Blooming in Fragments: What Remains of the Syrian Opposition Today

November 2024, Article by Camilla Maury

Introduction

“The streets were paved with jasmine flowers”, reminisces Haya, a Syrian refugee, in an interview with the United Nations High Committee for Refugees (UNHCR) on World Refugee Day 2022. Amid the ruins and the rubble of a war-scarred Syria, the jasmine flower– once a symbol of Damascus’ beauty and serenity– now blooms as a resilient reminder of the changed but enduring landscape of the Syrian opposition. Over two decades since the first major uprisings against the Assad Regime began, traces of the opposition remain, although redefined and uprooted. Today, the spirit of the Syrian opposition survives in fragmented forms, striving to keep alive a national hope for the country's freedom. Just as jasmine blossoms push through cracks in the pavements, opponents of the regime embody resilience and adaptation, reminding the world of their determination to reclaim Syria’s future.

Syria’s geographic and strategic position has long made it a “chessboard” for global powers. Whether it be regional dominance and influence over oil reserves for the U.S. and Turkey or leverage over rival factions for Iran, many third parties pursue distinct aims in Syria, making it a key element of international and regional power struggles. In fact, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, its numerous alliances and rivalries make it a “geopolitical linchpin” that can impact broader regional stability.

Beyond its importance on an international level, Syria has also received considerable media attention for its intra-national political turmoil. The country’s domestic politics have been marked by strong authoritarian repression since former leader Hafez Al-Assad took power in 1970, followed by his son, Bashar Al-Assad, the current President of Syria, in 2000. This long-standing undemocratic, repressive political atmosphere has led to a cyclical pattern of rebellion, where waves of opposition arise but end up being forcefully subdued by the regime’s military repression tactics. How, then, through its triumphs and setbacks, has Syria’s opposition evolved over the past 50 years, and what remnants, if any, can still challenge Assad’s hegemony today? We will explore this question chronologically, first delving into the early opposition forms of the 1980s and early 2000s, followed by the Civil War starting in 2011, and what remains of the opposition as of today and expected for the near future.

I. Repression Waters the Flowers of War

The month of November symbolizes remembrance and celebration of armistice and freedom for many Western countries. For Syrians, it recalls the last moments of national liberty. In fact, it was in November 1970 that, after a third and final coup, Hafez Assad imposed himself as leader of the Levantine state. This date marks the beginning of the “Assad Hegemony”, or decades of violent repression and war.

Assad quickly established rigid authoritarian policies, neglecting all forms of political expression and individual freedoms. This rigid control of power was enforced through an extensive surveillance apparatus, as the police and the military employed violent measures such as torture, enforced disappearances, and mass arrests to instill fear and suppress any form of opposition. Human Rights Watch reports indicate that the regime led by Hafez al-Assad (and later by his son Bashar) executed, imprisoned, or exiled thousands of political dissidents since 1970. The use of torture has been systematic in over 27 government detention centers across Syria. The array of human rights violations by Assad’s regime were quick to arouse rebellion within the nation, and eventually lead to the creation of the first movements of opposition.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Armed Resistance (1979-1982) was the first prominent aforementioned opposition movement. These Islamist groups strongly opposed Assad’s secular, Alawite-led regime, seeking to replace it with an Islamic government. The Muslim Brothers led an active armed resistance, including urban guerillas and targeted assassinations such as the June 1979 Aleppo Artillery School Massacre and an assassination attempt on Al-Assad in 1980. Between 1979 and 1981, Brotherhood militants killed over 300 Assad supporters through numerous violent uprisings however, Syrian forces never failed to strike back. Assad’s army and police forces responded by killing 2,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout this first period of resistance, and by leading open-fire attacks on civilians. The Syrian Human Rights Committee notes that an additional 10,000 political activists were killed or disappeared.

Rebellion acts were always violently reprimanded by the regime’s forces, a response mechanism ultimately leading to the Muslim Brotherhood’s defeat in 1982 during the ‘Hama Massacre’, where the government shelled the city of Hama, blindly killing an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians, violently and effectively ending the group’s organized resistance within Syria. Scarred by this bloody massacre, the Syrian nation didn’t foster any considerable movements of resistance in the years following 1982, during which the regime only became increasingly repressive and violent.

