Al Taef Accord: Rebuilding Lebanon

May 2024, Article by Jad Toufic Toutinji

In 1975, Lebanon fell into a detrimental civil war (or wars, to be more precise), which caused the death of more than 150,000 people and the emigration of over a million Lebanese. The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) exploded as a result of inter community tensions, realigned into interreligious segregation, between the Palestinian refugees, headed by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), alongside their Muslim-majority Lebanese National Movement (LNM) allies, against the Christian-majority Lebanese Front (LF). Even if the first stage of the war (1975-1976) was mostly a ‘local’ military confrontation between ‘local’ fronts, this conflict had been prompted and supported by different regional and international actors since its beginning, as the next stage will depict. The disastrous conflict would greatly expand to include actors such as Israel, Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, KSA and the Iranian revolutionary regime. It expanded to become part of the proxy wars within the Cold War between the US, the USSR, and their respective allies. Al Taef Agreement (1989), otherwise known as ‘The National Reconciliation Accord,’ is the renowned agreement that stopped the Lebanese civil war.

In the context of the near-failure of Lebanon's state and economy since 2019, many Lebanese people have begun searching for the root causes and solutions to this crisis. Many seem to blame Al Taef as a cause of this weakened state, while others, even if acknowledging its imperfections, still consider Al Taef as a way to salvation and prosperity if properly applied by the state.

A Briefing on the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990)

The Lebanese Civil War erupted on April 13, 1975, as a result of multiple factors that are highly contended. Mainly, it is a consequence of the uninterrupted, dominant presence of conventional community leaders in Lebanese politics; in other words, these leaders are persistently trying to resist being marked down as war criminals by history. Nonetheless, some evident reasons remain known and generally accepted.

In 1969, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had been authorised via the Cairo Agreement to resist Israeli occupation from Lebanon’s southern borders. The presence of the PLO caused Israeli responses, which significantly affected Lebanese civilians and infrastructure in the southern regions. Moreover, the PLO’s influence in Lebanon grew stronger as it entrenched more and more into Beirut militarily in an attempt to secure an unhampered resistance from the south. As a consequence, a division in Lebanese politics quickly appeared with regard to the PLO’s right to resistance between Arab nationalists and sympathisers, later the LNM, and Lebanese nationalists, the LF. Not to neglect the Syrian, Israeli, US, and USSR indirect interventions and support for different parties, which ignited the wars and weaponized the militias.

Ever since its independence, Lebanon has been under a political system that entailed a 6:5 ratio of Christian-Muslim parliamentary seat distribution, respectively. The president, which by convention was Christian Maronite, had constitutional powers which caused a disproportionate socio-religious representation in politics. This imbalance of representation was first recorded in the 1958 “mini civil war”, and then in the events nearing the start of the civil war. The more rapid population growth in the Muslim community in comparison to the Christian community resulted in a change in demographic balances which exacerbated the feelings of contempt by Muslims who felt neglected from the political scene. Many attempts were made to implement reforms to the system but to no success.

Another essential reason for the war is the disproportional economic and social developments across Lebanon’s regions – between Beirut and other cities and rural areas. This unequal development would create further distrust in Lebanon’s political system, especially in the Shiite-majority southern regions which were also bombed by Israel, and in the northern regions of Lebanon. The suburbs of Beirut had been severely neglected and slowly became areas of endemic weaponization by the PLO or the LF, especially as refugee camps existed in these suburbs. Indeed, the war ignited in Ayn al-Rumana, one of Beirut’s suburbs, in what came to be known as the “Ayn al-Rumana incident.”

The war recorded several invasions: two Syrian invasions in 1976 and 1987 and two Israeli ones in 1978 and 1982. Lebanon also saw the presence of American forces and its allies, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Arab forces. The civil war also recorded several cross-sectarian and inter-sectarian militia conflicts chiefly as a consequence of conflicts between warlords.

