Realpolitik, Reconciliation and Reconstruction: How Will Turkish-Kurdish Relations Evolve in Post-Assad Syria?

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March 2025, Article written by Lara Harmankaya

Introduction

After 40 years of armed conflict and insurgency against Turkey, Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the internationally designated terrorist organization, Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), called for the group to disarm and disband on February 27. The Kurdish guerrilla group soon announced that a ceasefire had been declared. This historic landmark in the decades-long conflict promises to usher in a new era of peace and democratization for the Kurds, winning the Erdogan regime much-needed political points for the 2028 elections, but also bringing with it uncertainty as to how it will impact the Kurds’ political position in the new Syrian state. What will the Turkish government concede in return, if anything?

Turkish diplomatic maneuvering is not a new phenomenon. Paradoxical geopolitical moves, ambitious but often counterproductive, have characterized the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s foreign policy since the beginning of their 23-year rule. Instances of bandwagoning, transactionalism and the pursuit of ‘flexible alliances’ have even been institutionalized under the policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ over the past decade. They have molded Turkey’s entry into the Syrian Civil War and have continued to shape its policy choices in its aftermath. Yet, they are not limited to foreign policy and have offshoots in domestic policy as well. The latest confounding case in Turkey is the development of a reconciliation process with the Kurds, triggered by a shaking of the hands between Devlet Bahceli, chairman of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdogan’s right-hand man in parliament, and politicians from the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). This surprisingly did yield results and gave rise to the PKK’s watershed statement, in return for a pathway to end the life sentence of its jailed leader.

Until October 2024, when Bahceli extended his unexpected olive branch to Öcalan, he had been adamant about his advocacy to ban DEM. He was also the man behind calls to reintroduce the death penalty to execute Abdullah Ocalan. Nonetheless, within this emerging political backdrop, he followed his newfound interest in peace with the PKK with a mention of the "millennial brotherhood" between Turks and Kurds. The timing of this maneuver, coinciding with Turkey’s attempts to maximize gains in post-Assad Syria, reveals the questionable authenticity of the AKP and MHP’s intentions regarding the Kurds, making clear yet again that at the heart of all of their alliances is invariably holding onto power. Situated at the crux of a path-defining point in the trajectory of a new Syrian state, Turkey’s transforming relationship with the Kurds and the prospects of a deal will have crucial repercussions on Syrian state-building efforts.

The New Status Quo in Syria

On 8 December, 2024, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad toppled at a shocking speed after a major rebel offensive, leaving behind in its wake the Turkey-backed Sunni Islamist rebel group Hayat Tahrir Al- Sham (HTS) to seize power. Tasked with governing the reconstruction of a country reeling from the impacts of a decade-long civil war and an even longer period under authoritarian rule under the Assad dynasty, HTS now faces a daunting future—one that Turkey wishes to play an active role in.

Amid winds of change and political rearrangement, Turkey is seeking to reassert itself as a major player in Syria, voicing its clear opposition to granting a political voice to the PKK-linked Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) before it reforms into a national political party. As a long-time ally of the US in its counterterrorism operations against ISIS, the YPG and the broader Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been the major actors of cross-border conflict with Turkey in northeastern Syria, eliciting suspicion, given their affiliation with the PKK, in the eyes of Ankara. The Turkish government has been entangled in armed conflict with the PKK since 1984. Its most recent reported attack was on the site of a leading Turkish defense industry company (TUSAŞ) on October 23, 2024, which killed at least five. Now, Turkey, with a renewed self-relevance given its ties to the HTS, is prepared to re-center its position within the coalition fighting ISIS and marginalize that of the YPG. Its February announcement of a joint regional initiative to counter a possible IS resurgence with Iraq, Jordan and Syria is the first manifestation of such intentions. Underlying this is the goal to disband the Kurdish militia in Syria entirely, the SDF, which Ankara views as a threat to its territorial integrity. What remains to be seen is whether the Erdogan regime’s position towards the elimination of the SDF will soften following the disbandment of the PKK. One important consideration to bear in mind is the detention centers jailing ISIS fighters that are managed by the SDF—for this project to work, the HTS must take over their operations smoothly.

Both Erdogan and Al-Sharaa, the interim president of the Syrian transitional government, have much to gain from their strategic partnership, which was embodied in Al-Sharaa’s January 9 visit to Turkey. For the latter, it is the guarantee that the new Syrian government will side with Ankara against Kurdish attempts at self-governance in the northeast, as well as the promise of new Turkish bases. For the former, Turkey’s commitment to push for the lifting of international sanctions on Syria would greatly facilitate its ability to acquire international legitimacy and status. It is worth noting that on February 24, the Council of the EU announced that it would suspend a number of restrictive measures, including in the energy sector and on the establishment of banking relations while retaining those related to the

Al-Assad regime, arms and drug trade, and chemical weapons to “facilitate engagement” and contribute to a “swift economic recovery, reconstruction, and stabilisation.” Evidently, the tide in opinion on the Al-Sharaa government’s credibility is already moving in this direction.

