Ally, Rival or Bridge : The Fundamental Foreign Policy Determinants of the Turkish Pivot towards Eurasia

4 janv.

April 2024, Article by Serbey Van Der Goudenhart & Lara Harmankaya

Abstract

This paper examines the political and economic determinants of Turkish foreign policy and seeks to understand which factors serve as the current determinants for the Turkish pivot to Eurasia. The paper uses both theoretical and empirical evidence to argue that Turkiye’s geopolitical position means that it’s abnormally reliant on external powers in shaping its foreign policy. In that respect, Turkiye uses a reactive form of foreign policy while at the same time trying to carve out space for itself regionally in order to exert its own influence. The paper highlights specifically the reactionary foreign policy employed by Turkiye that is motivated by democratic backsliding, the deterioration of Turkish-Western relations and Neo- Ottomanism. The paper concludes by analysing the state of Turkish foreign policy and the implications for the future of this field of scholarship. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the complexities that inform Turkish foreign policy.

Key Concepts : Pivot to Eurasia, Turkiye, Foreign Policy, Democratic Backsliding, Neo- Ottomanism, Turkish-Western Relations

1. Introduction

In the past decade, Turkish national interests have shifted from Europe towards Asia. Notorious for its characteristic position as the ‘bridge’ between the East and West, Turkey has always had an indeterminate global position. Yet, by pursuing its own ambitions to secure autonomy and dominance, Turkey has increasingly distanced itself from the orbits of the Western alliance. Evidence of this can be seen in almost all dimensions concerning its foreign policy: the Turkish-led foundation of the Turkic Council, the de-Europeanisation of Turkiye, deteriorating Turkish-Western relations, and warming Turkish-Eastern relations indicated by move towards the BRICS (Onis, 2011). This evolution of Turkish foreign policy has come to be known as the pivot to Eurasia. From its involvement in the Syrian Civil War to the consolidation of its economic ties with China and Russia, Turkey has followed a foreign policy strategy that is contentious, contradictory and confrontational. Societally, by understanding the deeper motivations and goals of the Turkish government, the decision-making of policymakers can be better informed to work on issues related to Turkish foreign policy or regional politics in Eurasia. In academia, this research can contribute to knowledge about the challenges and opportunities that states face when attempting to direct their foreign policy towards a different region or set of partners. Furthermore, research on this topic can contribute to the study of regional politics in Eurasia, as well as provide insights into how economic and political factors shape foreign policy decision-making more broadly.

This paper will answer the central question: “What are the primary determinants of the Turkish pivot to Eurasia?”. As the academic research is deficient in providing comprehensive, multidisciplinary answers to this question, the research aim of this paper is to gain an understanding of the fundamental tenets of the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. To successfully address this, two sub-questions can be formulated; one tackling the political factors, the second, economic factors.

To answer these questions, this paper will first give an overview of existing literature, and afterwards establish a theoretical framework in which the more complex concepts surrounding Turkish politics and economics will be explored. Following this is a description of the methodology used which comprises historical and literature analysis as well as the operationalisation of the paper’s concepts. We will argue that democratic backsliding, deteriorating Turkish-Western relations, the role of Erdogan and Neo-Ottomanism are the main determinants of the pivot.

2. Literature review

Academic literature synthesising the factors driving Turkish foreign policy are scant. There is one literature (an editorial) written by Erşen & Kostem (2019) that has attempted to approach the topic comprehensively. However, it fails to culminate in a theoretically sound and consistent approach to the pivot to Eurasia due to differing theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis by its authors.

Haugom (1990) employs an agency style of foreign policy analysis, centring his analysis on Erdogan’s influence over the more “assertive, transactional basis” of foreign policy that his government employs. He pins foreign policy changes on President Erdogan by claiming that concentration of executive power in Turkiye means that foreign policy decision-making is now decided directly by Erdogan along with a closed circle of advisors (Haugom 2019). However, this approach is simplistic and assumes that factors outside of Erdogan do not play as significant a role in forming foreign policy.