The 1976 Syrian invasion came in an attempt to “stabilise the country” after the Christian militias had lost major grounds to the PLO and the Muslim militias. This invasion was legitimised by a request from Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh. In reality, the latter had brokered a deal with his close Syrian friend to save the weakened Christian militias in the context of the ongoing war. For the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, however, the invasion was part of his multi-faced role as a PLO supporter and Christian defender. The goal behind al-Assad’s tactics was to ensure Syrian influence over Lebanon, to limit the PLO’s power to a Syrian proxy in order to gain leverage in future peace deals, and to protect Syria from the danger of an Israeli expansion in Lebanon.

In 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in an attempt to stop PLO incursions into its northern borders. This invasion benefited for a great part not only the Christian militias that had been fighting with their ex-Syrian allies but also the Shiite militias and Shiite population, which at the start welcomed the invasion to stop the consistent war in Southern Lebanon seen as a result of the Palestinian resistance.

In 1982, the Christian Phalange Party under Bachir Gemayel requested the intervention of Israel in Lebanon. The targets of this invasion were to push out Syrian influence from Lebanon, destroy the PLO, and create a Christian-dominated Lebanese state which would make peace with Israel. In other words, Bachir Gemayel was elected president as a consequence of this invasion. His assassination in 1982 would hamper the supposed peace deal, which would be followed up by Bachir’s successor, Amin Gemayel, through mainly the May 17 agreement, which entailed a plan on the retreat of the Israeli army and the normalisation of ties. However, because of Syrian and external pressure, the agreement would not be properly implemented.

In 1987, Syria invaded Lebanon for the second time and would remain in the country until the Cedars Revolution in 2005. Syria had got an American ‘green light’ to invade in exchange for a potential hostage release from the PLO and Hezbollah. Hafez al-Assad, however, never stopped interfering in the war; in fact, it is argued that he had a hand in the Muslim militias’ fighting in West Beirut in order to create ground for military intervention. The PLO had been regaining ground within the fighting in West Beirut through its allies the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) against the Amal Movement party. Accordingly, Syria was held responsible for maintaining the balance of power in West Beirut while taming the PLO’s power. Consequently, Hafez al-Assad managed to officially assert influence at a time when the next presidential election was nearing and a potential regional peace deal, hence also a Lebanese peace agreement, was in close sight.

All throughout, several assassinations took place, notably that of Kamal Jumblatt (1977) and Bachir Gemayel (1982) and horrific massacres were committed by all parties, such as Tel Al Zaatar in 1976 (around 1500-3500 deaths), Damour in 1976 (582 deaths), Sabra and Chatila in 1982 (500-3500 deaths), and the October 13 1990 (740-940 deaths) massacres.

As the war began to end in 1989, around the time the Taef Agreement was signed, many actors were taking part in the civil war: Syria controlled most Muslim areas, thus de-facto the several inter-fighting Muslim militias, and Israel was still in southern Lebanon facing resistance from Hezbollah supported by the Iranian regime. As for the Christian-majority area marked by East Beirut, it was semi- independent under the Lebanese Army headed by Michel Aoun, and the LF headed by Samir Gaegae. Despite seeming calmer, there was strong competition between the different Christian leaders aiming to become President.

Similarly, the political situation was severely worse: there were two ‘legitimate’ governments and a vacant presidency for over a year and a half. This political division was the result of a failure to elect a President after the end of Amine Gemayel’s term, thus leaving Michel Aoun as a Christian prime minister and Selim al Hoss as the Muslim prime minister. Indeed, it is within this political context that the Al Taef agreement was created as the paper will continue to explain.

Internal Buildup

As aforementioned, by the end of the war, there was the separation of government into two, each of which was headed by a Christian: Michel Aoun and Muslim Selim al Hoss, respectively. More importantly, however, the race for the presidency had been tense with Syrian, Israeli, American, French and Vatican intervention to push for potential candidates that both the Christian and Muslim militias would agree on while maintaining a relative geopolitical reconciliation.