It was only in the year 2000 that a new intellectual wave of opposition arose amongst the Syrian elites. The death of Hafez al-Assad and the ascension of his son, Bashar Al-Assad, gave the Syrian society hope for political openness and reform, as intellectuals, activists, and citizens started calling for greater freedom. Cities witnessed the emergence of public forums, ‘salons’ where, much like during the period of European Enlightenment, people would reunite to discuss political issues and engage in debates. This movement is incarnated by the “Manifesto of the 99”, a reform charter signed by numerous prominent Syrian intellectuals such as filmmaker Omar Amiralay. However, this period was short-lived, as Bashar Al-Assad’s political reign turned out to be much like his father’s; the regime quickly and brutally repressed the movement, arresting and sending many key figures to exile, firmly reasserting authoritarian rule. Human Rights Watch reports over 200 political activists to have been arrested.The repression following the Damascus Spring marked a severe escalation in the Assad regime’s clampdown on dissent. As hundreds of voices were being silenced, Syrian society was left fearful and fractured, with the government tightening its control on every aspect of people’s lives.

While this fierce repression from the government stifled domestic opposition, it also drove many dissidents abroad : many sought to seek foreign asylum, others were exiled. From afar, these believers in Syrian freedom continued to advocate for change and share news of abuses, fostering a network of exiled intellectuals and activists. A prominent voice of this exiled Syrian opposition is human rights activist and writer Radwan Ziadeh. Leaving Syria in 2007, he became a major figure in the Assad regime dissent as he founded the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. According to the International Science Council, Ziadeh worked extensively with U.S. policymakers and the United Nations to highlight the repression and human rights violations occurring in Syria. Despite the efforts of exiled activists, the lack of unified strategy and cohesive leadership prevented these groups from establishing a strong, organized opposition capable of challenging the Assad regime effectively; their influence within Syria, therefore, remained limited.

Meanwhile, the discontent of the Syrian population facing the authoritarian regime was intensified by the 2010’s economic turmoil. By 2011, rising unemployment, inflation, and the effects of a devastating drought that displaced over 1.5 million citizens had compounded the nation’s hardship, leaving many without livelihoods or hope. The United Nations Development Programme reports that 30% of the population lived below the poverty line. The eruption of the Arab Spring that same year rebirthed hope for exiled activists, who saw this as a new opportunity to advocate against the Assad regime, joining local protest organizers in calling for change. The government’s violent response to these protests rapidly escalated the crisis, turning the public’s peaceful demands for reform into an outright rebellion. As the country crumbled under economic decay and socio-political instability, the nation’s anger, long fueled and silenced by repression, ultimately erupted, pushing the country into a civil war that would entirely reshape the opposition landscape.

II. The Blooming

2010 marked a decisive turning point for many countries in the Middle East. As The Arab Spring sparked widespread pro-democracy protests across the region, Syrians were again inspired to demand reforms from the authoritarian government in 2011, expressing their political and economic discontent. Assad’s violent crackdown on peaceful protests led to a severe escalation of tensions, triggering what is known as The Syrian Civil War in 2012. As the nation mobilized itself against the regime, it witnessed a rebirth of organized resistance, with multiple groups leading an assiduous opposition.

The main opposition group during the early years of the war was the Free Syrian Army (FSA), consisting primarily of Syrian army deserters who banded together to form an armed resistance against the Assad regime. The FSA aimed to establish a democratic and inclusive Syria, opposing authoritarian rule and advocating for freedom, justice, and the protection of civilian rights while rallying both domestic and international support for their cause. Created in July 2011, the FSA was the primary armed force of the opposition network and organized itself into two different factions, with groups split between the country's North and South regions. Having, at its height, over 35,000 fighters, the group captured large parts of Syria through acts of organized guerilla, including half of Aleppo in 2012. They had numerous other successes, such as the Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, which, in cooperation with the Turkish armed forces, led to the Turkish occupation of northern Syria and the abandonment of Assad’s forces from the region.

However, the FSA was ultimately confronted with the same problem as the older resistance groups: the lack of coordination and the fragmentation of the army into different factions significantly undermined the group’s military effectiveness. This lack of internal cohesion paradoxically worsened when foreign powers entered the equation; while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the U.S. provided arms and funding to the FSA, they did so erratically, aiding different factions with dissimilar strategic aims and levels of support. Instead of strengthening the FSA as a single entity, this external support further weakened its cohesion.

