Rivalry and Realignment: How Iranian Ambitions in Bahrain Influenced Saudi Action and Strengthened Bilateral Ties Post-1971

March 2025, Article written by Simeon Mihaylov

Introduction

The small island Kingdom of Bahrain has found itself stuck in the middle of a ‘tug of war’ between the regional rivals of Saudi Arabia and Iran, in what some commentators describe as a “new cold war”. Despite a population of 1.4 million, of which approximately 55% are Shia Muslims, along with a total landmass of only 790 sq. km (almost the size of Berlin, Germany), the nation plays a critical role in the Persian Gulf guaranteeing the security of the global oil supply, providing a base of operations for the UK and US naval fleets respectively. Therefore, it is no surprise that since gaining independence from the British in 1971 and following the Iranian revolution of 1979, efforts to situate Bahrain on either side of the political spectrum of the Gulf have accelerated. Potential Iranian influence in Bahrain would not only disrupt the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) but also stir unrest in the Shia-dominated Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

So, what exactly are the key motivations behind the political swaying of Bahrain? How and in what nature has Saudi Arabia responded to Iranian action? Are sectarianism and religion merely used as a tool to sow discontent? Or is the issue at hand geopolitical rather than religious? In this article, I will chronologically examine the extent to which Iranian influence in Bahrain, or attempts to intervene in the country, has, in turn, resulted in Saudi intervention in Bahrain as a response and thus prompted closer ties between the two states, particularly post-1971. Beginning with a brief history of the formation of the Kingdom of Bahrain, commenting on the extent to which Britain’s influence and ‘informal empire’ politically isolated the regime, the modern Iranian claim on the Island of Bahrain, then moving on to the 1981 and finally the 2011 uprisings in Bahrain. It is important to note that up until the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, Saudi Arabia had quite a limited role in Bahraini affairs. That being said, it is exactly this prolonged political isolation which culminated in the vulnerability of the island kingdom to external influences and the general ‘fear’ of Tehran’s ability to stir violence among Shia populations in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as it did in the 70s and 80s (Foley 91).

Formation of Bahrain and British Influence

Similar to the other Gulf states, British influence in the region, both before and after the decision to depart from the Gulf, significantly shaped the political landscape of Bahrain. Although Bahrain was never an official British colony, relations date back to the 1820s with the establishment of the General Treaty of Peace. Since then, Britain enjoyed significant sway in Bahraini affairs through the role of political agents/residents acting as advisors and sometimes even ‘autocratic’ rulers in practice (in the case of Sir Charles Belgrave) (Joyce 6). Apart from the geographical importance of the island to the British, acting as a gateway to India, it was the discovery of oil in 1932 (the first country in the Gulf to do so) that made control over Bahrain even more valuable and began to attract the attention of other regional and global powers.

Following the Second World War, despite the relinquishment of India and other British protectorates, Britain decided to remain firmly situated in the Gulf. This foreign policy decision has been described by post-colonial scholars as an extension of the ‘informal empire’ utilised by Britain throughout the 19th century. In fact, up until the decision of the Wilson Labour government in 1967 to withdraw from the Gulf in the next 4 years, it can be argued that Britain exercised near autonomous control over most international affairs and foreign policy issues in the Gulf through a series of protection treaties. This resulted in Bahrain growing relatively isolated and thus politically shielded from the rest of the world apart from India (due to worker migration and merchants, the Indian rupee was also the currency used in Bahrain until the Gulf rupee in 1959). An anecdote describing the Bahraini isolation in the mid-20th century is provided by Rosemarie Zahlan, “In 1934 the Political Agent in Bahrain received a telegram informing him of an American arriving, a Mr Harding... The Agent panicked as he did not want any Americans in Bahrain, he decided to prevent Mr Harding from entering the country at the airport however once he arrived it turned out he was an Englishman and was allowed in” (21).

Continuing this idea of international isolation in Bahrain, in 1956 British Ambassador Roger Stevens suggested that the “presence of Her Majesty’s Government in the Gulf also prevented Saudi domination of the Gulf’s southern shore” (Joyce 22). This notion helps show that even as early as the 1950s, Saudi intention of controlling Bahrain was noticeable and thus only possible following the ‘east of the suez’ withdrawal. British hegemony in Bahrain is also visible through the ‘UK Naval Support Facility’ (UKNSF) bought in 1935 by the Al Khalifa regime itself, agreements between Britain and Bahrain allowing British only concessions to the oil fields in the east (countering US oil companies) and even by the fact that the Political Resident assigned to the region commanded his own military force known as the Trucial Oman Levies (Sato 11).