The search for the next president began in 1985-1986, around two years before the end of Amin Gemayel’s term in 1988; nevertheless, his term ended with a vacant presidency and the designation of the Chief of Army, Michel Aoun, as prime minister. The rupture of the government into two was because it was (and still is) the norm that a Muslim Sunni is a prime minister as a means of balance of sectarian power. As a consequence, Selim al Hoss, the prime minister since 1987 under Amin Gemayel, refused to transfer his position to Michel Aoun seeing that it would be illegitimate for a Christian Maronite to be prime minister, so he reassembled his government as a parallel one. Indeed, it would be later seen that the arrival of Michel Aoun as prime minister was the main reason for the forging of the Taef agreement and its acceptance by most parties, except Michel Aoun and his allies.

Over 2 years and a half, 6 attempts took place to agree on a common successor to Amin Gemayel. Most of these talks would be between both President Gemayel and President Hafez, the latter being due to Syria’s major influence in West Beirut, especially after its occupation in 1987. Yet, these talks were bound to fail as a result of miscommunication or, more precisely, external interventions and personal interests of Amin Gemayel, Michel Aoun and Samir Gaegae. As for al-Assad, he opposed several name propositions which he deemed would not benefit Syrian presence, mainly Michel Aoun who would launch a ‘liberation war’ against Syrian forces in 1989-1990. Regarding the US and France, the former made several mediations in an attempt to find an acceptable candidate, while the latter aimed early on to extend the presidency of Amin Gemayel, in vain.

The remarkable note of these negotiation attempts to elect a president was that obstruction often came from internal factions rather than geopolitical ones. In 1985, a Tripartite Accord was signed between LF leader Elie Hobeika, PSP’s Walid Jumblatt, and Amal Movement’s Nabih Berri, under the mediation of president Hafez al-Assad. Even if this accord was not directly related to the election of the presidency, its reverberations would have potentially led to a smooth transfer of power had it worked. However, it was Michel Aoun, Samir Gaegae and President Gemayel who deposed Elie Hobeika in a sort of ‘Christian coup d’état,’ accusing him of treason for negotiating with the Syrian regime. In reality, all three of them did not want to give too much power of Christian representation to Elie Hobeika, in fear that it would be at their expense, especially in the future presidential elections. It would be, as a result of the ‘coup d’état,’ that President Hafez will refuse to negotiate directly with Gemayel for a considerable period of time. Nevertheless, in 1986, another indirect attempt took place, but talks were soon hampered due to the assassination of Prime Minister Rachid Karami, which the Syrian government believed President Gemayel and the LF had a part in.

More importantly, a major opportunity for reconciliation took place in the 1988 Arab Summit in Algeria when talks resumed between both presidents, and presidential names were being proposed. President Hafez would later ask that President Gemayel, in coordination with the head of the Maronite church, send a name of three possible presidential candidates, out of whom al-Assad would choose one. Despite this optimistic news, Amin Gemayel would not resume negotiations, thus not send a list of possible candidates, claiming that he distrusts the close relationship between President al-Assad and his envoy. The sudden change in mindset was a consequence of a ‘French hint’ that President Gemayel received on his way back from Algeria via President Mitterrand’s advisor Francois de Grossouvre about the possibility of extending his presidential term.

Another final attempt, from the many others which sometimes involved French and American diplomats, was on the last day of president Gemayel’s term. After several mediations between Lebanese deputies and politicians, a final proposal was made that the LF would agree on Mikhael Daher as president, under the condition that there is no binding agenda attached. Nonetheless, after agreeing to meet, the LF would change their mind and send their refusal of the agreement. Accordingly, President Gemayel’s visit to president Hafez was a failure before it took place. Surprisingly, despite this previewed failure, the talks between both presidents in Damascus had gone well; however, just when an agreement was being made, President Gemayel received a message that the LF’s Samir Gaegae and Michel Aoun had met in Lebanon, thus making President Amin think that a coup d’état had happened. As usual, the talks ended with no agreement as a result of internal factions and their self-interests.

An hour before the end of his presidential term, Michel Aoun would be assigned as prime minister which Selim al Hoss would challenge with his own government. Even if President Amin should have constitutionally transferred the power to Selim al Hoss, the former tactfully did not in order not to hand over all the executive power to the Muslim militias under the Syrian regime. Moreover, President Amin could have assigned the LF’s Samir Gaegae as prime minister however, the former also thought it would be better not to concentrate the political and military control of the Christian region solely in the latter’s hands.

