The Saudi-Iranian proxy conflict: sectarianism or realpolitik?
Author: Emin Özdemir.
Introduction
Amid the shifting sands of Middle Eastern diplomacy, two regional powerhouses, Saudi Arabia and Iran, find themselves locked in a complex dance of influence, rivalries, and alliances. As they navigate the treacherous waters of Middle Eastern politics, their diplomatic, economic, and military maneuvers reverberate through the Middle East, deepening the fault lines of sectarianism and stoking the flames of religious tensions in the region.
This competition is sometimes portrayed as the “Middle Eastern Cold War”. Similar to the original period of the Cold War that marked tense relations, but no direct hostilities, between the United States and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Saudi-Iranian competition is evident in the national politics of Iraq, neighborhoods of Lebanon, and deserts of Yemen, without an official declaration of hostilities. Another parallel between these two political struggles is the use of proxy wars. To briefly define proxy wars, they are “conflicts in which a third party intervenes indirectly in order to influence the strategic outcome in favor of its preferred faction” according to Andrew Mumford (2013). The states prefer proxy conflict for multiple reasons including a) establishing plausible deniability on the diplomatic stage, b) destabilizing a competitor's internal politics, c) utilizing an extra layer of escalation between diplomatic protest and open hostilities, and d) lower costs associated with supporting proxies relative to direct military operations.
So far the Saudi Arabian-Iranian proxy conflict has been usually characterized as a fundamentally sectarian conflict, stemming from ages of divide in the Islamic civilization, namely that between Sunnis and Shias. This view has been prominently argued in both media and academic circles (Marcus) (Dahl). However, it is important to delve further into the causes of this proxy conflict as assuming it merely as a sectarian struggle can a) divert much-needed political capital needed to resolve the conflict away from the actual reasons behind it, b) create a fatalistic perception of this conflict as a natural one that has existed for centuries and hence one that cannot be realistically solved politically, and c) lead to oversimplification of a nuanced struggle crucial to understanding Middle Eastern geopolitics (Gause).
In this paper, I will argue that the “Middle Eastern Cold War” is not primarily driven by sectarianism but rather by geopolitical and domestic calculations. To secure better international and domestic political positions, actors involved in the conflict can utilize the rhetoric and tools of sectarianism, however, even in these cases the motivations are still political. To this end, I will first explain the possible non-sectarian motivations and then demonstrate that sectarian lines had been crossed when it was convenient for the discussed political interests. Finally, I will offer explanations for areas where there are convoluted dynamics between sectarianism and realpolitik before concluding my paper.
The political origins of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry
In the history of the Middle East sectarian conflict no doubt plays a large role, however, in no way was it a constant or omnipresent feature. When one examines the 20th-century history of the region, there is a stark contrast with the sectarian vision. Until the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, Saudi Arabia and Iran were both under the US security umbrella fighting against the socialist-republican wave of Nasserism and Soviet influence. Nor were the Saudi-Iranian relations explicitly conflictual in the decades between the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the Arab Spring. Thus other explanations are necessary to understand the causes of this competition. In this section, I will argue that domestic support, international security, and regional influence constitute the primary political origins of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.
When the mythical “black box” image of a state is scrutinized more closely it becomes clear that not all citizens of the state have a unified idea of the raison d’État. The decision-makers who sit in the halls of power usually have their own political survival in the back of their minds when making decisions about what suits the “interests of the state”. From such a perspective the inner workings of the regime elite and their domestic calculations will no doubt influence the foreign policy as well (Waltz). In this light, one of the political origins of the Saudi-Iranian competition can be argued to be domestic survival for both regimes. The Saudi monarchy has historically legitimized its rule through clerics and Islam, however, this was challenged by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 when the new Islamic regime declared the Saudi regime’s interpretation of Islam to be un-Qur’anic and the rule of the House of Saud illegitimate (Crepy). In reverse, the Iranian revolutionaries also embraced the ethos of “spreading the revolution” as a core tenant of their regime, hence both states had their legitimacy challenged and threatened by the other.