These significant inner divisions eventually led to the FSA’s defeat, when Assad gained Russian military support. In September 2015, the Russian army launched a major air campaign on Syria, completely shifting the balance of power. The Russian Ministry of Defense reports to have conducted over 6,000 air strike sorties by early 2016, targeting not only FSA bases, but also thousands of civilians. These attacks were instrumental in helping Assad retake opposition-held areas, culminating in the recapture of Aleppo in December 2016, which marked a decisive defeat for the FSA. The FSA was left helpless in facing this mass military intervention, with the U.S.’ support having shifted to other strategic agendas in the region.

The Syrian Civil War was also an outlet for the rise of opposition through international diplomacy, notably with the creation of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in 2011. This political movement sought to unify opposition groups and represent the anti-Assad view internationally, advocating for the end of the long-standing hegemony. Due to popular criticism on its limited effectiveness, and narrow leadership base and representation, the SNC was replaced in 2012 by the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also simply known as the National Coalition. This new organization of Syrian international representation was established to better represent the interest of the different branches of opposition existing in the country and enhance international support. While this new organization was recognised by many international representatives as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people over the Al-Assad administration, its impact was very limited - and here, again, the lack of cohesion in the movement is to blame. The executive branch of the coalition struggled to coordinate with armed groups on the Syrian ground and to adjust to the agendas of different opposition factions. The Middle East Policy Council and Brookings Institute note that competing interests of foreign powers supporting the Coalition, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, further exacerbated this fragmentation by fostering rival factions within the opposition, undermining efforts to establish a unified political and military strategy to mobilize widespread support, secure international legitimacy, and coordinate armed resistance to effectively challenge Assad’s rule.

Faced with the infeasibility of an organized, effective resistance by 2013, the Syrian population grew as hopeless as it was powerless. This despair deepened as the Civil War escalated in violence, especially between 2013 and 2016, marked by intense battles such as the siege of Aleppo and the intensification of Russian airstrikes starting in 2015. It is in this situation of chaos that extremist rebel groups like the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) gained prominence, marking two opposing yet complex approaches to opposition against Assad’s regime, and ultimately achieving paradoxical outcomes. ISIS, emerging from Iraqi al- Qaeda, aimed to establish an Islamic caliphate through brutal campaigns including mass killings, beheadings and strict sharia law. The terrorist group rapidly gained control of most Syrian and Iraqi territory, leaving a trail of violence in their wake, exemplified by atrocities such as the Mosul and Raqqa massacres of 2014. This use of violence quickly positioned them as a fearsome presence, and aroused aggressive international opposition, especially from the United States. By contrast, the SDF - a coalition mainly of Kurdish fighters and Arab allies - aimed to secure democratic autonomy in northern Syria, leading double combat: the fight against ISIS’ expansion (with significant support from the U.S.), and the opposition to Assad’s control.

Paradoxically, while both groups technically were anti-Assad, ISIS’ radicalism often undermined the broader anti-Assad movement, drawing international forces into the region against their religious extremism rather than against the Syrian regime. The SDF, meanwhile, built both national and international credibility as a U.S.-backed ally through focused campaigns, such as their retaking of Raqqa in 2017 and the final assault in Baghouz in 2019, which decisively fought ISIS’ territorial claims. However, Syria Direct reports note that while the SDF, with significant international military support, successfully dismantled ISIS’s territorial caliphate in 2019, this victory was limited in its broader impact. The operations focused primarily on eradicating ISIS’s strongholds in cities like Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, but the power vacuum left behind and ongoing conflicts with Assad’s regime, compounded by Turkey’s hostility toward Kurdish-led forces, prevented the SDF from leveraging their gains to challenge Assad’s entrenched dominance effectively. Turkish opposition to Kurdish autonomy in Syria, the U.S.’ reluctance to further their military engagement in the region, and the overall instability significantly limited the SDF’s political and military leverage against the regime.