Geopolitical Reasons

Despite the several attempts at peace that have taken place since 1975, some of which will be discussed below, there has never been an intersection between international, regional and local interests to be able to produce a long-lasting peace deal. In 1988-1990, the geopolitical base to end the war had been finally formed.

The US called for a peace deal for several years, especially post-1983 attack by Hezbollah which killed more than 400 American soldiers. In its main foreign policy goals, the US was trying to expand its influence in the region, stabilise oil markets, and protect Israel.

In 1987, the US gave Syria the ‘greenlight’ to invade and prevent the resurgence of the PLO in West Beirut, while also demanding that Syria releases the foreign hostages in Lebanon. It was also in the benefit of Hafez al-Assad to intervene in order to prove to the international community that Syria is capable of maintaining peace in Lebanon and thus request further power to interfere.

After the rupture of government, the US aimed to end the war once and for all in preparation for an Arab-Israeli peace deal to follow. Moreso, it was in an attempt to stop Saddam Hussein’s and Iranian expansions into Lebanon through Michel Aoun and Hezbollah, respectively, thus endangering Israel and the region’s stability in case of a Baathist or Iranian bloc. It would be in this context that the US would continuously push Michel Aoun to come to terms with the Syrian regime. However, when Aoun’s stubbornness and continuous Iraqi support propelled him to launch the ‘Liberation War’ in 1989, seven months prior to the Al Taef negotiations, the US shifted sides to lean more towards Syrian interests. Accordingly, the US and Syria would refuse the adjustment of the Reforms section in al Taef (III, part 2.D and 4) because it preserved the Syrian military presence in Lebanon.

As to France and the Vatican, there was a general understanding that a peace agreement was being arranged. With Christian interests in mind, both tried to prolong Amin Gemayel’s presidency to not enter a presidential void that would further weaken the Christian groups in Lebanon. Later on, after the Taef was signed, both would insist in vain on convincing Michel Aoun to agree to the agreement in hopes of avoiding a military attack by the post-Taef government, supported by Syria and the Arab League, on the Christian-controlled areas.

For Saddam Hussein, aiding Michel Aoun was a strategy to expand his influence in Lebanese politics; most importantly, it was an attempt to provide his regime with more political and military gains within the future Lebanese and regional peace deals. Then, Saddam Hussein’s tactics served to limit Syrian growth in Lebanon, counter-Iranian support of Hezbollah, specifically during and after the Iran-Iraq war, and threaten Israel via its northern border. After all, it is in the Iraqi Baathist’s ideology to form an Arab nation in the Levant extending from Iraq to Lebanon and Palestine, so it includes a fight against Syrian Baathists, Iranian Islamic arc and Israel. In addition, Saddam saw the relationship between Lebanon and Syria as similar to the one between Iraq and Kuwait. In the Casablanca Arab Summit 1989, he indirectly warned that letting Syria intervene in Lebanon would allow a precedent for Iraq to invade Kuwait, seeing that Syrian and Iraqi Baathists consider Lebanon and Kuwait, respectively, as part of their entity and a colonialist consequence.

For Hafez al-Assad, apart from having similar expansionist goals with Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, it was also a matter of sovereignty. Throughout the war, Hafez al-Assad made sure to interfere in Lebanon to ensure that Israel would not advance militarily into his neighbour territory or make peace with the Lebanese, thus surrounding Syria from the south and the west. It was essential for him that Syria controlled Lebanon by the time a Lebanese and regional peace was forged to ensure that his regime would have significant gains and reduce the losses. This fear of a peace deal between Lebanon and Israel had been the result of the May 17 Agreement (1983) when Lebanon almost became an Israeli ally.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s concern in Lebanon was about the protection of the significantly weakened Sunni population in Lebanon. Moreover, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not want a Syrian and Iraqi influence which would harm its prestige and strength in the region. At the start, KSA was doubtful of allying with Syria due to al-Assad’s strong position in Lebanon and his significant influence over the PLO. Later, under American pressure, KSA would support Syrian intervention as it feared Saddam’s and Iranian expansions, especially after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. As a result of the change in stance, KSA would be prompted by the US and the Arab League to host and mediate several Lebanese peace talks, ending with Al Taef Agreement, which took place in Al Taef, KSA.