Altunisik and Martin (2011), however, attribute the shift in foreign policy to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In doing so, the AKP is considered as being accompanied with a broader political trend of a concurrent rise of nationalism and Islamism which is then connected to increasing Turkish involvement in the Middle East (Dalay and Friedman 2013). Alternatively, this determinant is often also connected to Neo-Ottomanism which itself is closely connected to the AKP and Islamism (Erşen & Köstem 2019). While this does deal with domestic political factors, there is a lack of explanation on external factors driving Turkish foreign policy change.

Oguzlu (2019) aims at explaining shifting foreign policy with the widening rift between the North Atlantic community (defined as the US and EU) and Turkiye. As part of this reasoning, Turkish involvement in Syria, Iran, and Israel as well as Turkiye’s problematic accession attempt into the EU are often described as the primary disruptors of the relationship, respectively (Erşen & Köstem 2019, Bayrakli & Ozdemir 2019, Erhan & Sivis 2017). This approach pays attention to the external determinants of Turkish foreign policy; however, it does not provide information on domestic pressures on foreign policy making.

Economic determinants are tied strongly with recent de-Europeanisation in the literature (Duzgit & Kaliber 2016). As a result, Turkiye’s need for new economic partners, which have primarily been China and Russia, has been highlighted (Onis & Yalikun 2021, Onis & Yilmaz 2016). Further attempts have also been made to establish economic ties with Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel (Ozkarasahin 2022). These analyses, while considering economic factors, do not consider politics in their conclusions.

From this research we conclude that there exists a glaring research deficit in the academic debate due to the lack of synthesised research, in English, that is politically-relevant in our contemporary international order. The existing articles on this topic are often too one-dimensional to explain the ongoing multidisciplinary transformations in Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly, this paper is situated in a unique place to serve as a comprehensive, up-to-date, and multidisciplinary attempt to map out the reconstruction of Turkiye’s position in the geopolitical West-East continuum.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Framework for Foreign Policy Change

The theoretical foundation of this study is the foreign policy change framework promulgated by Charles Hermann (1990). His paper conceptualises foreign policy as being a “goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed towards entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdictions” (Hermann 1990). This conceptualisation is broad, which makes it applicable to a wide array of foreign policy related activity. Combined with a thorough analysis of foreign policy change, along with its wide-ranging applicability and different levels of policy analysis, it is Hermann’s key contribution to the literature. Importantly, the framework does not consider the continuous, fine readjustments made to foreign policies but only large-scale changes.

Hermann’s framework of policy changes considers four levels of change, each increasingly more fundamental than the last. The first level of analysis, adjustment changes, are “changes that occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope of recipients” (Hermann 1990). Thus, this first level of analysis considers a surface-level change, how much effort is being put in and how many actors are being targeted.

The second level of analysis is program changes. Program changes are changes in the way that a goal or problem is considered and responded to (Hermann 1990). Adjustment changes tend to be quantitative (which makes sense considering that effort/scope is a two-dimensional measurement, with varying levels of effort). On the other hand, program changes tend to be qualitative and involve a change in the tools of statecraft a country uses to address its problems/goals (Hermann 1990).

Problem/goal changes occur when the “initial problem or goal that the policy addresses are replaced or simply forfeited” (Hermann 1990). The purposes for a foreign policy are replaced or removed entirely, whether this might be because the issue is no longer at the top of a state’s agenda or because the issue has resolved itself.

The last kind of foreign policy change is international orientation changes. These are the most widescale and of the highest level in Hermann’s typology. These involve the “redirection of the actor’s entire orientation towards world affairs” and often involve the “simultaneous change of many policies” (Hermann 1990). Hence, the problem at hand is no longer a single policy, instead, numerous policies are altered at the same time.