As the Syrian Civil War unfolded, the opposition once again faced the obstacle of fragmentation. Despite initial gains by groups like the SNC and the FSA, increased fragmentation and competition for foreign backing weakened the groups’ effectiveness. By 2015, Assad’s government capitalized on this fractured resistance. Due to the decisive Russian military intervention, Assad was able to regain control over strategic cities and opposition strongholds, such as the city of Aleppo. This external support marked a pivotal shift, pushing the opposition into retreat and signaling the beginning of a new phase in the conflict, where Assad would re-assert dominance and opposition forces would once again struggle for survival in isolated regions.

III. The Withering

Russia’s 2015 intervention began as a critical move to support Bashar Al-Assad’s government, weakened by the multiplicity of opposition factions. Russia committed extensive airstrikes, primarily against anti-Assad rebel groups such as the SFA, mostly avoiding ISIS, despite claims of counterterrorism being a primary objective. Russian military assets - including fighter jets, helicopters, drones and the deployment of military advisers - concentrated efforts on opposition-held areas such as the city of Idlib, the powerhouse of Northern Syria’s SFA forces. Official reports indicate that initial Russian deployments included an estimated 4,000 personnel, a robust aerial fleet of Su-24, Su-25, advanced Su-34 jets, and tanks and artillery positioned at the Latakia airbase. This heavy deployment of military violence intensified the conflict in the region, drawing global attention to Moscow’s deepening role in the situation. In fact, according to analyses by experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and other geopolitical observers, Russia sought to stabilize Assad’s regime and counter U.S.-backed forces, thus ensuring Russia’s influence in the Middle East, with Assad as the Kremlin’s pawn.

The intensified bombardment of opposition strongholds in Northern Syria led to the consolidation of various opposition factions, including more radical groups, into a unified presence under the “Idlib Group”. This coalition continued to resist both Russian and Syrian forces, reinforcing itself as one of the last remaining networks of organized opposition.

A prominent actor we must also consider in the picture is Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, who ultimately returned in support of the opposition. Turkey played a strategic role in supporting the Idlib group against Assad’s regime, aiming to manage the flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey and to maintain influence over border regions, threatened by radical Kurd groups and remnants of ISIS. Turkey’s numerous military campaigns, such as Operation Spring Shield in 2020, involved extensive drone strikes and artillery targeting Syrian government forces, thus upholding a “safe-zone” for opposition fighters and displaced civilians. These operations often clashed with Russian interests, leading to deadly confrontations between Turkish and Russian-backed Syrian forces, notably the February 2020 Russian airstrikes in Idlib, which killed at least 34 Turkish soldiers, according to Deutsche Welle reports. This incident marked a peak in the ongoing confrontations, as Turkey retaliated by targeting Syrian army positions, reportedly killing numerous Syrian soldiers. Despite Turkish efforts, Russia’s superior military capability and air support for Assad’s forces ultimately limited Turkey’s impact. The Russian air presence, combined with Assad’s strong alliances, hindered Erdogan’s attempts to stabilize Idlib autonomously. Although Turkey backed several militias in the region to counter both Assad’s forces and Kursidh groups, these militias often pursued their own agendas, lacked cohesive coordination, sometimes even clashing with one another, further complicating Turkey’s efforts to establish control and prevent Assad’s advances. This disunity within Turkey- backed forces, along with the fragile ceasefires and de-escalation agreements brokered by Russia and Turkey not only strained Turkey-Russia relations, but also highlighted Turkey’s geopolitical limitations in countering Assad and his allies without broader international support.

It can be argued that it is this lack of international cooperation and visibility that invalidated the opposition’s success, despite it being united at last. While backed by Turkish forces, the Syrian opposition faced limited international support, which critically hindered their efforts against Assad and its allies. With no broader Western or NATO support, Turkey and the opposition were left isolated as Assad’s forces, bolstered by Russia and Iran, advanced. This isolation became more pronounced as global priorities shifted, particularly with the U.S.’ strategic agenda changing toward focusing on other regions, effectively deprioritizing Syria and reducing their involvement in the conflict. Russia’s consistent military and diplomatic support, alongside Turkey’s strained relations with the U.S. over issues like Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, left Ankara with limited room to maneuver. Over time, this geopolitical isolation forced Turkey to adapt to Russia’s agenda in Syria, consolidating Assad’s power and diminishing the opposition’s chances for success.
Russian and Iranian support allowed Assad to reinforce his power and regain most of Syria’s key territories, leaving only pockets of resistance mainly in the North and North East. As international support diminished and regional actors refocused on their own interests, the Syrian opposition transformed from a broad movement with grand political aspirations into, once again, a collection of isolated factions fighting for survival. In this context, the remaining opposition forces- mainly the SDF and Idlib group- continue to resist, though their influence and reach are severely constrained by Assad’s strenghtened position both domestically and internationally