Overall, it can be said that Al Taef was forged through an inclination to fight back Iraqi and Iranian influence in Lebanon and maintain, at least, the pre-war status quo of the geopolitics of Lebanon between Syria, Israel and KSA.

Two Illegitimate Governments

After Amin Gemayel’s term ended, two ‘illegitimate’ governments were ruling the countries, as always based on a sectarian division. General Michel Aoun’s government was seen as illegitimate mainly because it was headed by a Christian Maronite, which was unprecedented; meanwhile, Selim al Hoss’ government was seen as illegitimate since Amin Gemayel had not designated it as the provisional government. Indeed, if a history book were to be written to explain the main reason for the Taef Agreement, a majority would agree that it is because of Michel Aoun’s rise in power and declaration of wars against LF and Syria.

The designation of Michel Aoun as prime minister, as aforementioned, was supposedly to prevent the concentration of all Christian powers in the hands of the LF; however, this decentralisation attempt led to an unequal balance of powers between the Christian militias, which hampered peace attempts on several occasions. In this situation, both Samir Gaegae and Michel Aoun had been working to “defend the Christians” while aiming to win the race for the presidency (An ironic reproduction of history would take place in the 2010s between the same two personalities). This strong weakening of the Christian militias would propel the LF, and also Michel Aoun to some extent, to accept the invitation to the Taef Conference.

Overall, the Muslim militias were equally as weak as the Christian ones, yet the former ones had ‘Syrian protection,’ arguably Syrian domination, while the latter were facing attempts of Syrian domination as well as attempts of internal domination. It would be in such a context of destruction and defeat that all parties were propelled into the Taef Conference.

Michel Aoun’s race for presidency would hurt all Lebanese on all sides. First and foremost, he would declare a small war against the LF in an attempt to prevent any potential competitor, especially Samir Gaegae, from becoming a strong candidate for the presidency.

Later on, Aoun received information that there was a regional agreement being forged around Lebanon, but Aoun was unsure if it entailed him as president or not. Afterwards, Aoun would receive from an unknown source (most probably in relation to Saddam Hussein) that the agreement being prepared would not provide him with the presidency. In reality, the US had been supporting Michel Aoun as a possible presidential candidate, yet his insistence on refusing negotiations with the Syrian regime and his later declaration of war would push the US to jump ship in favour of the Syrian regime.

Accordingly, Michel Aoun would declare his new political campaign, claiming that no peace talks and no negotiations for internal reforms should occur before Syria’s retreat from Lebanon: sovereignty before reforms. As a consequence, with the support of Saddam Hussein, Aoun declared the War of Liberation on the Syrian regime in April 1989, which would reluctantly be stopped during the Taef Conference, but then resumed afterwards against both the Syrians and the LF (War of Elimination/Weapon Unification Battle).

In sum, the main internal reasons for the Taef Conference would be Michel Aoun’s self-interests and the weakening of all fighting parties under Syrian domination.

Al Taef Conference

Over the course of the Lebanese Civil War, several peace negotiations had taken place: Geneva talks (1983), 17 May Agreement (1983), Lausanne talks (1984), Tripartite Agreement (1985), the Arab League Committee of Six (1989) and the Tripartite High Commission of the Arab League (1989). Despite the continuous failures of said agreements, the final text of the Taef Agreement would be an assemblage of all previous peace drafts presented via these peace talks.

The Tripartite High Commission of the Arab League, led by the kings of KSA, Algeria and Morrocco, initiated the invitation and mediation of the Taef Conference, as assigned by the Casablanca Arab Summit in 1989.

