Propaganda in vain: Managing Egyptian Public Opinion on Relations with Israel since al-Sisi
November 2024, Article by Rafael John Sowden García
Introduction
The expression ‘between a rock and a hard place’ is reflective of the situation Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government in Egypt finds itself in, following Israel’s war in Gaza after Hamas’ 7th of October, 2023 attack. El-Sisi’s regime, having pushed for closer economic and political cooperation with Israel since 2013 due to a mix of perceived economic necessity and pressure from Western states, finds itself facing ever greater pressure from the Egyptian public, as the situation in Gaza and its regional implications damage both Egypt’s economy and the regime’s credibility in the face of an Egyptian population that is staunchly opposed to forming ties with Israel. As a result, it is worth discussing how the government balances the two, focusing on how it has managed public opinion regarding its relationship with Israel until now, whether it has been successful in the attempt, and how recent developments may change government policy moving forward.
The first section of this essay will begin by discussing the impact the most recent events of the Israel-Palestinian conflict have had on Egypt, as well as how they work to exacerbate the long-term economic and political issues the country. This will then be followed by a brief discussion of why el-Sisi’s regime is interested in maintaining closer ties with Israel, even if it is in opposition to what the broader Egyptian population desires. The second and third sections will then provide an overview of how the Egyptian government has sought to manage public opinion regarding the conflict, using a) a mix of physical suppression of dissent, and b) sources of legitimation such as state-sponsored media and the education system. The fourth section will seek to gauge how successful this public opinion management has been, and whether the regime’s approach is sustainable, or if it will generate severely detrimental backlash for it, especially following the developments in Gaza. Finally, the conclusion will recapitulate the main points of the essay, and highlight a few more recent indicators of how the situation may be changing.
I. Egypt’s Troubles
To understand government policy surrounding relations with Israel, one must first look both at how the Israel-Palestine conflict is impacting Egypt and at how this fits into the more general situation the country finds itself in both economically and politically. These two factors are ultimately the drivers of why the government sees it necessary to maintain a strong relationship with Israel.
The impact of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
The conflict is proving to be extremely damaging to Egypt’s economy in the short-term. Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea following the Israeli response to October 7th has led to a complete collapse of transit through the Suez Canal, leading to a decline in revenue coming from the Canal from 9.4 billion dollars in the 2022-23 fiscal year to 7.2 billion in 2023-24. This is one of Egypt’s most stable sources of income whilst also serving as a significant foreign exchange source, necessary to pay off its foreign debt, which is approaching 200 billion dollars. Its ramifications also appear as if they will have a longer-term impact, as important shipping companies have begun re-routing shipping for the time being around the Cape of Good Hope; Maersk, one of the world’s largest shipping companies, announced it had ended prior plans with the company Hapag-Lloyd to share vessels travelling through the Suez Canal, and instead began plans to phase in a new route which would stop relying on it altogether. The Egyptian government also finds itself pressured politically, as countries it depends on for economic aid pressure it to maintain its position as a mediator for peace and to continue its process of normalisation with Israel, whilst, at the same time, the Egyptian public shows ever-increasing anger towards the exceptional amount of deaths occurring in Gaza and the fact that the government’s actions are in a sense making them complicit in the outcome. Furthermore, in trying to deal with the accumulation of Gazan refugees at the Rafah crossing, the govermnent has been reluctant to allow aid into the area, potentially in an attempt to force Israel’s hand and make it suspend its operations in Rafah. As one could imagine, this has led to substantial international and domestic outcry, as the regime is accused of prioritising its own interests at the expense of the lives of Palestinians.
2. Long-term problems
These recent developments, however, do not exist in a vaccuum. The conflcit is only one gruesome piece of the puzzle, which has only served to exacerbate existing pressure on the Egyptian government.