IV. The Last Fading Petals : What is Left of the Opposition Today?

After Syria’s Civil War, Bashar Al-Assad reinforced his domestic control and achieved significant international diplomatic victories, strengthening his hegemonic position. As the conflict wound down, the Arab states began prioritizing regional stability over the isolation of Assad’s regime. Many, in fact decided to reopen embassies in Damascus, such as the UAE in 2018 and, more recently, Saudi Arabia in 2024. This tied in to Assad’s diplomatic reintegration, with the restoration of Syria’s membership in the Arab League in 2023. This move was supported by Arab nations grappling with issues spilling over from Syria, such as refugee flows or the illicit Captagon drug trade, amongst numerous other economic and security concerns. The desire to counterbalance Iran’s significant influence in Syria was also a key consideration. The devastating earthquake of February 2023 catalyzed these normalization efforts, as neighboring countries provided aid and engaged more with Assad and his government, which they now viewed as a long-term reality that had to be dealt with in order to maintain broader peace dynamics, despite the numerous occurring violations of human rights.

These shifting priorities on the international geopolitical scene have provided Assad with increased legitimacy, helping him to secure his position without significant international resistance. What is then left of the Syrian opposition ?

The Syrian opposition today, under Bashar Al-Assad’s reasserted rule, is fragmented and largely ineffective, and is facing severe limitations both politically and militarily. The two major surviving opposition groups are the aforementioned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and what remains of the Idlib resistance.

The SDF remains active in Northern and North Eastern Syria, controlling significant areas, including resource-rich territories like Deir ez-Zor. Despite their initial successes in defeating ISIS with U.S. support, the SDF struggles with internal dissent, particularly among Arab tribes, who feel politically underrepresented and economically marginalized. Despite this fragmented organization, Syrian Defense Forces continue to engage in clashes with ISIS remnants while also resisting Turkish aggression. Tensions with Turkey arise from its affiliation with the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which, although represent a primary component of the SDF, are considered by Turkey to be a terrorist group. Turkish operations, such as airstrikes under “Operation Claw Sword” and the SDF’s reliance on U.S. support have politically isolated it, significantly diminishing its relevance and impact in Syrian political dynamics. Despite sporadic opposition to Assad, the SDF is hampered by internal changes and external threats limiting the consistency of its resistance against the regime. Armed confrontations, such as the 2023 Deir el-Zor clashes, opposing tribal armed groups and the dominant SDF organs, illustrate these difficulties and the ongoing instability in the region.

As for Idlib, what remains of it is largely controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al- Qaeda affiliate that has attempted to moderate its image to maintain control and secure international legitimacy. Despite governing Idlib through the Syrian Salvation Government (de facto alternative government of the Syrian opposition in Idlib Governorate, formed in early November 2017), HTS faces persistent threats from Russian-supported Syrian bombardments, Turkish opposition and, once again, internal factionalism. The group’s survival is made even more difficult by its geographic isolation and dependence on international aid to sustain its population, which includes many internally displaced Syrians. Lastly, HTS’s efforts to consolidate power and provide governance are also undermined by its designation as a terrorist organization by Western powers, along with the continued military targeting by Assad’s forces and allies.

Ultimately, both groups lack the resources, international support, and unity needed to challenge Assad’s entrenched regime effectively. Assad has leveraged shifting global priorities and alliances, such as tacit Russian, Iranian and occasionally Turkish alignments, to consolidate power. These dynamics have further marginalized opposition groups, reducing their influence and ability to operate effectively.

Conclusion : What Future for Our Jasmine Bud?