The invitation for the Taef Conference was received differently by parties. Even if the Muslim parties were relatively less reluctant, they had little-to-no choice of resisting due to Syrian domination and Saudi pressure. Nonetheless, both Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt were against peace talks in fear of losing their militias’ power to the elected Muslim deputies. On the other hand, all Christian parties showed reluctance despite Aoun’s reluctance being the more dominant one. After mediation by the Maronite Patriarch, the LF saw it more befitting to accept the negotiations than to support Aoun in his resistance; in other words, the LF came to the Taef conference with an urgency to end the war so that the LF can maintain power and put in place Aoun’s dominance. Meanwhile, Aoun strongly stood against any talks, continuing on his campaign of ‘sovereignty before reforms.’ Nevertheless, he agreed to not prevent any Christian deputy from joining the conference as long as the latter ensures Syrian retreat as part of the peace deal.

On September 30, 1989, the Al Taef Conference’s first meeting took place between the Lebanese parliament deputies and which would last until October 22, 1989.

The paper that would be discussed was to resemble, if not exactly it, that which was prepared independently by soon-to-be prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. The latter had been working on a peace draft since 1987 with no prior knowledge that later on it would be used as a source for the Taef Agreement. Over the course of his work, Rafik al-Hariri would aim to establish an agreement entailing internal and external resolutions, unlike other previous drafts which would mainly focus on internal solutions. He would depend on the drafts of all previous peace talks while also taking into consideration the opinions of the Lebanese deputies, politicians and religious leaders like the Maronite Patriarch. The likelihood that the al-Hariri draft was chosen as the main source was due to his closeness to the Saudi royal family and his several positions as mediator between Lebanese factions, the Syrian regime and the Saudi king. In addition, another paper by Hussein al Husseini, which focused on the legalities of internal reforms would also be taken as a source. Al Husseini would eventually mediate the talks during the conference.

Throughout the whole conference, several points of discussions were prevalent: the redistribution of power between the president, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament to represent equal and proportional demographic changes, the timeline to end political sectarianism and, most importantly, the Syrian and Israeli retreats from Lebanon. The debates on the two former points were heated and took the majority of the conference’s time.

The distribution of powers was a point of extreme importance as many saw its results to determine who won the civil war. Indeed, later, Aoun’s loyalist would claim that the Taef was a Christian declaration of defeat due to the loss of presidential powers towards the prime minister; meanwhile, other parties refuse such point of view and claim that the redistribution of power was necessary to reflect demographic changes (seeing that Christians had no longer been the majority) and that the Taef agreement was the declaration of defeat of all fighting parties.

Moreover, with regards to political sectarianism, it was in majority agreed that it should be cancelled, yet several minorities and many Christian deputies tried to postpone it till after the Syrian retreat to ensure their proper political representation. Similarly, other Muslim deputies would call for its postponement until other reforms were made. On the other hand, other deputies called for an immediate removal of political sectarianism because it was blamed to be the source of all Lebanese miseries. An important suggestion presented in Hussein al Husseini’s draft would entail the creation of a non-sectarian national assembly in parallel to the sectarian parliament in order to limit political sectarianism until someday its full elimination. This proposal would partially be adopted in theory, yet totally disregarded in application due to future disagreements on the presidency of such an assembly.

As to the point on the Syrian and Israeli retreats, all discussions were continuously postponed during the conference by many deputies to avoid disagreements that would threaten the peace talks. On the other side, many other deputies, mainly those loyal to Aoun, but also those loyal to the LF, were pressing to determine the results of this predicament. As a result, the Tripartite High Commission had to interfere to organise the discussion. First, the commission would propose to resume negotiations on other points, while it discusses the matter of Syrian and Israeli retreat with the Syrian regime and the US, respectively. Later, the commission would respond by an insistence that immediate retreat is non- negotiable for the Syrian regime, promising that the commission will pledge to oversee personally a timeline for Syrian retreat after two years from legislating the main Taef reforms and electing a new president and government. After several disagreements, the deputies had no choice but to accept a timeline for Syrian retreat after two years towards the Lebanese Bekaa region and not fully towards the internationally recognized borders. The full retreat would later be negotiated between both governments separately. As to the Israeli retreat, the Taef would recall the different UN resolutions regarding the matter, especially UN resolution 452.