The Modern Iranian Claim

If British influence in Bahrain was both dominant and welcomed by the Sunni regime, what were Iran's official claims to the island, and how legitimate were they? An argument used by pro-Iranian commentators lies in the administrative details made by Iran referring to Bahrain as the 14th province of the country since 1957 and the fact that the emirate (officially declared itself a kingdom in 2002) had two representatives in the Iranian parliament (Koohpayeh). Scholars argue that this was primarily done to artificially stress the Iranian claim and thus apply pressure on the local government. As a result, Britain vowed to protect Bahrain from Iran and guarantee the state’s independence (Saab).

A 1951 paper written by Majid Khadduri, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, summarises the modern Iranian claims for Bahrain dating back to November 1927 when the then Persian government sent a note to Great Britain “protesting emphatically against the part of the Treaty referred to (Treaty of protection between Britain and other Gulf Sheikdoms including Bahrain), and looks to the British Government to take steps without delay to nullify its effects” (Khadduri 633). Persian protests stem from their historical ownership of the island following the Safavid Empire’s expulsion of the Portuguese from Bahrain in 1602. It was the Persian perspective that since then, multiple events had transpired (see Khadduri’s paper for a complete summary), which would affirm that the British recognised the island population as part of the Persian realm and therefore could not assume a ‘protective’ status over another country’s province. This note was also sent to the League of Nations and was followed by several correspondences between the two governments. Ultimately, the claim was dismissed by the British in 1929 after Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain challenged the legality of the claims. The League itself also did not take considerable action.

Thus, the importance of British influence in the region is vital in understanding not only the historical context of Bahrain but also the struggle experienced by Persia and later Iran in pursuing their claims over the island. Experts such as Shohei Sato and Toby Matthiesen agree that British presence in Bahrain de facto isolated the state and thus ‘protected’ it from any foreign incursions politically from either Saudi Arabia or Iran. In fact, prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution, it would not be unreasonable to claim that the Americans became the leading influence in Bahrain rather than any regional power in the Gulf (Matthiesen 14).

An Independent Bahrain and the 1981 IFLB Coup

During the process of withdrawal from Bahrain, British diplomatic activity in Iran was centered around securing guarantees of non-intervention in Bahrain from the then-ruling Pahlavi dynasty. In 1970 Shah Mohammed Reza famously renounced the historical claim on the island leading to national discontent, the claim would later be revived and reused by the new Islamic regime (Zahlan 62). Following the official British departure, leading to “bewildered resentment” in Bahrain from the Al Khalifa family (Smith 116), the Gulf states would become internationally recognised for their economic power, especially during the 1973 oil boom coinciding with the Arab oil embargo on the US. According to Zahlan, the self-confidence of the state by the mid-1970s starkly contrasted with Bahrain's initial fear and vulnerability in 1971 (74). This newfound national strength and perception can also help explain Bahraini resistance to external pressures, mainly from the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran post-1979.

Immediately after Ayatollah Khomeini seized power, radio broadcasts from Tehran began spreading revolutionary propaganda in Bahrain (Zahlan 75). Bahrain also experienced minor protests and skirmishes between pro-Khomeini groups and Iranian monarchists mainly in the capital city of Manama. The revolution particularly impacted Bahrain in such a way that the British government warned the British embassy to “keep a watchful eye” on the rising tensions. Revolutionary tension was also amplified by Amir Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa’s decision in 1975 to dissolve parliament and suspend the constitution just two years after its establishment due to legislative deadlock and the unwillingness of parliament to allow an American naval base on the island (Alhasan 605). This culminated in the failed 1981 uprising prompted ‘allegedly’ by Iran and also indirectly led to the first major political, and economic, advances into Bahrain from Saudi Arabia (Joyce 81).