On top of domestic concerns, international security played a decisive role in the emergence of this rivalry as well. Saudi Arabia bankrolled the Iraq war of 2003 to topple the Islamic regime and annex the Sunni-majority Khuzestan region. In reverse, Iran also challenged Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity through the Shia minority living in the North East and South West of the country (Crepy). Arguably, it was this insecurity caused by the possible threat of Shia separatism that triggered Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. On top of threats to territorial integrity, Saudi Arabia also feels threatened by the threat posed by Iran to its oil and water facilities. As the country is economically dependent on oil and has limited water facilities the threat of Iranian attacks on these resources poses an existential threat to the country. The attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen against Saudi oil facilities in 2017, 2019 (Al Jazeera), and more recently in 2022 (Yaakoubi and Dahan) demonstrate the extent of the Houthi capacities. The Saudis see the Iranian missile program that can target the Saudi Gulf and the increasing entrenchment, and close ties with Iran, of Houthis that can carry out attacks in the south and Hejaz regions as a fundamental risk to their security.
Moreover, the Iranian vision of spreading the Islamic Revolution, or at least their influence, over other Middle Eastern countries threatens the position of Saudi Arabia in the region. Before the Gulf and Iraq wars, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq used to be an important counterweight for the Saudis against the Iranians. However, the chaos resulting from the American Invasion opened up a window of opportunity for Iranians. The weakness of state institutions and the inability of the post-Saddam regimes to offer an inclusive vision for Iraq gave rise to increasing Iranian influence through parallel organizations like Popular Mobilization Forces.
The second play of this conflict of regional influence emerged after the Arap Spring and the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. Syria had close relations with Iran since the times of Hafez Assad, however, this alliance became solidified and Iranian influence in Syria increased as Iran, along with Russia, became a key ally in propping up the Assad regime. To counter the growing regional influence of Iran, Saudi Arabia also allied itself with other regional proxies that will be analyzed in more detail in the following section.
As demonstrated, the political elites of both Saudi Arabia and Iran have various interests to protect or promote both in the domestic and international arena. When both states view each other as a threat to their regime survival, national security, and regional influence it is very much expectable for a rivalry to emerge regardless of sectarian differences.
The scenes and the actors
Uncharasterically for a purely sectarian conflict, both Iran and Saudi Arabia supported actors that crossed or did not abide by sectarian lines as proxies or allies through the last decade. The diversity of the supported actors across the scenes of conflict from Palestine to Iraq draws us to a complex political network of alliances aimed at counterbalancing the competitor rather than a dogmatically sectarian outlook.
Saudi Arabia has a history of supporting non-sectarian political factions to enhance its regional influence. In order to limit the Iranian influence in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall, Saudi Arabia supported the secularist Iraqiya Party in both the 2005 and 2010 elections. This is a puzzling case to explain from a sectarian point because the Iraqiya Party not only had a secular policy platform, in contrast to the Salafist outlook of Saudi Arabia, but their leader, Iyad Allawi, was also a Shia by birth (Gause). Moreover, when the Syrian Civil War broke out, instead of supporting Salafists or other fundamentalist groups, Saudi Arabia turned to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a non-sectarian umbrella opposition group against Assad (Gause). Only after the FSA’s failures and increasing Turkish/American influence on the FSA did they turn to support Salafist groups. Their initial preference and later shift suggest a politically motivated calculation rather than a strictly sectarian support.
A similar case also exists for Iran. Syria under the Assad regime is Iran’s erstwhile ally in the region. This is despite the Arab nationalist and secularist Ba’ath ideology of the Syrian regime and Bashar’s Alawi identity, which is considered heretical by most Shia clerics (Kramer). Furthermore, in addition to its established links with Shia organizations in Iraq, Iran also has ties with secular nationalist Kurdish groups such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Gause). Lastly, despite their Sunni affiliations Iran is also known to support the activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad (“Iran's Stakes in the Hamas-Israel Conflict”).
It is also important to note that, although I will not delve into much detail due to the scope of this paper, even when proxies or regional allies themselves seem to fit the narrow sectarian framework, they do not necessarily need to operate in a sectarian manner. For instance, Hizbollah tried to engage and mobilize the support of non-Shia populations of Lebanon since the beginning of its “Lebanonization” process. Also, the fact that Houthis belong to a different sect of Shiism, Zayidism, rather than Iranian Twelverism did not act as a barrier to their cooperation with Iran.
