ which enables access to international legal protections and advocacy, but also
represents an acceptance of the Kuwaiti Government’s claim that the Bidoon are not and
should not be a part of the national population (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2011;
Beaugrand, 2018). This conceptual impasse serves to benefit the Kuwaiti Government with
either resultant path; if the stateless label is accepted, the political threat of the significant
Bidoon population turns to a humanitarian one – a situation preferable and more easily
managed for the Kuwaiti government; conversely, if the label is rejected, the Bidoon remain
without international legal standing and continually at mercy of the Kuwaiti government
(Beaugrand, 2018; Diwan, 2017).
III. The Comoros Solution?
As aforementioned, in 2015 the Kuwaiti government pursued the ‘Comoros Solution’,
exchanging foreign investment into Comoros for Comorian citizenship for the Bidoon
(Rabuffetti & Wills, 2025). This approach is known as citizenship by investment, de-
emotionalising nationality as financial and security concerns are placed above a ‘national
identity’ (Estève, 2026). Kuwait directly modelled their proposed program on the United Arab
Emirates’ model, who had invested $200 million in exchange for Comorian citizenship for
stateless residents (including 4000 Bidoon families) (Džankić, 2019). The Kuwaiti plan was
grounded in the narrative that the Bidoon had concealed their ‘true’ nationalities to seek
citizenship and state benefits, and that thus providing the Comorian passport would correct
their deception (UK Home Office, 2024), outsourcing citizenship to avoid integration. There
were mixed reactions among the Bidoon to the Comoros Solution; some celebrating the
creation of a route to recognised legal residency in Kuwait, with others denouncing the
program as a ‘human trafficking crime’ (Al-Fadhli & Kennedy Nour al Deen, 2019) and
calling for recognition of the Bidoon’s Kuwaiti nationality (Beaugrand, 2018). A critical point
of concern for the Bidoon rested with the risk of deportation. If they were to become
Comorian nationals, and thus foreigners inside Kuwait, they would become deportable.
Therefore, by providing citizenship for the Bidoon, Kuwait would gain the ability to expel
them to Comoros (Lori, 2019).
The Comoros Solution eventually collapsed under Comorian corruption, with over $45
million being embezzled by government members, backchannel passport selling occurring,
and passport quotas being significantly exceeded (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Kuwait’s
own interior ministry responsively terminated the deal, announcing the scheme had been
convicted of receiving bribes for human trafficking (Assemblée de l’Union des Comores,
2017; Rabuffetti & Wills, 2025). Despite its failure, the scheme would still have failed to
address the Bidoon issue justly, instead further promoting the instrumentalization of the
stateless label (in this sense through its resolution), to allow the ostracization of the
population group. Overall, the Comoros Solution was a significant continuation of political
disenfranchisement for the Bidoon – the process was undergone without Bidoon consultation
or consent (Lori, 2019). The proposed plan even failed to provide effective Comorian
citizenship; the passport not entitling entry or residency in Comoros, nor diplomatic
protection from the State (Jain, 2023).
This form of ‘hollow’ imposed foreign citizenship fails to satisfy the International Court of
Justice’s view that
“Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and
duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it
is conferred (. . .) is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring
nationality than with that of any other State” (Nottebohm Case, 1955).
The Comoros Solution does not satisfy this definition, which viscerally connects the concept
of ‘genuine connection’ to nationality, capturing the injustice of imposing foreign citizenship
on the Bidoon. Moreover, the ‘affective’ element of being stateless, where one is rejected
from inclusion in the national community which one associates (or feels ‘genuine
connection’) with, is not satisfied by simply granting citizenship. This argument can further
be directly linked to political sociologist T. H. Marshall’s three stages of citizenship, arguing
that the final contemporary stage is ‘social citizenship’, where access to a minimum level of
economic wellbeing is guaranteed (Marshall, 1963). Through these frameworks it becomes
evident that the Comoros Solution, outside of its clear structural faults, was an attempt to
instrumentalize a population through outsourced citizenship, with the goal of avoiding
integration.
IV. The mechanisms of instrumentalization and exclusion
In exposing the instrumentalization of the Bidoon, it is critical to examine the political and
social mechanisms of this exclusion. Kuwait's Central System for the Remedy of Situations of
Illegal Residents (CARIRS) issues ‘Security Cards’, which act as a gateway to exclusion
rather than rights for the Bidoon (UK Home Office, 2024). Kuwaiti security cards determine
access to basic legal functions of the state, particularly documentation. The tiered access
structure imposed on the Bidoon differentiates exclusion into three levels, ranging from
access to public service with the ‘illegal resident’ label, to complete lack of documentation or
access (Minority Rights Group International, n.d.). The conditional and constantly revocable
nature of the cards enables centralised control over access to state resources and welfare,
promoting marginalization and the State’s influence over the population by enforcing
compliant behaviour in return for access to resources (UK Home Office 2024). Moreover, the
coercive employment of ‘confessions’ by the State forces Bidoon to acknowledge their
‘foreign’ nationality and origin to receive temporary permits, legalising their exclusion and
simplifying stratification against the group (Global Human Rights Defence, 2025).
The state has further pursued the ostracization of the Bidoon from the public apparatus
through an ‘educational apartheid’. Since 1986, Bidoon children have been excluded from the
public school system, forcing them to revert to ‘charitable funds’ which provide an education,
though this is of a lower quality (Mansoor, 2021). This causes the reproduction of a
permanent intellectual underclass, manifesting itself into long-term stratification from
political processes (European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, n.d.). Finally, access
to healthcare is heavily tied to the validity and tier of security cards in Kuwait, meaning those
under ‘security blocks’ (qayd amni, a restrictive label often applied to Bidoon cards) are
effectively barred from surgery or specialised care. This conditional healthcare access for the
Bidoon means their administrative dependency on the state is reinforced, granting it
exclusionary power against the marginalised Bidoon population (Human Rights Watch,
2011). Therefore, the political and social mechanisms of Bidoon exclusion by the Kuwaiti
State enable control through the monopolisation of welfare resources.
V. Conclusion
Conclusively, the systemic marginalisation of the Bidoon is a deliberately perpetuated
mechanism of socio-political exclusion. The Kuwaiti state has transformed statelessness into a
managed weapon of population control, prioritising a conception of national identity above
the Hobbesian social contract which would constitute a just, democratic polity. Despite
(portrayed as genuine) attempts to resolve the Bidoon question through administrative
reforms and the Comoros Solution, they remain thinly veiled strategies of containment
seeking to limit culpability and maintain ostracization. The recent wave of State
‘denaturalisation’ powerfully illustrates how this architecture of exclusion goes beyond the
case of the Bidoon, capturing the erosion of democratic structures during the process of
enforcing the ‘true’ Kuwaiti nationality.
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