Officially created on January 27th 1976, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) aimed to topple the Al-Khalifa regime, establish a “free Islamic order” and obtain ‘true’ independence for Bahrain, free from British, American or Saudi influence. The organisation included various Shia clerics, the majority of whom came to Bahrain seeking asylum from Baathist persecution in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This included Hadi al-Modarresi, the figurehead of the movement, largely referred to by IFLB sources as the “representative of Imam Khomeini in Bahrain”, who was exiled from Bahrain due to allegations of the IFLB wanting to “import the Islamic revolution” into the Gulf (Alhasan 606). Al- Modarresi relocated to Iran and allegedly supported the movement externally. The coup was planned for December 16th 1981 (Bahrain’s national day). The conspirators, whom the government claimed were trained in Iran, would attack the government offices in Manama and take ministers as hostages. This would be followed by a siege of the national media stations and finally the forceful overthrow of the regime. The plot was discovered just three days before it was supposed to take place. The Bahraini Ministry of Interior arrested 73 individuals and seized “equipment ranging from radios to Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns — and even fake Bahraini police uniforms whose buttons had ‘made in Iran’ stamped on the back” (Cody). Bahrain later expelled a number of Iranian diplomats in response.

Although Iran denied any ‘direct’ involvement in the failed coup, December 1981 was a significant turning point in not only Bahraini but also wider Gulf relations with Iran. It served to intensify the already unstable security conditions in the region due to the Iran-Iraq war and therefore contributed to the general inclination and acceptance of a multistate political organisation in the Gulf to counter Iranian influence. In May of that same year the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) was founded in Riyadh and according to Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, was officially concerned with fostering "greater unity among the Gulf countries for the welfare of the people of the region" (Rizvi 33). Despite the official statements of the council revolving around economic concerns such as oil prices and tariffs, a common thought among commentators such as Rizvi is that the GCC was primarily born out of collective security and defense issues. A meeting between the heads of state of the GCC in January of 1982, a month after the failed coup in Bahrain, resulted in the establishment of a “joint defence command”. They also formulated plans to turn their armed forces into "a mobile, coordinated striking force” (Rizvi 33). It can therefore be argued that Iranian involvement in Bahrain indirectly consolidated the strength of the newly formed GCC by providing it with a need and justification for military considerations. This is relevant as Saudi influence in the GCC is significant and therefore the organisation’s actions can also be inferred as Saudi decisions to an extent, especially in the 1980s. The final outcome of the failed coup was the bilateral mutual security pact signed between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain which effectively displays the impact of the threat posed by Iran, pushing Bahrain closer to the Saudis as a result (Zahlan 171). According to the AIC (American Iranian Council), Saudi Arabia also offered ‘on the ground military support’ to the Al-Khalifa family directly after the foiled plot.

“Gulf Spring”?

“It is a mercenary corps protecting an artificial regime. The more of us they kill, the more powerful we become”. These were the words of Fatima Majid, a Bahraini national who returned to the kingdom to join the anti-regime protests that began on the 14th of February 2011 (Dehghan). The month- long demonstrations aimed to empower the 55% Shia majority and end the monarchy of Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. Taking place mainly in the capital city of Manama and encompassing an estimated 300,000 protestors (POMED) they came to an abrupt end with the entry of the Peninsular Shield Force, the military arm of the GCC. The expeditionary force, consisting of at least 1000 Saudi troops and around 500 policemen from the UAE (Matthiesen 51), was pivotal in countering the protests and reestablishing control over the capital and the famous Pearl roundabout. The largely peaceful protests resulted in an estimated 120 deaths and many more injured along with thousands of arrests by the government. The Al Khalifa regime established martial law for the following months, resulting in an almost ‘counter- revolution’ thus signifying an end to any potential ‘Gulf spring’ in Bahrain. The military intervention in Bahrain has been dubbed ‘an act of war’ by the main opposition bloc al-Wefaq (Chulov) and is another example of Saudi attempts to weaken Iranian influence in Bahrain but also in the surrounding region, especially in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, chiefly Qatif and Al-Ahsa, which contains a Shia majority known as the Baharna. In fact, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is often regarded as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the peninsula due to its vulnerability to revolutionary propaganda and general anti- regime / Sunni sentiment (Matthiesen 72).

Saudi troops crossing the King Fahd causeway on the 14th of March 2011 not only represented the first major GCC military operation since its failure during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 but also the manifestation of Saudi paranoia regarding potential revolt in the eastern province. As mentioned earlier, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia is not only dominated by Shia citizens but is also considered the concentrated melting pot of sectarian issues on the peninsula. Matthiesen describes the Saudi Shia experience as one of “second-class” citizenship due to discriminatory policies in both government and education. There has never been a Shia minister or mayor, and many official positions in the foreign and security services are closed to Shia citizens. Textbooks used in schools also refer to Shia and other sects as ‘unbelievers’, allegedly rejecting the oneness of God (tawhid, a foundational pillar of Islam) which in turn allows for potential ostracism of Shia students (73).