The strength of this framework is that the goal, scope, extent and tool approach to foreign policymaking represents the complex nature of foreign policy without the complexification of the framework to a point where it becomes useable only in a niche set of countries/policies. In this article, it will be applied to contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

3.2. Turkish Pivot to Eurasia

The other theory that will be used to construct the theoretical framework is the pivot to Eurasia. This theory refers to the relatively recent reorientation of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP since 2002 towards the East (including Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, and Russia). The strategic rapprochement with the East is seen as a pivot due to it representing a break in the long-established Turkish foreign policy tradition of Europeanisation. Europeanisation in this context refers to the “domestic change in candidate countries within the context of conditional incentives exerted by the EU” (Erdenir 2015). Thus, “de-Europeanisation” refers to the deterioration or reversals of these changes once these incentives are no longer present or attainable.

3.3. Conceptualisations

For democratic backsliding, Bermeos’s (2016) definition will be used, in which she refers to it as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions sustaining an existing democracy”. We will also use Hoffmann’s (2019) conceptualisation of Neo-Ottomanism as increasing Turkish interventionism in ex-Ottoman lands, and Mozaffaris’s (2007) conceptualisation of Islamism as an ideology.

As the aim is to investigate the relationship between these concepts and foreign policy change rather than investigating the concepts themselves, simplicity and clarity is important. The focus will be placed on the application and analysis of these concepts onto the case rather than dwell on differing theoretical approaches.

4. Methodology

4.1. Data Collection & Analysis

The resources examined for this research include historical and literature analysis, as well as case study analysis. Primary data was taken from both academic articles as well as reputable news websites when needed for additional context and to supplement the analysis. This research method was utilised because data sources such as literature analysis provide an explanatory account of events which can be combined with this case study to provide a more nuanced understanding. Furthermore, due to the low level of specific research on the topic, by making use of different sources of data, we aimed to synthesise sources to provide a more complete and accurate image of the landscape. The time frame is set from 2002 to the current day, which reflects the rise of the AKP in 2002 and also coincides with the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy.

4.2. Operationalisation

In this section Hermann’s foreign policy change theory will be operationalised by providing empirical examples at each progressive level.

Adjustment changes are highlighted in Turkey's desire to be an energy hub which has led it to strike deals more hastily with Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline (Avdaliani 2021). Meanwhile, program changes can be seen in the concentration of foreign policy-making in Erdogan’s hands; it has gone from becoming a government consensus decision to becoming centralized under Erdogan and a few of his confidants.

Problem/goal changes are seen in Turkiye’s move away from the ‘Strategic Depth’ doctrine of Ahmet Davutoglu and into more pragmatic policy decisions that may deteriorate Turkiye’s relationship with its neighbours, but which benefit Turkiye. Operation Olive Branch, which saw a Turkish military incursion into northwest Syria to combat Kurdistan’s Worker’s Party militants (PKK) can be seen as an example of such (Cavusoglu 2018).

The last kind of foreign policy change is international orientation changes, and this is seen with the Turkish pivot to Eurasia as it represents a widescale redirection of the state’s geopolitical orientation.

5. Analysis

5.1. Democratic Backsliding & Diverging Values

Turkey, in the 20th century, was a central ally of the USA and the Western camp (Hoffman, 2019). Rather than participating in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War era, it was often a facilitator of American pursuits in the Middle East. Despite slight differences between the foreign policy conducted by its different prime ministers, a general alignment with Western foreign policy was observable. Moreover, the Europeanisation of Turkiye since the early 2000s had resulted in closer ties with the European Union (EU) due to the ease of political and economic relations that had originated from the recognition that mutual cooperation would be beneficial for both parties. However, the subsequent de-Europeanisation of Turkiye at the start of the 2010s has meant that Turkiye has gradually begun to institutionally move away from the EU in the spheres of both economics and politics (Toygur et al. 2022). At the same time, the EU’s attitudes towards Turkey in today’s geopolitical climate have also been reduced to ‘strictly transactional’ (Ozel, 2023).