Overlaps and the role of sectarianism
Although not the core driver of the Saudi-Iranian confrontation, sectarianism is undoubtedly a part of it. Due to the inextricable link between politics and religion, sectarian fault lines may from time to time overlap with political interests. In such cases, we witness the involvement of sectarianism in the larger framework of political, diplomatic, and military confrontation.
In some cases, sectarian fault lines served as linkages between the country and proxy groups. It is no coincidence that Hizbollah and Houthis are allies of Iran as their cultural and political interests and visions overlap sufficiently. Moreover, in some reversed cases the proxies fashion themselves as sectarian organizations to secure funding and support from regional powers. For instance, some opposition groups in Syria rebranded themselves as Salafist groups to receive Saudi backing (Gause). As demonstrated in these cases sectarianism can serve as a link between the proxy and the regional power.
Secondly, sectarian rhetoric can be used to mobilize domestic support against the competing powers as well. Iran used the 2015 Mecca stampede and execution of Nimr al-Nirm, a prominent Shia cleric, by Saudi authorities as excuses to protest and cut diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia (“Timeline: Iran and Saudi Arabia, from rivalry to rapprochement”).
Finally, the conflict itself can also lead to increased sectarian tensions. The continued warfare and proxy involvement in both Syria and Yemen strengthened already existing sectarian fault lines and further divided the communities. As proxy elements came to increasingly rely on a narrower and narrower basis of support, typically from their own sects, they turned more aggressive toward the outside groups. Over the duration of these conflicts, previously unimaginable amounts of inter-communal hatred became normalized (Crepy).
Conclusion
The portrayal of the causes of conflict matters because they inform how we think of them, their causes, and their solutions. As it is virtually impossible to solve a crisis without first knowing where and why it emerged framing how we think of these crises matter. For a long time, the Saudi-Iranian competition has been framed as a religious tension by some in the media, academy, and even politics, perhaps with an influence of Orientalism. However, this perspective can be troublesome as it naturalizes the problem and allows for an almost indifferent attitude towards it as “you cannot solve hundred years old problems”. Moreover, it also simplifies a deeply complex situation and places it in a vacuum isolated from international interventions when it is precisely such interventions (such as in Iraq and Syria) that escalated these tensions.
In this paper, I argued that the driver of the “Middle Eastern Cold War” is domestic and international political interests rather than a struggle of sects. I argued this by first offering alternative narratives of motivations and interests for the conflict and secondly by demonstrating the cases where the sectarian line has been passed. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that sectarianism still plays a role, although not as a central cause, in this conflict as it overlaps with political interests and is further fueled by continued conflict.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that this paper is a retrospective one that aims to analyze past events. The sands of Middle Eastern geopolitics are as fluid as ever and recently we have witnessed a de-escalation of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. In March 2023, through a Chinese-brokered deal, both states re-established their diplomatic relations. However, it remains to be seen whether this normalization can lead to a state of peaceful co-existence or even fruitful cooperation. The violent resurgence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since October and the possible Saudi normalization of relations with Israel could facilitate or risk the prospects of Saudi-Iranian relations.
Works Cited
Crepy, Pauline. “Proxy Warfare's Impact on Sectarianization: The Case of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry.” FLUX: International Relations Review, 2018, pp. 23-35.
Dahl, Gustav Skjold Bang. “Understanding the "Islamic Cold War": How can the growing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and their behavior in recent years best be explained using IR theory.”
Gause, F. Gregory. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Brookings Doha Center, 11 November 2014.
“Iran's Stakes in the Hamas-Israel Conflict.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 October 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90847. Accessed 16 November 2023.
Kramer, Martin. “Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism.” Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, Westview Press, 1987, pp. 237-254.
Marcus, Jonathan. “Why Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals.” BBC, 16 September 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809. Accessed 7 November 2023.
Mumford, Andrew. “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict.” RUSI Journal, no. 158, 2013, pp. 40-46.
“Timeline: Iran and Saudi Arabia, from rivalry to rapprochement.” Al Jazeera, 10 March 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/iran-and-saudi-arabia-from-rivalry-to-mending-ties-a-timeline. Accessed 7 November 2023.
Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State, and War. Columbia University Press, 1959.
Yaakoubi, Aziz El, and El Dahan. “Saudi Aramco petroleum storage site hit by Houthi attack, fire erupts.” Reuters, 26 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-air-defences-destroy-houthi-drones-state-tv-2022-03-25/. Accessed 7 November 2023.