The story of Syria’s opposition is one of resilience, fragmentation, and loss, much like a jasmine flower struggling to bloom in harsh soil. From the early seeds of dissent crushed under the Assad regime’s brutal repression in the 1970s, to the budding hopes of the Damascus Spring, and the full flowering of resistance during the civil war, the opposition’s journey has been marked by cycles of growth and suppression. However, as foreign powers intervened and internal divisions deepened, the opposition’s petals fell one by one, leaving only scattered remnants in the Idlib region and Northern Syria, where groups like the SDF and HTS only hold precarious ground.

Today, Assad’s regime has regained control over the majority of Syria, with the support of Russia and Iran ensuring the leader’s continued grip on power. Meanwhile, the international community’s focus has shifted toward regional stability and reconstruction, sidelining the fragmented opposition. Reports from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Human Rights Watch estimate that Syria will require over $250 billion to rebuild, a cost that will most likely encourage further normalization of relations with Assad, as seen with the diplomatic reintegration of Assad’s Syria.

Yet, the jasmine flower never fully withers. In the North, the SDF continues to advocate for autonomy, and activists in exile still call for accountability and reform. However, without cohesive leadership or robust international support, the opposition faces an uncertain future. Looking ahead, the opposition’s survival will depend on its ability to overcome internal divisions and adapt to changing political dynamics. The ongoing humanitarian crisis– reportedly affecting more than 13 million displaced Syrians, according to the UNHCR– may yet spur new forms of resistance or activism. Still, it is unlikely that these groups would receive the adequate military support they need. The jasmine flower symbolizes resilience and renewal, but equally, it represents the hope that the Syrian opposition may one day find fertile ground to flourish, even in the face of overwhelming odds against the seed.

Methodology

This study focuses on the Syrian opposition from 1970 to the present, examining both domestic and international actors that have influenced the country’s political landscape. The geographical scope encompasses Syria itself, with a particular emphasis on key opposition-held regions during the civil war, such as Idlib, Aleppo, and areas in northern Syria controlled by Kurdish forces. The study also includes the role of exiled activists and diaspora groups. These areas are critical for understanding the evolution of opposition movements, as they represent key moments of resistance, foreign intervention, and shifts in power dynamics.

To gather data, I have reviewed a combination of both quantitative and qualitative sources. Quantitative data includes conflict-related statistics, such as the number of displaced persons, territorial control over time, and military casualties, sourced from international organizations, such as the United Nations High Committee for Refugees (UNHCR), NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, and official military reports from countries concerned. For qualitative data, I analyzed reports, academic articles, and firsthand accounts from opposition groups and exiled activists, focusing on prominent individuals like Radwan Ziadeh and Omar Al-Shogre. My selection of sources was based on their relevance to the key phases of Syria’s opposition movement, ensuring a broad perspective of various opposition factions and their international interactions. I also drew from government and NGO reports, media outlets, and interviews to ensure diverse viewpoints.

I used a chronological approach to analyze the evolution of Syria’s opposition, highlighting key events such as the Damascus Spring, the formation of the Free Syrian Army, and the impact of foreign intervention. I categorized the information based on opposition factions, political movements, and the role of foreign powers in shaping the conflict. The analysis integrates both content analysis of historical documents and comparative analysis of opposition strategies and their outcomes. Data was cross-referenced with academic sources on Syrian political movements and conflict studies to ensure accuracy and context. For trends and patterns, I used a descriptive statistical approach to assess territorial control and external involvement in the conflict. All sources were critically evaluated for credibility, and I acknowledged any gaps in data where appropriate.

Bibliography :

Abdul Sattar Ibrahim, Mohammad. “The Rise and fall of the Syrian Democratic Forces” Syria Direct, 2019. On line : https://syriadirect.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-syrian-democratic-forces/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Al Jazeera Center for Studies. “Idlib : The New Strategic Nucleus of the Battle over Syria”, 2020. On line : https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/idlib-new-strategic-nucleus-battle-over-syria [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Arab Center for Current Affairs.“The Syrian National Coalition: Motivations for its Formation and Building Blocks of Success”, 2012. On line : https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The_Syrian_National_Coalition_Motivations_for_its_Formation_and_Building_Blocks_of_Success.aspx [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Baker, Benjamin D. “Everything You Need To Know About Russia’s Intervention in Syria”, The Diplomat, 2015. On line : https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/everything-you-need-to-know-about-russias-intervention-in-syria/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Cafarella, J., J. Dunford, M. Land, and B. Wallace. “Turkey Commits to Idlib”, Institute for the Study of War, 2020. On line : https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-commits-idlib