The recent blows to the Egyptian economy caused by the decline in Suez transit are simply an add- on to more struuctural economic issues the country is suffering through. To begin with, a substantial amount of Egypt’s revenue over the last 60 years has come from foreign support; beginning with aid given by the Soviet Union in the 1960s in a bid to expand its influence in the region, following the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt also became America’s largest aid recipient (along with Israel), due to its strategic importance to the US. This reliance on foreign aid persists today — for example, in early September 2024, the US granted Egypt 1.3 billion dollars in military aid, despite human rights concerns, in the name of US national interest. In addition to this, el-Sisi’s regime has relied heavily on borrowing, leading to heavy foreign debt. This reliance on non-productive income (rent) rather than on domestic economic growth makes the Egyptian government particularly vulnerable to other states’ interests, leaving it in the difficult position of having to adapt its foreign policy to those of its patrons, sometimes at the expense of popular support. Furthermore, the domestic economy suffers from a lack of diversification, heavily relying on imports of food and machinery, meaning the government cannot in the short term rely on local economic production for legitimacy. The collapse of transit in the Suez Canal therefore only makes an already precarious economic situation worse, as it removes one of the few stable and reliable sources of income Egypt has at its disposal that does not force conformism to other states’ foreign policies (the lack of a good alternative to the Suez Canal route means interested countries cannot us it as leverage in geopolitical matters).
The political situation in Egypt has likewise been precarious. The overthrow of Mubarak was caused in part due to significant political problems, namely police brutality, the absence of political freedoms, and large-scale corruption in government. With el-Sisi, none of this has changed. In fact, the police has become increasingly central in el-Sisi’s control over the country, hugely expanding the number of private security forces in the region as well as the expansion of resources of the Ministry of the Interior, leading to what sociologist Maha Abdelrahman has termed a ‘securocratic’ state. Additionally, there is anger at how el-Sisi is using government spending to fund prestige projects such as the New Administrative Capital, which has greatly increased the government debt, and is being constructed at the expense of a deteriorating Cairo, strengthening the pre- existing spatial inequality in Egypt. In a country where 27.31% of the population lives below the poverty line, there are declining real wages — between 2012 and 2018, mean real monthly wages fell by 17% — and there has been an increase in income inequality and inequality of opportunity, the government cannot afford to continue alienating a population already neglected by its policies.
3. Why would the regime want normalisation with Israel?
Despite a lack of support for Israel amongst the Egyptian population (as will be further explored in subsequent sections), several factors compel the Egyptian government to push for normalisation with Israel beyond the agreed-upon negative peace following the Camp David Accords. To begin with, the aforementioned reliance on foreign, in particular Western, support strongarms the government into a position where if it wants to continue its current economic policies, it must acquiesce to Western allies, namely Israel. On top of that, Israel is a significant economic partner in its own right, being a provider of natural gas and petroleum to Egypt. However, the Egyptian government’s desire to keep peace with Israel is not only due to foreign pressure — the government also maintains that it must pursue cooperation to preserve national security, namely against Islamist insurgents. It has shown particular concern in the Sinai peninsula, bordering Gaza; the government fears that allowing a significant flow of Gazans into the region would only destabilise it, allowing for the spread of Hamas’ influence, which it has in the past accused of working with the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result of this, it has shown a reluctance to open the Rafah crossing despite the increasing amount of refugees who are fleeing the Israeli army’s advance in Gaza. They also hold the more general concern that a significant influx of refugees would be challenging to sustain in an already struggling economy.
It is clear that the government benefits from continuing to improve its relationship with Israel, despite deep disagreement with this policy among the broader population. To mitigate this discontent however, the Egyptian government has used a blend of coercion and consent-generation, in the hopes that a population already frustrated with the state of the country will not be triggered into revolting against the regime, in the face of a complete dismissal of popular opinion.
II. Stifling Dissent
Use of force and suppression are the most obvious measures in the autocrat’s playbook for controlling the spread of unfavourable opinion, and the el-Sisi regime is no exception. In looking to stifle any efforts of dissent amongst a public, which not only disapproves of relations with Israel, but actively seeks to prevent the government from carrying out normalisation with it, the government has cracked down on pro-Palestinian sentiment. For example, on the 4th of April 2024, 10 activists and journalists were arrested for spreading ‘fake news’ regarding the conflict following their participation in a protest at the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo. They were further accused of ‘collaborating with a terrorist group’, in line with the government’s fears that Islamist groups may be taking advantage of the conflict to spread their influence in the country, as well as a potential attempt to delegitimise the protestor’s viewpoints, framing them as not just misinformed, but also as inherently dangerous. As well as journalists however, members of the wider public also face systemic arrests if found involved in pro-Palestinian protesting — according to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, as of the 13th of November 2024, there were still over 100 Egyptians detained for showing support for Palestine, who were arrested without trial and denied medical care — blatant human rights violations.
