Hezbollah’s legitimacy: Affected by its response to the events in the Gaza Strip?

November 2023, Article by Nicolás Restrepo

       The consolidation of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s can be seen as a product of the convergence of multiple circumstances. Among them, according to Nizar Hamzeh (2004), was the historic marginalization of the Shiite community in the region, the recent political victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the 1978, but especially, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon along with its subsequent occupation. Regarding this last set of events, according to Israel, its military actions had the objective of dismantling the operational capacity of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon, which had a strong presence in the country since the early 1970s. However, the invasions ended up causing a significant amount of civilian casualties in particular among Shiite communities located in Southern Lebanon, where violent clashes were concentrated. In this context, Hezbollah positioned itself as the main source of resistance against the Israeli Army, which brought it a notable amount of popular support. But Hezbollah didn’t frame its opposition to Israel solely on the basis of the military incursions into Lebanon. The organization also presented itself as a defender of the greater Palestinian cause which it perceived as a religious duty, heavily opposing Israel’s occupation of Palestine.

 Taking into account the strong, militant anti-Israel stance which has been part of this group’s identity since its conception, at first glance, it might seem somewhat puzzling that Hezbollah, at least at the moment of the writing of this article, has not had a fierce military reaction to the events that are unfolding in the Gaza Strip since October 2023. Mainly the bombing and other belligerent actions carried out by the Israeli army as a response to the Hamas attacks that took place earlier that same month. Through public statements and speeches, the leadership of Hezbollah has condemned Israel’s actions as well as praised Hamas’ initiative. Despite this, it has kept its military activities to a minimum. Hezbollah has not declared total war against Israel, and there have only been relatively small clashes along the Israeli-Lebanese border. The main reason why Hezbollah has abstained from more forceful means of action is that its leaders are aware that the organization may not have the capacity to deal with a direct confrontation with Israeli forces. Especially, taking into account the possibility of US support, be it direct or indirect. A possibility that must be taken seriously considering the mobilization of U.S. military assets that has taken place since the outbreak of the crisis, which includes an increased number of troops in Middle East bases and the presence of two aircraft carriers near the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Thus, Hezbollah's recent decision-making can be explained by a will of self-preservation. However, this article will argue that even though this path of action might ensure Hezbollah’s survival in the short term, it can potentially weaken the group in the long term due to the erosion of its legitimacy.

This paper is divided into three main sections. The first one presents and expands the legitimation model developed by sociologist Stefan Malthaner in order to showcase why it is so important for armed groups to be perceived as legitimate and how they attempt to do so. The second section applies this model to the case of Hezbollah. Last, taking into account the insight produced by the application of this model, the third section discusses how Hezbollah’s actions, or lack thereof, regarding the events in Gaza might lead to a de-legitimation of the group. The possible consequences of this erosion of legitimacy will be analyzed subsequently.

 I. The Legitimation Model

According to Schlichte (2012), armed groups engage in a constant pursuit of legitimacy. As to why they do this, he claims that a social order established solely through physical coercion is always going to be less stable and overall more costly to maintain that one where people willingly abide by an authority because they perceive it as legitimate. Thus, in order to advance their political goals efficiently, it is in the interest of armed groups to legitimize themselves. More precisely, Malthaner (2015) states that there are three ways in which legitimacy impacts the relationship between armed groups and the population inhabiting the territory they control. First, if the armed group is perceived as legitimate, then it is able to frame any losses it suffers in combat as sacrifices done for the welfare of the community. Since people believe this narrative, they develop a greater sense of loyalty and attachment to the armed group. Second, a greater level of legitimacy leads to a greater level of tolerance of the civilian population towards the use of coercive means by the armed group, of course, as long as they are not used indiscriminately. In other words, if legitimized armed groups use violence against the population to enforce compliance with the norms they established, there is less of a risk that this use of violence will motivate an act of resistance or defiance from the local population. Third, legitimacy activates mechanisms of social control. Essentially, this means that since people truly consider that the social order established by the armed group is beneficial for them, they want to contribute to the mitigation of any threat to that order. An example of this is civilians engaging in mutual surveillance or applying measures such as social ostracism and public shaming when they believe someone in the community is collaborating with the enemies of the armed group.