It is, therefore, no surprise that they are on the same page on several issues related to the Kurdish question. With Turkey having a degree of leverage over the governing HTS, its threat perception and security concerns must not be unheeded.

Peace with the PKK?

The domestic motivations for forging peace with the Kurds are not minimal and are bound to have significant ramifications on its policy towards the Syrian Kurds. To enact constitutional reforms to enable Erdogan’s accession to a third term in government, his Justice and Development Party and its primary ally, the far-right MHP, must achieve 360 votes out of 600 in the national parliament to call early elections—for which they need an additional 45 votes. To that end, the recent willingness to revise relations with the Kurds and propel a renewed peace with the PKK can be interpreted as a means to a self-serving end: a partnership with the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) in parliament to extend Erdoğan’s mandate.

This simultaneously requires votes from the Kurds themselves, who have favored the opposition in the May 2023 local elections. By conceding its hard stance on Öcalan and reducing his sentence to house arrest, the AKP regime can curry support from the Kurdish population and split the opposition, which has consisted of a bloc containing the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and DEM. What makes this highly relevant is the existing lines of dialogue that exist within the Kurdish community divided across Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Early in February, a delegation from the DEM Party met with Iraqi Kurdistan Party’s Masoud Barzani to advance the PKK peace deal negotiations, and with the

An equally salient feature of what is at stake, domestically, in Syria is the status of the refugees. Anti- immigrant sentiment permeates Turkey, which has hosted more than three million Syrian refugees since the Syrian civil war and is ‘The World’s Leading Refugee Host,’ according to the Migration Policy Institute. With the promise of a rules-based alternative to Al-Assad’s dictatorships that Al- Sharaa is presenting, Erdogan has endorsed the voluntary repatriation of Syrian refugees in line with the demands of his constituents. Coupled with this is the prospect of a revival of the suspended Turkey- Syria Free Trade Agreement and investment from Turkish companies across Syria to bolster the inflation-torn Turkish economy. All of these factors point to one reality: there is real political interest in effectuating some sort of peace with the Kurds in Syria. It is in Turkey’s interest to reach a compromise. This, however, necessitates a peaceful formula of inclusive state-building in Syria that is not disrupted by external players.

A Complicated Geopolitical Panorama

Consequential not only for Turkey’s foreign policy but also for the broader region was Donald Trump’s re-election in November 2024. Particularly relevant for the Syria-Turkey border, this points to the likely outcome of a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria by 2026. The 2,500 and 900 US soldiers positioned in Iraq and Syria respectively have a history of cooperation with the Kurdish militias, and their sudden departure undoubtedly would impact the power balance, potentially leaving behind a power vacuum that Ankara will want to benefit from. Namely, Turkey would have a stronger negotiating position against the Kurds by threatening military incursions from the North. Nevertheless, Turkey is not the only country situated in the region with plans to promote its interests in the ‘new’ Syria. Israel, having significantly weakened the ‘Axis of Resistance’ through its intense bombardment campaigns against Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas, and thereby contributing to the lightning fall of the Assad regime, also hopes to capitalize on its aftermath.

Israel has already relaunched its defenses in the Golan Heights, launched hundreds of strikes on Syria’s remaining arsenal under Operation Bashan Arrow, violated the 1974 UN disengagement agreement by seizing the Area of Separation (AOS) and established a buffer zone for itself by capturing Syria’s Mount Hermon outpost. It will do everything possible to preclude the rearmament of Hezbollah and the resurgence of the Islamic State. Without the presence of the US troops in Syria, it is ambivalent whether Israel will be emboldened to take further steps to reinforce its objectives.

Interestingly, Israel also sees an ally in the Kurds within this recomposing context. On November 10, 2024, Israel Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar declared, “[Kurds] are our natural ally,” and that Israel “must reach out and strengthen our ties with them.” With a history of supporting Kurdish rebels in the 1960s and 1970s, and a growing list of countries that have been targeted by Israeli airstrikes since October 7, the chances of a military confrontation with Turkey in Syria’s northeast are far from insubstantial. Yet, there is one point on which reconciliation is possible: countering Iran. Having lost its ally in Syria, Al-Assad, and subsequently, its weapons supply line, Tehran is likely to reject the peace bid pursued by Turkey and attempt to forge stronger ties with PKK commanders based in Qandil. Although it is still too early to tell whether in-fighting within the PKK following its leader’s declaration is feasible, neither Turkey nor Israel should allow the strengthening of an Iranian-backed opposition movement to gain a foothold near Iraq.

Is Consensus Conceivable?