Similarly to the Shia in Bahrain, the first issues in the region were mainly inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution. Failed uprisings in Qatif and Al-Awamiyah were suppressed by the Saudi government and since then sectarianism has prevailed, fostering deep tensions and bigotry mainly targeted towards the Shia minority (Matthiesen 83). It is Toby Matthiesen’s thesis in his book ‘Sectarian Gulf’ that sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shias were not only divisive but also served to “legitimise the GCC monarchies” (111). This allowed Saudi Arabia to exploit these issues at times of political and social instability, as seen in 2011, to justify the suppression of Shia protests even if the demonstrations were purely ‘anti-government’ rather than ‘pro-Shia’. This is relevant in the Bahraini context as the February demonstrations have been widely described as being anti-regime, with Sunni citizens also taking part. What is important here is the narrative being shaped and thus it can be argued that religious issues take a secondary stance in comparison to purely pragmatic geopolitical decisions taken by the GCC and Saudi Arabia, domestically and in Bahrain.

Even though the GCC intervention in March 2011 aimed at weakening Iranian influence and consolidating control, not only on behalf of the Al Khalifa regime in Bahrain but also domestically in the eastern province, it would be misleading to ignore the role of Iranian scapegoating specifically in the 2011 context. During a turbulent period in the Arab monarchies, sectarian problems were ripe. Emboldening minority groups and accelerating protest movements. Despite Iranian support for Shia unrest, which was nothing new in 2011, Saudi Arabia among other GCC countries framed the narrative that Iranian agents were behind various uprisings including the ‘Day of Rage’ protests. This was particularly significant and dangerous as it shaped popular opinion against the Shia citizenry and allowed for general voicing of anti-Shia propaganda which in turn favoured the Sunni regime of King Abdullah.

Since 2011, Bahrain’s political environment has deteriorated, human rights issues are worsening and political freedoms along with the general ‘democratic’ state of the kingdom are consistently ranking low on various indexes such as the IDEA (Global State of Democracy Indices). An apt description of Bahrain post-2011 would be that of authoritarian repression. Rex Brynen comments that the kingdom is intact but society has been “polarised along sectarian and political lines now more than ever” (303). The continued strategy of the regime to partly blame Iran for local instability and discontent has allowed the state to effectively discredit the opposition with very little consequences. In 2016 the government banned the al-Wefaq party (main opposition which held 18 out of 40 seats in parliament in 2010) due to suspected ties to Tehran (Aboudi). Although the party does have a complicated history with Iran, with some leading figures such as Sheikh Ali Salman and Sheikh Isa Qasem facing overwhelming allegations of dissent (Bilal 5), the censoring and banning of political parties is a significant symptom of authoritarianism. This trend was followed in the following year with the banning of another opposition party, Wa'ad, under suspected terrorism charges. Increasing reports of inhumane detention conditions, mistreatment and even torture have ignited human rights activist groups and contributed to international pressure on Bahrain (HRW). The situation in Bahrain can certainly, partly, be attributed to a ‘counter revolution’ attempt by the regime following the 2011 uprisings as written by Toby Matthiesen. A further analysis of these events also points to the role of Saudi Arabia, and to an extent the unified security that the GCC provides, emboldening the regime to take action to consolidate power and remove any potential revolutionary threats from Iran in the meantime.

Conclusion

This article aims to analyse the extent to which Iranian influence in Bahrain, or attempts to intervene in the country, has in turn resulted in Saudi intervention in Bahrain as a response and thus prompted closer ties between the two states, particularly post-1971. Although encompassing a broad time period, thus resulting in gaps and potential uninvestigated factors, it seemed appropriate for the topic at hand. That being said, it by all means does not aim to pass judgement or come to a certain conclusion, especially regarding such a complex and intricate question.