This same author theorizes that there is not one, but multiple sources from which armed groups can obtain legitimacy. First, people might start perceiving an armed group as legitimate when they can tangibly benefit from the order it has established. For example, this is normally the case when armed groups provide public services like health and education, or when they act as mediators for conflict that arise within the community (Baylouny, 2010). The legitimacy attached to a beneficial order is called basic legitimacy. The second type of legitimacy an armed actor can obtain is called traditional legitimacy, and it is acquired when the group successfully mobilizes already existing ties of loyalty and kinship within a society. Third, when an armed group is capable of portraying itself as embodying the identity of a particular community, it gains legitimacy because the population considers that the group represents them and that it will act as a defender of the community against any external threat. Last, legitimacy can also be obtained if the population is actually ideologically aligned with the political project of the armed group. That is, they believe that the fulfillment of the political goals of the group will have a positive impact on society.

II. The Legitimacy of Hezbollah

Having discussed how and why armed groups legitimize themselves, this paper will proceed to apply the concepts of the legitimation model to the case of Hezbollah. Regarding the sources of Hezbollah’s legitimacy, it seems that this armed group has been able to tap into all four sources. Concerning basic legitimacy, Hezbollah has developed a robust institutional system through which it provides public services to the population inhabiting the territory it controls. This system, as described by Nizar Hamzeh (2004), is made up of three main institutions: the Social Unit, the Islamic Health Unit and the Educational Unit. The first one is in charge of coordinating the provision of social welfare services through several smaller bodies known as foundations. The functions carried out by these foundations include, but are not limited to, building and rehabilitating public infrastructure, giving out food and clothing, and providing financial and medical support to those injured in war. The second institution, as its name indicates, is responsible for the provision of healthcare services and it has been doing so with notable success. In the year 2000, the Islamic Health Unit had over 400,000 beneficiaries[1]. Last, the Educational Unit mainly provides financial aid and scholarships to students in need. This financial aid amounted to over fourteen million dollars between 1996 and 2001[2]. Through these institutions, Hezbollah has covered the essential needs of a significant portion of the Lebanese population, mainly the Shiite community, which for many decades has experienced the absence of the state in their territory. Additionally, as stated by Baylouny (2010), Hezbollah has also created a judicial system of courts which allowed it to act as a mediator in blood feuds between family clans. Taking all this into account, it is clear that a notable amount of people under Hezbollah's control are gaining material benefits from the rule of this group and thus, perceive it as legitimate.

Hezbollah has also been able to capitalize on existing kinship dynamics in Southern Lebanon to obtain legitimacy. This group has become so intertwined with the existing power structures in the region that several of Hezbollah’s leaders are also members of powerful family clans (Malthaner, 2015). Another circumstance that illustrates Hezbollah’s capacity to mobilize family clans is that, as demonstrated by Eisenstadt and Bianchi (2017), it has largely relied on clan solidarities to recruit more members. When people perceive a social actor as legitimate for a long time, in this case family clans, then they also perceive as legitimate those who associate with, or are supported by, said actor. Thus, Hezbollah also enjoys a significant level of traditional legitimacy.

Apart from these two sources, Hezbollah has also acquired legitimacy by embodying the Shiite identity. Constantly using cultural means such as symbols and rituals to highlight and reinforce this component of its identity as an armed group (Baylouny, 2010). For example, every year, Hezbollah organizes a public event that includes prayers, speeches and demonstrations for the religious date of Ashura, which is of special importance for Shi’a Muslims. This has led to many members of the Shiite community identifying themselves with Hezbollah, viewing the group as a bastion of the values of their community and representing the interests of those who are part of it. This confers the group legitimacy as it provides a platform for Shiites in Lebanon, a community that has been marginalized by the political establishment for the great part of the country’s history.

Last but not least, Hezbollah has also gained legitimacy thanks to its political project. To put it simply, a considerable amount of people agree with this group’s ideology, be it partially or fully, and support it because of that. In his work, Nizar Hamzeh (2004) identifies two pillars of Hezbollah's ideology. He labels them as “the necessity of the Islamic order” (p. 28) and “the unity of the Islamic Ummah” (p. 39). The first element refers to Hezbollah’s conviction that society needs to be ruled through an Islamic order. A conviction which necessarily implies the establishment of an Islamic State. In Hezbollah’s theology, according to this author, God is the sole source of sovereignty and authority and thus, its divinity should be the guiding principle of the state. The Qur’an and the Sharia should be the building blocks upon which a social and political order must be built. This proposition of an Islamic state resonates especially among Shiites given the perception that exists in this community of the current Lebanese State being ineffective, absent and corrupt. However, the same degree of support cannot be evidenced in the other religious groups present in Lebanon. They fear that in such an Islamic State dominated by Shiites, they would be marginalized.