In accordance with the rising trend of ‘digital authoritarianism’, the regime has also updated censorship laws to encompass the use of social media, allowing them to restrict the spreading of discontent, which, as seen in 2011, had been a significant tool for expressing political contempt, a driver in instigating the spread of the Arab Spring, and a contributor to the toppling of the previous regime in Egypt. A significant development of said digital authoritarianism in Egypt was the creation of the 2018 Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law No. 175, Article 7 of which stipulates that broadcasts which “jeopardize the national security or economy” of Egypt can be blocked. This is paired with Articles 11 and 34 of the same law, which state that evidence taken from websites is equally incriminating as physical criminal evidence and that those crimes committed which are found to be done for the purpose of disturbing the public order shall be punished with “rigorous imprisonment”. Combining these laws, the government has been able to prosecute anyone deemed to be threatening the government’s interests, under the guise of protecting the national interest. This has recently been extended to pro-Palestinian activists based on their social media content. According to an Amnesty report in June 2024, two students, Mazen Daraz and Ziad Basiouny, were arrested for ‘publishing fake news' due to their online involvement with a ‘Students for Palestine’ student group. The creation of offices dedicated specifically to monitoring online activity that can threaten the state apparatus has thus worked in inhibiting the ability of pro- Palestinian Egyptians to properly mobilise beyond symbolic shows of support.
III. Generating Public Opinion
Authoritarian regimes do not solely rely on physical force and censorship however. Equally important is the role of propaganda in generating public opinion which sides with the regime, the two main aspects of which are the state media and the state education system.
Overview of the Media Landscape
The government in Egypt has a strong hold on the media landscape in the country. Polling done by the World Values Survey suggests that only around a quarter of Egyptians use social media as a daily information source, which means that for the vast majority of people, the information they get will come from domestic news outlets. Additionally, due to high rates of arbitrary journalist detentions in the country, the Reporters without Borders index currently ranks Egypt 170th (out of 180) on the press freedom index, down from 166th in 2023. Naturally, following from this, the state can dictate what most available news sources say, both in general, and with regards to Israel specifically.
Journalism in Egypt has indeed been and often still can be extremely critical of Israel; to provide an example prior to the coming to power of el-Sisi, a 2004 article titled “Dowidar: The Israeli ambassador to Egypt is a foul-mouthed liar”, discusses a situation where the editor-in-chief of a state-owned newspaper ‘Al-Akhbar’ published an article supporting the armed resistance of Palestinians, even pointing to the possibility of Israel being responsible for the events of 9/11. However, focusing on the government-owned ‘Al-Ahram’ newspaper, the most widely circulated one in Egypt, it becomes apparent that under el-Sisi’s regime, even if the Egyptian government has been critical of Israeli leadership, it has also emphasised its role in the conflict as one of mediator between Israelis and Palestinians (thus acknowledging Israel’s legitimacy as a state), with a continued affirmation of its relationship with Israel as one that can bring economic benefits and international standing to Egypt. Exemplifying this, an article from the 18th of November 2024 is illustrative: titled “President Sisi and his Brazilian counterpart agree on the necessity of implementing the two-state solution and rejecting any attempts to liquidate the Palestinian cause” it ,)الـرئـیس السـیسي ونـظیره الـبرازیـلي یـتفقان عـلى ضـرورة تـنفیذ حـل الـدولـتین ورفـض أیـة مـحاولات لـتصفیة الـقضیة الفلسـطینیة( shows el-Sisi as a leader at the forefront of international diplomacy regarding the conflict. Similarly a 2022 article, titled “$9.9 billion in Egypt’s natural gas exports in 2022. Infrastrcuture is a turnkey مـلیار دولار صـادرات مـصر مـن الـغاز الـطبیعي عـام 2022.. والـبنیة الـتحتیة حـل 9.9( ”solution to meet Europe’s needs regarding a deal between the European Union, Israel, and Egypt, stresses ,)جـاھـز لـلوفـاء بـاحـتیاجـات أوروبـا the significance of such a deal in reinforcing Mediterranean cooperation, clearly framing economic relations with Israel as beneficial to Egypt and the region as a whole.