As a result, Michel Aoun would refuse to recognize the Taef Agreement and would later declare the War of Liberation and the War of Elimination. On the other hand, many deputies would see this agreement as the best possible opportunity despite many unprofessed criticisms on it. Finally, after the long-predicted military defeat of Michel Aoun, the Taef reforms would be implemented into the constitution following the election of Elias al-Herawi as president (after the assassination of the previously elected president Rene Mouawad).

Was the Taef Agreement the product of international pressure?

Over the years since the Taef Agreement, a number of growing sceptics have imposed a strong claim that the Taef Agreement was forced upon the Lebanese. Indeed, it often coincided with a similar point of view which refuses to acknowledge the war as a civil one but as a regional one; in other words, it is ‘the war of others in Lebanon’ and ‘not the war of Lebanese.’ The latter claim finds its roots in the civil war in an attempt to symbolise Syria as an invader. It is clearly expressed during the Taef Conference when the Tripartite High Commission tried to convince the Christian deputies to make compromises in order not to insinuate to the international public that the issues are between the Lebanese factions. Later, post-1989, the claim developed into a ‘deLebanization’ of the agreement as means of resistance against Syria’s continuous occupation and its delegitimization. On the other side, the supporters of the agreement refuse to acknowledge its ‘deLebanization,’ especially that it is seen to have balanced out the sectarian power sharing in the country. Nevertheless, claiming that the Taef agreement is an organic Lebanese agreement is far from reality and only comes into a romantic spirit of Lebanese unity.

On several occasions, accusations of bribery during the Taef Conference had been made. Due to limited media coverage during the conference, it would be difficult to confirm the bribery and its briber. It should be noted that deputies at the conference had been served with services ranging from luxurious meals to massages, but such services can also be attributed to the traditional Saudi royal accommodation. Nonetheless, post-Taef bribes have not been dismissed.

It would be unrealistic to look at the Taef agreement as being only the product of Lebanese deliberation for several reasons. Evidently, the location of the Taef in Saudi Arabia as well as the invitation sent from the Arab League’s commission are both suggestions of foreign role in the conference. In fact, without such a role, an agreement would not likely have taken place.

Moreover, on the regional scale, the KSA, Syria, US and Israel had been trying to limit the influence of both Iranian and Iraqi expansion. It was in the benefit of all parties to end the Lebanese civil war in order to prevent further foreign interference which would alter the balance of powers. It was also necessary for the US and Israel to weaken the PLO and its allies in Lebanon so that a regional peace agreement could take place in the future. It is undeniable that regional conditions for the Taef, as discussed above, existed.

It is, however, false to assume that if regional conditions existed, then foreign pressure certainly took place. An example of such a context would be the Lebanese independence from the French colonisation in 1943: the regional condition emerged when France was already weakened by the Nazi invasion, so the Lebanese politicians took advantage from the weakness to exert further pressure to attain independence. Even if some British interference existed, it was the Lebanese politicians who benefited from the opportunity presented within the geopolitical situation.

During the Taef Conference, it is interesting that the Tripartite High Commission had to negotiate with the Syrian regime to find a compromise between Syrian interests and Lebanese demands. It is more interesting, however, that despite negotiations, it was the Lebanese side who compromised on their demands in favour of Syrian interests in the end. The former did not voluntarily compromise but were instead ‘encouraged’ by the Tripartite High Commission to do so in order to avoid ‘hampering the agreement.’ Yet, the same commission, supported by the US and the Arab League, could have otherwise chosen to pressure the Syrian regime but instead made it clear that negotiations on Syrian retreat is a dead-end. The fact that Syria had been a part of the negotiations trying to preserve its own dominance with little to no resistance by the US and the Arab League puts doubt on the degree in which foreign interference played a role in the Taef agreement. Then, it is correct to assume in this context that the regional conditions which existed certainly led to foreign pressures.