The second element mentioned by Nizar Hamzeh (2004), on the other hand, appeals to a significant number of people beyond the Shiite community. The unity of the Islamic Ummah, according to him, refers to Hezbollah’s belief that it is its religious duty to fight against Israel and contribute to the liberation of Palestine, giving especial importance to Jerusalem, which the group considers as holy land. The Palestinian issue resonates with most Muslims regardless of whether they are Shi’as or Sunnis and as such, Hezbollah is perceived as one of the few actors in the region who actually carries out tangible actions to fight against Israel and support the Palestinians. Without doubts, this active pro-Palestinian stance and especially,  its disposition to engage Israel militarily, has legitimized Hezbollah in the eyes of many, not only in Lebanon, but in the whole Middle East. However, it is this legitimacy that might be threatened by how Hezbollah has responded to the situation occurring in the Gaza Strip since October 2023.

III. The impact of Hezbollah’s recent decision-making on its legitimacy

By avoiding blunt military action against Israel and instead opting for limited border clashes and strongly worded condemnations, Hezbollah is likely to be perceived by those who had supported the group until now as lacking commitment to the Palestinian cause. Hezbollah’s course of action contradicts the expectations that people had formed about the group, mainly that of a resistance organization willing to oppose Israel by any means necessary. In other words, given the history of Hezbollah and the ideology it claims to defend, it is unsurprising that, in a situation like the one happening in Gaza where thousands of Palestinians have been killed, Hezbollah’s supporters expected a stronger response than the one that took place. The absence of such a response may lead to many supporters no longer agreeing with the way the group is carrying out its political project, at least part of it. As such, the legitimacy that Hezbollah initially acquired by positioning itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause is now at risk of being lost. But what could be the effects of this erosion of legitimacy? It ultimately depends on whether Hezbollah’s legitimacy is substitutable or not. The notion of substitutability in this context, as explained in the work of Ross (2019), refers to whether legitimacy obtained through one specific source can be replaced with legitimacy acquired through a different source. In the case of Hezbollah, if its legitimacy were to be substitutable, it would mean that despite losing some legitimacy because of an apparent insufficient commitment to the Palestinian cause, the people living in the territory controlled by the group will still perceive Hezbollah as an overall legitimate authority because of the legitimacy it generated through other sources, mainly the provision of public services, the mobilization of existing kinship ties, and the alignment with the Shiite identity. From this point of view, the consequences of the way Hezbollah has reacted to the events occurring in Gaza do not threaten in a significant way the group’s stability in the long term. The only thing Hezbollah has to ensure to continue to be perceived as legitimate is to impede the erosion of the other sources of legitimacy. As long as it continues what it has been doing (providing services like health and education, incorporating family clans in its structure, and using symbols and rituals to highlight its Shiite identity), this is likely to be achieved.

However, if this portion of Hezbollah’s legitimacy is not substitutable, meaning that, no matter the other kinds of legitimacy that the group holds, the Palestinian cause and the opposition to Israel are irremovable aspects of the way people construct their perception of Hezbollah, they might start perceiving it as an illegitimate actor or at least not as equally legitimate as before. This has important repercussions because, as discussed in the first section of this article, legitimacy is what makes people abide willingly by the commands of an authority. Taking this into account, a lack of legitimacy means that in order to maintain the social order it established, Hezbollah would have to increasingly rely on physical coercion. Research has demonstrated that when an armed group ramps up its use of violence against civilians living in the territory it controls, said population is more likely to oppose the rule of that armed group (Arjona, 2015). According to Gutierrez-Sanin (2003), one way this opposition can materialize is through civilians collaborating with enemies of the ruling armed group, like for example, the State. To address this opposition, armed groups have to allocate additional resources and to further increase their use of violence, which ultimately leads to greater opposition. This creates a cycle where it becomes more and more costly for the armed group to effectively control its territory and the social order within it. So costly in fact, that it can hinder the group’s capacity to pursue its main political goals by forcing it to dedicate most of its resources to forcefully enforcing its commands. It is in this way, that Hezbollah's response to the situation in Gaza can ultimately weaken the armed group in the long term.