To examine why, it is important to explore what makes something distinctly European. European institutions, both political and economic, are rooted in EU values which consist of concepts such as democracy, rule of law, and liberalism. These are also the values around which regulations, institutions and laws are built (European Union n.d). Following the 2016 coup and the 2017 referendums that have transformed Turkey into its idiosyncratic Presidentialist system, Erdogan’s authoritarian grip on the country has gained in potency. The repression of political dissent, imprisonment of journalists and the passage of a new disinformation bill are all indicative of this (Esen, 2022). Hence, as Turkey moves away from liberal constitutionalism, it simultaneously also diverges from commonalities with EU values.

These EU values are mostly shared by the US and are a large factor behind deteriorating Turkish- American diplomatic relations. This is seen empirically with diverging foreign policy decisions in the wider Middle East, ranging from Syria to Iran to Iraq (Gulmez 2020). These differences in threat perception have resulted in several diplomatic incidents which have deteriorated relations between what was once America’s second closest partner in the Middle East region (Cook 2018). This divergence is further seen in the Turkish decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from Russia, despite repeated American warnings that it would be kicked out of the F-35 fighter jet programme (BBC 2019). The topic of USA’s support for the YPG, the Kurdish militant group situated near the southern borders of Turkey, has also antagonized relations (Toygur et al. 2022).

This divergence in values is compounded further by the different approaches of EU policymakers and Turkish policymakers. EU partnerships tend to be value-based and consequently tend to restrict states like Turkiye that might not necessarily subscribe to these values, nor find the economic incentive worth the trade-off.

Thus, Turkiye has had more freedom to pursue economic relationships with rising and re-emerging Asian states such as Russia and China, which tend to be less value-based and more transactional. This is highlighted in China’s One Belt One Road Initiative, known for not demanding the political or economic restructuring of its client states (Seibt 2021). As these economic ties are not dependent on values, Turkiye is free to take on a more assertive form of diplomacy and statecraft in its key policy areas in the Middle East, Caucausus, and Central Asia without being restricted by EU values. Beyond its search for economic alliances, its acceptance of Eurasian political ties have also been clear in its alliance with Russia and Iran in the Astana peace process in Syria. However, despite the departure from Turkish self-isolation in the Middle East and Turkish commitments to forge connections with other emerging powers, it still cannot be argued that Turkey has managed to integrate well into the Middle East. Suspicions from the UAE over its military deployments in Qatar and Sudan and its more overt presence in geopolitically-significant MENA locations has meant that Turkey has not truly embedded itself in a sustainable Eurasian or Middle Eastern alliance (Hoffman, 2019). Turkey remains, in this sense, a solitary player in international relations.

The democratic backsliding of Turkiye, resulting in a preference for non-values-based partnerships, could be seen as either a problem/goal change or an international reorientation. A problem/goal change could be argued; the goal of Europeanisation has been transformed into de-Europeanisation in favour of strenghtening relations with countries that will not hinder Turkish foreign policy goals. However, the extent to which de-Europeanisation is prioritised and new partnerships are being developed indicates that there is a far greater scope than a simple problem/goal change. Therefore, it can be concluded that this de-Europeanisation represents an international orientation on Hermann’s foreign policy framework.

5.2. Neo-Ottomanism and the role of religion: Turkiye as a Tri-Regional Power

The second major determinant of Turkish foreign policy is its desire to become the frontmost regional power in the Middle East, Caucasus, and the Balkans through a policy of Neo-Ottomanism. The legacy of Turkey’s imperialist history is inseparable from its current forms of nationalism and perceptions of national threats and vulnerabilities (Haugom, 2019). Owing to military interventions in Libya and Syria, numerous stand-offs with Greece regarding the Aegean, along with close relations with Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo and military support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkish interventionism is evident in all three of these regions.