Charap, S., E. Treyger, and E. Geist.“Understanding Russia’s Intervention in Syria”, RAND Corporation, 2019. On line : https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Clingendael, Erwin van Veen. “Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad : The case of Idlib”, Clingendael, 2021. On line : https://www.clingendael.org/publication/turkeys-interventions-its-near-abroad-case-idlib [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Council on Foreign Relations, Zachary Lubb. “Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror”, 2023. On line : https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war [accessed on January 4th 2025]

CSIS. “Experts React : Turkey’s Intervention, U.S. Diplomacy, the crisis in Syria, 2019. On line : https://www.csis.org/analysis/experts-react-turkeys-intervention-us-diplomacy-and-crisis-syria [accessed on January 4th 2025]

EU Agency for Asylum. “The muslim Brotherhood Uprising in Syria (1979-1982) which comprised the Hama massacre (February 1982) Common Analysis, 8.1.2. 2020. On line : https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria-2024/812-muslim-brotherhood-uprising-syria-1979-1982-which-comprised-hama-massacre-february-1982 [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Etana Syria. Report - Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria, Sept. 2023. On line : https://etanasyria.org/syria-military-brief-north-west-syria-september/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

F. Gregory Gause III. Beyond Sectarianism : The New Middle East Cold War” Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, no. 11, 2014. On line : https://www.brookings.edu/articles/beyond-sectarianism-the-new-middle-east-cold-war/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

German Institute for International and Security Affairs, M. Kaim and O. Tammings. “Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria”, 2015. On line : https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2015C48_kim_tga.pdf [accessed on January 4th 2025]

German Marshall Fund of the United States. What Future For Syria? On line : https://www.gmfus.org/news/what-future-syria [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Holtz, Mackenzie. Examining Extremism: Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), Centre for Strategic & International Studies, Aug. 2023. On line : https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts [accessed on January 4th 2025]

House of Commons Library, Philip Loft.“Syria’s civil war in 2023: Assad back in the Arab League”, 2023. On line : https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9378/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth. Before We Pay $250bn to ‘Rebuild Syria’, We Should Force Putin to Stop the Endless Death and Destruction, 2018. On line : https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/04/we-pay-250bn-rebuild-syria-we-should-force-putin-stop-endless-death-and-destruction [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Human Rights Watch. “Syria - The Price of Dissent” Vol. 7 N°4 July 1995. On line : https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Syria.htm [accessed on January 4th 2025]

International Science Council. “Science in Exile podcast: Syrian political scientist Radwan Ziadeh on continuing human rights research and activism across borders” 2021. On line : https://council.science/blog/podcast-radwan-ziadeh-human-rights-across-borders/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Insight Turkey. “The Syrian Political Opposition : What Went Wrong ?” Vol. 18, no. 2, 2016. On line : https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/the-syrian-political-opposition-what-went-wrong [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Kheder Khaddour and Armenak Tokmajyan. “Borders Without a Nation: Syria, Outside Powers, and Open-Ended Instability”2024. On line : https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/09/borders-without-a-nation-syria-outside-powers-and-open-ended-instability?lang=en [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Prasad, H., O. Brunzell, G. Nebel, and E. Leendertse. “Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics”, The Carter Center, Oct.-Dec. 2022. On line : https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/quarterly-conflict-summary-oct-dec-2022.pdf [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Sewell, Abby. As Assad restores relations with Arab states, Syrians divided by hope, fear, The Times of Israel, Apr. 2023. On line : https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-assad-restores-relations-with-arab-states-syrians-divided-by-hope-fear/ [accessed on January 4th 2025]

Seth Wikas. Battling the Lion of Damascus, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. On line : https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3488 [accessed on January 4th 2025]

The G.W. Bush Presidential Center. Interviews with Radwan Ziadeh, 2024. On line : https://www.bushcenter.org/freedom-collection/radwan-ziadeh-background [accessed on January 4th 2025]

The United States Institute of Peace, Mona Yacoubian. “Mona Yacoubian on Arab Normalization with Syria’s Assad”, 2023 On line : https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/mona-yacoubian-arab-normalization-syrias-assad [accessed on January 4th 2025]