Turkey has articulated its vision for the resolution of the Kurdish question in Syria: the expulsion of PKK cadres from the SDF, the disarming and integration of the SDF into the centralized command of a Syrian military, and the reduction of the areas under Kurdish autonomous control—like the oil-rich towns of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Although this contradicts the Kurdish visions of a decentralized governance model that includes fully autonomous administrative, military and cultural control, a compromise is not inconceivable. Turkish demands, emerging from years of battling terrorism and existential insecurity, are not entirely outrageous. They can coexist with the hopes of the Kurds to live in peace and free from forces that wish to deprive them of their rights, but only if Al-Sharaa and his interim government do not divert from their promises of pluralistic representation.

Reaching a consensus between various interpretations of political Islam and secularism will undeniably be difficult in the state formation process. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that the upcoming national dialogue conference projects an unprecedented potential to establish a constitution that can enshrine multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and tolerant principles as foundational pillars of the new Syrian state. Participating in this process by negotiating with Al-Sharaa and sparking a deal will bring the Kurds one step closer to maintaining autonomy. The meeting of SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Al-Sharaa in early January, where they agreed on the importance of keeping Syria unified is a step in the right direction.

The secret ongoing negotiations between jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and Ankara are also seemingly bearing some fruits, with the predictions of a video statement by Öcalan to restart peace talks with the Turkish government finally materializing on February 27. Although it is unlikely that this will immediately undo years of wrongdoing and reverse a precedent of cracking down on pro- Kurdish politicians in Turkey, it is an indication of the close correlation between Turkish domestic policy and its implications on foreign policy. Most importantly, it opens the way for the terrorist organization’s disbandment and has massive potential to overcome the PKK issue in US-Turkish relations. This would mean not only Turkish acquiescence in incorporating more Kurdish autonomy throughout the reconstruction phase but would also allow a strong, united front including Turkey and the US against potential attacks from jihadi forces on Syrian sovereignty. Cooperation between Turkey and the PYD may arise after shedding the perceived looming shadow of the PKK infringing on Turkish security interests. At the very least, the ongoing clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), as well as violent confrontations with the Turkish army in Turkey’s southeast, can cease.

The most undesirable scenario would be one of foreign encroachment on Syrian soil at this moment. Neither Israel nor Turkey should be threatening military involvement, and the EU and the USA must deter such a turn if peace is to be preserved. The new Syria must be built on dialogue between all parties, and the Kurds should have a political voice in this as well. Turkey recognizes this. It is in favor of integrating the Kurds into the Syrian political system and has involved the Kurdistan Democratic Party of the Iraqi Kurds as a mediator to further the reconciliation process with the PKK. What remains to be determined is the question of the degree of autonomy and decentralization.

Conclusion

The peace process with the Kurds was originally initiated between 2009 and 2015. It failed to cease the sparking of renewed tensions, terrorist bomb attacks in civilian areas in Turkey, retaliatory airstrikes and military operations in northeastern Syria and Iraq, and government repression on those with alleged affiliation to the PKK. It is thus clear that a new paradigm in relations will not happen overnight. Scholars’ skepticism of the Erdogan government’s ‘democratic’ intentions is also justified—Turkey’s democratic backsliding over the past two decades is visceral. Furthermore, the recent policy U-turn of the Turkish government regarding the PKK and the Kurds, who make up 15- 20% of the Turkish population, point to another fact: peace should not be the pragmatic pursuit of a populist politician but a long-term project. The instrumentalization of minority rights, in foreign or domestic policy, serves only to stir further resentment if the authenticity of peace-making intentions can be questioned. At the same time, however, the opportunity for a change in the current state of affairs with the Kurds can be interpreted as a positive development, especially if it can induce the resolution of the bloody, family-dividing and polarizing Kurdish question.

The Turkish government, amid all of its strategizing, should remain realistic. What happens in Syria, after all, has direct consequences on Turkish domestic policy, and vice versa. The economic benefits of reconstruction can only be cultivated and reaped if astute decision-making is prioritized. Erdogan’s ideologically driven neo-Ottoman dreams of Islamic diplomacy throughout the Middle East may engender as many enemies as allies. Other Sunni states are bound to feel threatened by such behavior, and Israel has already started showing signs of its frustration at Turkey’s hegemony-seeking moves. If the existential fear of Turkey—that of a Kurdish proto-state backed by the US and Israel on its southern border—is to be prevented from transpiring, it should enact its political maneuvers prudently. Appearing to favor aggression against the Kurds could radicalize their aims. Their stated aims of some autonomy within a unified and centralized Syrian state should not be a source of fear but reassurance. If this fails to come to life, the ramifications of a failed Turkish-Kurdish rapprochement and a remoulding chain of alliances along the Turkish-Syrian border can unlock a Pandora’s box of instability and foreign intervention.

If there is one conclusion that all parties can agree on, it would be this: state failure in post-Assad Syria would benefit nobody. To avoid such an outcome, alliances, whether tenuous or not, must be forged shrewdly. Stability in Syria is in everyone’s best interest.

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Lucas Desgardin