This erosion of Hezbollah’s legitimacy could happen not only at a Lebanese level but also at an international one, specifically within the Middle East. Up until this point, Hezbollah had been regarded as a leading actor with regards to the fight against Israel by both individuals and other islamist groups in the region. As a matter of fact, as mentioned by Nizar Hamzeh (2004), this group is even the head of a network called Islamic Current[3], which is made up of several islamist groups, both Shi’a and Sunni, that share the common objective of opposing Israel. However, because of its lack of forceful military action in response to the events that unfolded recently in Gaza, Hezbollah might no longer be looked up to, at least not to the same extent, as a group that is fully committed to the Palestinian cause. In other words, the legitimacy that Hezbollah acquired at the regional level by framing itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause might be lost. This would lead to the reduction of Hezbollah’s capacity to mobilize masses and organizations outside of Lebanon. Especially, taking into account that people living outside of Hezbollah controlled territory are not benefited by the other actions of the group which have conferred it legitimacy within Lebanon, like the provision of public services. Thus, there is no possibility of substitution for Hezbollah’s legitimacy at the regional level.

Conclusion

This article argued that Hezbollah’s response to the situation taking place in Gaza since October 2023 might weaken the group in the long-term. By applying Malthaner’s legitimation model, it was established that the legitimacy Hezbollah enjoys comes from multiple sources. By taking this into account as well as the notion of the substitutability, it was possible to suggest multiple possible outcomes of Hezbollah’s recent decision-making. In the case this group’s legitimacy is not substitutable, the lack of forceful military action against Israel could lead to a significant erosion of its legitimacy, which then would force Hezbollah to use physical coercion to maintain the social order it established. This increased use of violence would end up being counterproductive for Hezbollah as it would make it more costly and overall more difficult to control the population living in the territory under its management. Ultimately, weakening the capacity of this armed group to achieve its main political goals.

The way the situation of Hezbollah continues to evolve, specifically its relationship with the population, will provide very useful information for future research. Especially, regarding the substitutability of legitimacy since at the moment, there is not a precise understanding in the literature of the circumstances under which legitimacy can be substituted or not. Thus, whatever the specific outcome that ends up materializing in the case of Hezbollah, researchers could identify the factors that led to it and analyze whether the same factors are present in the cases of other armed groups around the world. 

Last but not least, it is possible that, after this article is published, Hezbollah changes its approach to the situation in Gaza, leaning towards a more direct military action against Israel. This doesn’t mean that this article loses all of its value. On the contrary, the legitimation framework discussed in it and its application to the case of Hezbollah can be used as tools to understand the motivations behind this shift.

Bibliography: 

Arjona. A. (2015). Civilian resistance to rebel governance. In A. Arjona, N. Kasfir and Z. Mampilly (Eds.), Rebel governance in civil war (pp. 180-202). Cambridge University Press.

Baylouny, A. M. (2010). Authority outside the state: Non-state actors and new institutions in the Middle East. In A. Clunan and T.A. Harold (Eds.), Ungoverned spaces : Alternatives to state authority in an era of softened sovereignty (pp. 136-152). Stanford University Press.

Eisenstadt, M. and Bianchi, K. (2017). The ties that bind: Families, clans, and Hizballah’s military effectiveness. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ties-bind-families-clans-and-hizballahs-military-effectiveness

Gutiérrez-Sanín, F. (2003). Heating up and cooling down. Workshop on Obstacles to Robust Negotiated Settlements, Santa Fe Institute and Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá.

Malthaner, S. (2015). Violence, legitimacy, and control: The microdynamics of support relationships between militant groups and their social environment. Civil Wars, 17(4), 425-445. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2015.1115575

Nizar Hamzeh, A. (2004). In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse University Press.

Ross, N. (2019). Authority, legitimacy, and support for armed groups: A case study of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional. Civil Wars, 21(3), 303-328. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1604934

Schlichte, K. (2012). The limits of armed contestation: Power and domination in armed groups. Geoforum,43(4), 716-724. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.03.002

[1]  Figure extracted from Ahamad Nizar Hamzeh’s book “In the Path of Hizbullah” (2004). 

[2] Ibid.

[3] Al-Tayyar al-Islami in Arabic.