2. Education: How El-Sisi Frames Israeli Relations through Textbooks
The Egyptian government has also put in place policies to change the views of younger generations of Egyptians on Israeli cooperation, using its control of the education system. Taking advantage of their control over the early stages of socialisation to inculcate political views has substantial precedent in authoritarian regimes, as it presents an opportunity to shape the long-term views of the people. A regime that has used schooling to advance its political agenda in recent years is China’s communist party. Using textbook reforms between 2004 and 2010 as a case study, Cantoni et al. found that the government had successfully altered students’ views on Chinese political institutions to be more positive, and show more scepticism towards the free market, suggesting that “an authoritarian state can effectively indoctrinate students.” Even more striking is that they found educational reforms more successful in indoctrinating citizens than other forms of propaganda, including television.
It is, therefore, no surprise that the Egyptian government has attempted implemented similar policies within its curricula. A noticeable shift occurred under el-Sisi, where official school textbooks began to frame establishing relations with Israel in a more positive light, in line with the economic goals of the regime. To provide one example, the 2016/2017 edition of the ninth-grade الــــدراســــات( ’social studies textbook ‘The Geography of the World and the History of Moden Egypt 1979 outright lists the benefits of peace with Israel since the ,)الاجـتماعـیة جـغرافـیة الـعالـم وتـاریـخ مـصر الحـدیـث Camp David agreement. To provide an extract from the textbook:
“Choosing peace instead of war that drains resources has come with many benefits such as follows:
Internal stabillity in Arab countries
Faster social and economic development and infrastructure
Encouraging investment from domestic and foreign capital in Egypt and other Arab countries
Encouraging tourism, providing income and hard currency
Establishment of national projects and development in Egypt and other countries”
As O. Winter notes, the overall historical framing of the creation of Israel in the Egyptian education system remains in line with Mubarak-era textbooks, and in particular, it still attempts to reinforce the idea that Egypt has still stood by the Palestinian people. However, it still looks to establish peace with Israel as “a result of pragmatic-utilitarian considerations...a strategic asset whose preservation is a basic condition for Egypt’s economic survival.” Just how successful these reforms will be is hard to determine as the proportion of the population who willl have grown up reading these reformulated textbooks is still relatively small.
IV. Have these Policies Worked? Are they Sustainable?
Theoretical framework
When aiming to measure the impact of authoritarian governments’ attempts at shaping public opinion, a useful framework is discussed by academics Neundorf and Pop-Eleches. They outline two outcomes of authoritarian indoctrination: internalisation and resistance. In the case of internalisation, citizens’ views begin to align with those held or desired by the regime; in the case of Egypt, this would be reflected in greater support for Egypt’s role as a ‘neutral mediator’ in the Israel-Palestine conflict and acceptance of closer economic ties with Israel. On the other hand, resistance is marked by the disapproval of the regimes rhetoric. However, it is their classification of resistance into two main types that makes the framework particularly useful. They distinguish between a) the rejection of doctrine and embracing of opposition groups to the government, and b) disengagement, where people simply do not buy into the propaganda, but ultimately, whether because of a perceived inability to change things or otherwise, do not look to actively challenge said propaganda. As one can imagine, although the former situation could be a genuine problem for the regime, strengthening its opposition, the latter would likely not be a 'bad' scenario for it, as acquiescence to an oppressive government is ultimately an already common attitude within authoritarian regimes.