Strategic Depth, first established by the ex-Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, was designed as a foreign policy agenda through which Turkiye would aim to strengthen its relationships with neighbouring countries and establish close partnerships (Tüysüzoğlu 2014). However, owing to a program change, the Strategic Depth doctrine cannot be seen in the development of Turkish foreign policy today and has effectively been abandoned by Erdogan which can be seen by the political developments detailed below.

Neo-Ottomanism, being closely connected to Islamism and the AKP-ideology, strongly informs Turkish foreign policy and spurs on regional activism. It strikingly contradicts the fundamental values of the Kemalist secularist republic, as well as the Kemalist aversion to interference in the Middle Eastern demonstrated in Ataturk’s famous motto: ‘Peace at home, peace abroad’ (Jung, 2011).

Contemporary regional power projections by Turkiye can be seen as a combination of neo- Ottomanism tinged with 21st century diplomacy and strategies. Examples of the intersection of Islamism and Neo-Ottomanism can be seen in warming relations between Turkiye and Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Anadolu Agency 2021, Ozturk 2022, Daily Sabah 2022). Turkiye’s in-depth involvement in the Syrian crisis in the form of operations Euphrates Shield in 2016 and Olive Branch in 2018, also evince this, and are now succeeded by a gradual normalisation of relations (Gurbuz 2022). Beyond these are Turkiye’s attempts to foster strategic partnerships in Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Yuksel & Engin 2021; Hakkı Taş 2022) as well as attempts to position itself as an energy and transport hub (Tüysüzoğlu 2014).

From our analysis thus far, we see that neo-Ottomanism has sparked a wide scale shift in foreign policy towards economic, military, and social investment in the East in an attempt to impose dominance in the region. This paradigm shift requires not only vast resources, but also the vast political will needed to simultaneously redirect foreign policy. Thus, when analysed under Hermann’s framework, this kind of foreign policy change can only be viewed as international reorientation away from the West and towards the East and not anything less as it involves a change in scope, method, and aim altogether.

5.3. Domestic politics, the instrumentalization of religion and Erdogan

The Turkish pivot to Eurasia has occured parallel to its marked departure from the Western modes of acceptable behaviour in the Middle Eastern geographical sphere. Turkish interventionism in the past two decades, observed by many political figures in the West as contradictory to “conventional universal liberal patterns of acceptable interventionism” (Hoffman, 2019) has been characterized by its deployment of military forces to its neighbors, Iraq and Syria, and its overall more hostile and aggressive nature. What renders these developments particularly significant is that they have a prevalent correlation with the the consolidation of Erdogan’s power within Turkish politics, especially after the 2016 coup and the beginnings of the new Presidentialist system in Turkey. Thus, Erdogan’s ‘strongman’ role as an influence on Turkish foreign policy is unignorable.

Born from the ashes of the Refah Party’s Islamic identity-focused foreign policy, as its reformed successor, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Erdogan’s reigns, has repeatedly employed anti-West discourse and mediatory involvement in regional affairs in order to improve its global stature. From Davutoglu’s ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors’ policy and ‘Strategic Depths’ doctrine in the early 2000s to the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine, it can be seen that AK Party has reimagined and reformulated its foreign policy following changes in the international order. However, its fundamental goal of ascending Turkey to a central geopolitical role in the region has persisted (Dalay and Friedman, 2013).

Erdogan’s emphasis on religious narratives when describing his policy of regional détente is also worth noting; recent ‘normalisation’ of relations with Saudi Arabia, marked by visits between Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Saudi Arabia and Turkey respectively, are framed in the language of seeking ‘friends’ and embracing religious similarities. In reality, the return of cooperation and the removal of the restrictions on trade between the two countries are strongly motivated by the Turkish search for trade relations during its time of economic fraility (Cuskun and Gumruckcu, 2022).