The foreign interference becomes more evident when looking at the progression of the Syrian and Israeli occupation in Lebanon. Israel did not fully retreat from Lebanese territories till the day of writing. The focus should be more on the Syrian regime’s occupation, which should have retreated out of Beirut and other Lebanese regions within two years according to the Taef Agreement. This retreat never took place despite the Arab League’s symbolic guarantee. The foreign interference becomes clearer when US foreign policy towards Syria is studied: first, US gives Syria the greenlight in 1987 to invade West Beirut in exchange for help in hostage release. Then, it allows Syrian discretion to invade the Presidential Palace militarily and kick out Aoun loyalists after the Taef. Finally, it permits the extension of Syrian occupation of Lebanon after the two-year deadline is over via a different interpretation of the agreement in return for Syrian participation in the Gulf War. Evidently, the agreement was eventually utilised to achieve regional gains for all relevant powers in Lebanese territories. It is clear that the agreement aimed to ensure the legitimacy of foreign powers’ intervention, thus explaining foreign insistence on the importance of the success of the Taef Conference.

It would also be false to assume that if foreign intervention existed, then internal willingness and internal conditions were not factors in forging the agreement. Indeed, there was internal willingness, but not necessarily for peace. The Taef Conference was not only about the Syrian occupation, but it was also about political reforms, which were a main cause of the war. These reforms were reflected in the final text of the Taef and the bulk of most peace talks. The constant willingness for these reforms had been present since the beginning of the war as seen in the various peace attempts that took place. The issue was, as always, the degree of willingness to compromise by each party and for what in exchange. Based on that, the question of whether the Lebanese parties were truly willing to forge peace or were only trying to not lose power rises. In reality, both claims are correct. On one side, militia leaders wanted to end the war because it had weakened them, but they were willing to resist if that meant losing their power, like Michel Aoun for example. It is noteworthy to mention that the deputies who attended the conference were not representative of those leaders except for a few loyalists as they had been last elected in 1972. So, the distrust of militia leaders in the decisions taken in the Taef was evident. It was only through Syrian pressure on Muslim militia leaders, like Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, and American and French pressure on the Christian militia leaders that those leaders agreed to sort of respect the Taef Conference’s decisions. Had these militia leaders not been already weakened and dominated, the foreign powers would have been faced with more than one replica of Michel Aoun’s resistance. On the other side, Lebanese politicians and Lebanese deputies, such as Hussein al- Husseini and Rene Mouawad, had been working with religious leaders like the Maronite Patriarch to push for dialogue to make peace. If it were not for them to convince Michel Aoun, the Taef Conference might have not included but a couple of Christian deputies. In brief, despite some Lebanese parties’ mediation, it was mainly under foreign pressure that the militia leaders gave the greenlight for some deputies to attend the conference.

Nonetheless, the discussions on reforms took place between Lebanese deputies only. Furthermore, the drafts chosen as sources for discussion were made by Rafik al-Hariri and Hussein al-Husseini, both of whom are Lebanese and held positions in direct relation with Lebanese authorities. Even if the drafts chosen were by the Tripartite High Commission, mainly al-Hariri’s paper since it included a sufficient response to Syrian interests, there was an inevitable negotiation among deputies trying to create peace and achieve the long-awaited political reforms.

Overall, the Taef agreement was the product of international pressure and served to a great extent the continuous interests of foreign powers in Lebanon. On the other hand, there were some Lebanese voices, which were reproduced by Lebanese deputies’ negotiations and attempts to limit Syrian occupation as much as possible, calling to end the war. Yet, the segregation between the militia leaders and the Lebanese deputies’ and politicians’ intentions weakened the Lebanese’ abilities to further manoeuvre among regional forces and would later translate into a failure in building a true Lebanese state. Despite this claim, the source of the Taef Agreement should not undermine its potential effectiveness and the positive points it entails in building a post-war state. On the other hand, it also becomes questionable whether the Taef Agreement effectively ended the civil war or not.

Here, the reader can find the link to the Taef Agreement : https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf

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