2. Internalisation or Resistance? Measuring Public Opinion
With this framework in mind, one can start to explore the trajectory of public opinion regarding cooperation with Israel. Unfortunately, measuring public opinion in Egypt is difficult, as in most autocracies, where good polling is scant. However, of the polls that exist, a general trend has become clear: public opinion of the government’s relations with Israel has remained unfavourable, thus signalling a rejection of the regime's rhetoric. The government’s whole gamble, in being symbolically highly critical of Israel and simultaneously justifying its relationship with it as a matter of pragmatism, relied on the hope that Egyptians would be sold by the idea of improving the economy, even if at the expense of Palestinian lives. However, this has simply not been the case; a Washington Institute poll published in June 2023 found that only 15% of responders agreed with the statement: ‘if it would help our economy, it would be acceptable to have some business deals with Israeli companies’. This shows an abject failure in the government’s main rhetoric, and very much reinforces the fact that normalisation with Israel “has only occurred at the official level.”
A potential reason to explain this is that there is an overwhelming view that the Palestinian cause is seen as an Arab issue, leading to much stronger support than might otherwise be expected at the expense of potential economic benefit. In fact, the sense that the conflict is an Arab issue has only grown stronger as a consequence of the Gaza war, from 75% of poll respondents believing it was an Arab issue in 2022 to 94% of respondents during the Gaza war. Additionally, the previously mentioned arrested pro-Palestinian protestors are a cause for concern for the regime, as it marks the first time in half a decade that there have been any anti-government protests. To make matters even more difficult for a regime that relies on military forces, soldiers are also becoming frustrated with the government’s attitude towards the conflict, and the apparent downplaying in the Egyptian media of the killing of an Egyptian soldier by Israeli forces at the Rafah crossing can only inflame this frustration.
At the same time, even if it is relatively simple to conclude that the government has not succeeded in garnering support for economic ties with Israel, it would be misleading to suggest that these results necessarily ring the death knell of the regime. Despite the instances of protests from Palestinian sympathisers, there is also some evidence to suggest that people’s resistance to the regime’s rhetoric has come in the form of disengagement. The lack of data makes it hard to substantiate. However one poll by the Washington Institute, conducted in Spring 2023. found that half of the population was still in disagreement with street protests, signalling a seeming lack of motivation by many to actively challenge the regime. And yet, potential future trouble for the regime does exist, as younger generation may be more prone to challenging political doctrines. As has been seen, the Gaza war has evidenty inflamed the people’s anger at the government’s foreign policy, and could mark a turn away from the disengagement and lack of support for protests. There are also prospects greater political motivation in the future. The Arab Barometer found in 2019 that Egypt was the only country where the youth was substantially more interested in politics than older generations. This, along with the fact that younger cohorts also tend to use social media more often could cause problems for the regime; although social media is monitored by the government, the decentralised and expansive nature of the internet means that it is still easier for younger people to encounter reporting critical of the regime, or engage in political expression themselves.
Conclusion
Ultimately, even though it is apparent that the government has failed to change nation’s opinions on normalisation with Israel, one cannot conclude whether its position is unsustainable for el-Sisi’s regime. However, a few ‘ifs’ can signal potential change. Firstly the sustained economic pressure caused by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea is a significant problem, as it highlights both the political and economic frustrations the population has with the government — political due to it reflecting the failures of the regime to actually broker peace in the region as it claims it is doing, and economic because it has severely damaged one of Egypt’s best sources of continual income. If this continues, as the Maersk shipping company’s new long-term network plans show might happen, it could be a point of no return for a regime that has failed to deliver on economic and political promises. Even worse, the more the conflict drones one, and thus the more its stable Suez Canal revenue suffers, the more it will have to rely on Western aid, which to reiterate is dependent on friendly relations with Israel, which will only increase public anger at the fact that this relationship exists in the first place. Furthermore, the pro-Palestine protests do point to increasing pressure from below; if the government continues to show a reluctance to take any substantial action, even in situations where Israel is accumulating military forces at Egypt’s border, and even in cases where Israeli forces (allegedly mistakenly) kill an Egyptian soldier, the regime may not survive the disastrous optics this may cause.
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