Erdogan’s recognition that the use of religious and anti-West rhetoric wins votes at home has historically consolidated his constituent base at home. However, despite his re-election in 2023, he remains under the strong scrutiny of the Turkish population. The domestic situation in Turkey is dire; inflation rates have skyrocketed along with the cost of living, the lira has plummeted, social discontent runs rampant among the population, and cultural polarizations continue to fuel tensions. Thus, moves to produce a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect have been prioritized over the past few years. By declaring the YPG and the PKK in Northern Syria as the central enemies of Turkish sovereignty, for instance, the administration has deliberately placed questions of territorial integrity at the forefront of public attention. Likewise, Erdogan’s staunch opposition to Sweden’s NATO accession and unabashed defiance of the West has won him praise from nationalists at home. Leveraging Turkey’s veto power and status as the country with the second-biggest military within NATO, Erdogan has shown his willingness to oppose Western mechanisms to pursue his own interests. He has managed to maintain the diplomatic connections to other Western powers through NATO, while also building alliances with non-Western states through its pivot to Eurasia. As a consequence, foreign policy has become a means to evade the pressing demands at home and force the public to look outwards.

It is important to note that Islam has been instrumentalized to induce national cohesion and curry favor from the public since the beginnings of multipartyism in Turkey (Jung, 2011). Rather than following a coherent doctrine based on Islam and Islamic principles, Erdogan’s foreign policy has favored strategic gains. Overall, his political astuteness lies in his ability to conduct foreign policy that is independent of religious ideology with religious justifications that satisfy the domestic public. This is precisely how he has implanted his persona deeply into Turkish internal and international politics, and the reason why he is likely to be the central director of its direction in the years to come.

5.4. Deteriorating West-Turkiye Relations

The last major determinant of Turkish foreign policy is the status of the East and West economically and politically. Turkiye’s position as a middle power, both politically and geographically, means that its position in the international stage is precarious. Moreso, its characteristic placement halfway between East and West, as a political and cultural ‘bridge’ nation, makes it especially susceptible to changes in power structures and dynamics.

The recent rise of the East as a centre of power economically, militarily, and politically means that Turkiye has the option to reliably pivot to the East. Especially with the catastrophic economic situation at home, it is also notable that Turkey has increasingly been looking to the Gulf countries, China and Russia as potential trade allies to help finance its process of economic recovery. It is no coincidence that the current Minister of Treasury and Finance’s first trip abroad was to the UAE (Ozel, 2023). However, the long-term success of such a pivot depends wholly on whether the East can maintain its prominence or more accurately, its convenience for Turkiye as a partner. The East currently presents itself as the favourable option due to the failure of Turkish-EU accession as well as differing policy decisions between the U.S and Turkiye, notably exacerbated by US partnership with the YPG in northern Syria (Toygur et al., 2022)

Another incentive lies in Turkiye’s desire to become a regional power and thus a power-broker, a role that would require Turkiye to navigate its relations between East and West rather than firmly siding with either. This is exemplified by its role in brokering in the Black Sea Grain Initiative between Russia and Ukraine and its current mediation in talks to revive it (Macias, 2023). Its ambivalent position in the conflict, as both a condemner of Russian claims on Ukrainian lands and as one of the states who reject participation in sanctions against Russia, is further representation of its larger increasingly-ambivalent positioning in the Western alliance and beyond. Earlier Turkish governments saw Turkiye firmly aligning itself with the West, which serves as a reminder of the dynamism that exists in Turkish foreign policy.

The biggest determinant of Turkish foreign policy, however, is not to do with internal factors such as the strength of the Turkish economy or the status of democracy, but with external factors that Turkiye can take advantage of to improve its standing in geopolitics. The significance of realpolitik in Turkish foreign affairs cannot be ignored – like many nations in the world, its stance on global issues has emanated not from ideological or religious pursuits, but from its pragmatic geopolitical concerns. The glaring example of this is its ever-contradictory relations with Israel and periodic support for Palestinians – seen by many as a “political expediency” to win domestic political support (Jung, 2011). Similarly, Erdogan’s waning interest in offering safe asylum to the repressed Uyghurs in China is indicative of the selectiveness of his Islamic solidarity in foreign policy.