The island kingdom of Bahrain plays an incredibly important strategic role in today's geopolitical landscape, not only in the Gulf but globally. Bahrain’s unique yet shared history of British hegemony and aspects of ‘informal empire’ led to its comparably late inception as a state. As a result, it was, and still finds itself inbetween the two regional powers of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Analysis of events post British withdrawal in 1971, namely the 1981 uprising prompted by Tehran, the creation of the GCC’s military branch and other agreements designed to weaken the newly formed Islamic Republic to the east along with the 2011 uprising, point towards Iranian influence, or the threat thereof, positioning the Sunni led regime in Bahrain closer to Saudi Arabia. It is clear that friendly and supportive relations between the two states would not only weaken Iran but also quell domestic unrest, specifically in the eastern province due to higher control over Shia action in Bahrain. Iranian ambitions in Bahrain certainly played a part in guiding Saudi foreign policy in Bahrain, that being said caution is necessary. The framing of the narrative and the use of sectarian divisions, particularly in 2011, as a tool to consolidate power and reestablish order in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain must be noted. Certainly similar to other geopolitical topics in the area, only time will tell if encroachments into Bahrain from across the Persian Gulf will continue or whether recently restored relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will put this issue to rest.

Bibliography :

Aboudi, Sami. “Bahrain Court Shuts down Main Shi’ite Muslim Opposition Group.” Reuters, 14 June 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/bahrain-court-shuts-down-main-shiite-muslim-opposition-group-idUSKCN0Z018D/.

Alhasan, Hasan. “The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The.” ProQuest, 2011, https://www.proquest.com/docview/922953030/fulltextPDF?parentSessionId=wcTTr7ImESmZGDdM6hD4l0PYPnp%2FctxUdoSwVLX20Hg%3D&pq-origsite=primo&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals

Brynen, Rex, et al. Routledge Handbook on Middle East Security. Routledge, 2019.

Cody, Edward. “Iranian-Backed Coup Bid In Bahrain Reverberates Throughout Persian Gulf.” The Washington Post, 31 Mar. 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/03/31/iranian-backed-coup-bid-in-bahrain-reverberates-throughout-persian-gulf/4f0380cf-375e-4cb4-832c-f7c1ab7c8851/.

Foley, Sean. The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam. Lynne Rienner, 2010.

Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Political Isolation Laws Ban Opposition.” Human Rights Watch, 31 Oct. 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/31/bahrain-political-isolation-laws-ban-opposition.

IDEA. “Bahrain.” The Global State of Democracy, Apr. 2024, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/bahrain.

Joyce, M. Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab Spring. Springer, 2012.

Khadduri, Majid. “Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrayn.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 45, no. 4, Oct. 1951. JSTOR.

Kouhpayeh , Faramarz. “How Iran Lost Bahrain.” Tehran Times, 3 Jan. 2025, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/508251/How-Iran-lost-Bahrain.

Lester, Stephanie. “Iran and the Middle East (Part I: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq) — American Iranian Council.” American Iranian Council, 15 May 2019, https://www.us-iran.org/news/2019/5/15/iran-and-the-middle- east-part-i-bahrain-egypt-iraq?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Mabon, Prof Simon. “Bahrain: The Epicentre of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry?” The Foreign Policy Centre, 12 Nov. 2018, https://fpc.org.uk/bahrain-the-epicentre-of-the-saudi-iranian-rivalry/.

Ahmed, Omar, Middle East. “Remembering the Bahraini Uprising.” Middle East Monitor, 14 Feb. 2021, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210214-remembering-the-bahraini-uprising/.

“POMED Notes: Maryam al-Khawaja – An Update on Bahrain.” Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), 18 July 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20110823050344/http://pomed.org/blog/2011/07/pomed-notes-maryam-al-khawaja-an-update-on-bahrain-2.html/#.Twa9kDX9Oot.

Saab, Bilal. “Iran’s Long Game in Bahrain.” Atlantic Council, 18 Dec. 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/irans-long-game-in-bahrain/.

Chulov, Martin, Guardian staff. “Saudi Arabian Troops Enter Bahrain as Regime Asks for Help to Quell Uprising.” The Guardian, 14 Mar. 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/14/saudi-arabian-troops-enter-bahrain.

Rizvi, Hasan. “Gulf Cooperation Council.” Pakistan Horizon , vol. 35, no. 2, 1982. JSTOR.
Sato, Shohei. Britain’s Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, 1964-1971. 2011. University of Oxford, https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:df0aec03-0426-410e-be60-e5e702647df3/files/m241b3eaf5bafa5aa6a1bf77b380a2e51.

Smith, Simon C. “Imperialism after Decolonization? British Relations with Bahrain from the Withdrawal East of Suez to the Iranian Revolution.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 61, no. 1, June 2024, pp. 115–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2024.2368600.

The Wall Street Journal. “Bahrain: The Tiny Island Playing a Big Role in the Middle East.” Youtube, 23 Dec. 2022, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AhFDcUcFTPU.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Routledge, 2016.