A closer look into the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean can prove to be of merit when evaluating the strains in the relationship between the EU, Turkey and other foreign powers in the past decade. Starting with its interventions in Cyprus in the 1960s, culminating in the 1974 invasion, Turkish presence in Cyprus marked an important instance of Turkish interventionism that was not in accordance with Western motivations in the region. Thus, it is evident that displays of Turkish independence in foreign affairs have long been rooted in its history. In the 21st century, Turkey’s trust in Western cooperation diminished as Western powers publicly, financially and militarily supported Syrian Kurdish forces fighting ISIS. On top of this, Western attitudes in the aftermath of the 2016 Coup attempt were interpreted by Erdogan and the Turkish government with suspicion and blame (Toygur et al. 2022). Therefore, it was within this atmosphere of growing hostility that provocations with Greece over Exclusive Economic Zones developed. Similarly, the impact of the nationalist ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine and its justifications for involvement in Libya were arguably also a reflection of Turkey’s feeling of diplomatic isolation.

It is evident that foreign policy decisions do not exist in a vacuum; the changing conceptions of Western powers and their potential for cooperation, or lack thereof, influence the Turkish resorting to self-reliance in foreign affairs. Turkey’s exclusion from the EastMed Gas Forum and its subsequent deployment of military forces in the Eastern Mediterranean is indicative of this (Adar et al. 2020). Fearing the alignment of its enemies more than anything, the Turkish pivot to both confrontational methods and the East is thereby a product of its interpretations of the behavior of other international actors. In other words, the observable clashes between the Western bloc (in the form of EU) and Turkey are intrinsically linked to Turkish vulnerabilities and the belief that autonomous actions are required to achieve a respectable global status.

Quantifying this determinant on Hermann’s foreign policy framework is difficult because the goal of the Turkish state is to take advantage of the political balancing game between East and West. This requires international reorientation but here, international reorientation is the means and not an end. Regardless, it is evident this determinant is indeed international orientation because it cannot be anything else. The constantly-changing relationship between states and Turkiye is only a by-product of Turkiye’s pursuit of being a regional power, and not a form of adjustment change. This is not a problem/goal change – the goal of the Turkish state has been to ensure its position as a regional power since Ottoman times.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has investigated the primary drivers of the pivot to Eurasia. In our analysis, we have shown that democratic backsliding, Neo-Ottomanism, and the deterioration of the Turkish- Western relationship are the most important determinants of this pivot, which all inextricably relate to the rise of the AKP and the particular role of Erdogan. They signify the varying, and oftentimes contradictory, ambitions of Turkish foreign policy. Its desire for integration in the Western liberal order, while also striving for regional hegemony and recognition from other rising global powers, all complicated by its pressing financial needs, has painted a picture that is as complex as its unidentifiable global positioning. This article has also reaffirmed the applicability of Hermann’s foreign policy framework and therefore its value to the literature of foreign policy analysis.

The relevance of Turkish foreign affairs in the field of international relations is substantial. As we have shown, its reorientation is the amalgamation of decades’ worth of history, as well as domestic, religious, economic and political considerations. It is in itself a reflection of the conflicting national identity of Turkey and its geopolitical presence in the region. The role of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is undeniably extensive; given the re-election of Erdogan in May 2023, the hold of Erdogan and his close-circle over foreign policy decision-making looks as though it is here to stay.

Thus far, Turkey’s reorientation has been ever-evolving and reactionary in nature, with ambiguities that are tightly scrutinized by international actors in both the East and West. Whether it is diplomatic relations with the EU, the USA or Russia in question, it is clear that Turkey is both deeply embedded in networks of international alliances and equally isolated from them. It has both stoked and resolved conflict, even more so in recent years. Understanding the complex dimensions behind the fluctuating attitudes of this major ‘bridge’ nation is thereby vital to analyze the future trajectory of the increasingly multipolar contemporary global order.

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Lucas Desgardin