Redefining Power: the deconstruction of tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Written by Farida Dowidar.

The question of power in the African context remains an intricate and elusive matter to define. The historical backdrop of the Scramble for Africa during the 1880s saw colonial powers occupying the continent, with Britain and France seeking substantial economic and strategic gains in the name of power. As African states fought for autonomy, freeing themselves from colonial rule, from 1914 onwards, power became a tricky issue. With a legacy of neo-imperialism, the control of resources and political allegiances continued to be held by the colonial forces. Between the African states, power was doled out to the nations preferred by colonial and post-colonial policies. However, as the grip of European states in Africa begins to, arguably, wane, the question of how regional power dynamics will unfold is brought to light. 

Enter the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or GERD, Ethiopia’s monumental gravity dam constructed on the Blue Nile. Africa’s largest hydroelectric power plant, with an estimated construction cost of around $4.8 billion, is a large-scale, ambitious state response to Ethiopia’s acute energy shortages. However, there has been controversy surrounding the construction of the dam as Egypt staunchly contends that it jeopardizes its water and food security. With the GERD’s reservoir having the capacity to hold the entire Blue Nile, Ethiopia’s assertion that the dam is of existential necessity, and Egypt’s claims on ⅔ of the Nile’s flow based on a treaty signed in 1959, varying interests are causing geopolitical tension in the region. Egypt’s ever-increasing population relies on the agricultural sector, and with the looming threat of finite freshwater access, Egypt necessitates the Nile. 

However, is the cause of tension indeed a matter of food and water security, or are there deeper, underlying roots to this geopolitical conflict? 

Food and Water Insecurity

Amid the escalating climate change emergency and the concurrent rise in global populations and consumption, global water resources are being depleted. In a shared predicament, both Egypt and Ethiopia approach water scarcity, yet the GERD causes opposing effects on their respective agricultural products. In this way, this conflict is a matter of water allocation, a deadlock with both nations heavily relying on the Nile for food and water resources. 

Ethiopia

The second most populated African nation and one of the fastest-growing economies in the region, Ethiopia holds significant potential. However, with a per capita gross national income of $1,020, Ethiopia is also one of the most impoverished countries in the world (Gini coefficient). According to Fekahmed Negash, a director at the Ethiopian Ministry of Water, Ethiopia is now at 1,200 m³ water per capita. With the population expected to reach 230 million in the next 25 years, the per capita water share will drop below 500 m³, making Ethiopia a water-scarce nation. Thus, Fekahmed argues that “without using its (the Nile’s) transboundary waters we cannot proceed forward with honor and sovereignty.” This is a critical note as Ethiopia has affirmed to Egypt and Sudan that the dam will only be employed for energy production. Therein lies a contradiction between the supposed uses of the GERD. Nevertheless, controlling the Nile’s water flows with the dam and utilizing the energy produced will strengthen Ethiopia’s economy, regulate its agricultural output, and facilitate growth, whilst cementing the nation's security. 

Egypt

On the other hand, there are an array of ways in which the GERD will significantly affect Egypt’s water security. Most substantially, there will be a reduced flow of the Nile into Egypt. The state relies on the Nile for more than 90% of its water needs, so filling the dam’s reservoir will markedly impact Egypt’s access to this vital resource. This reduction of the Nile’s flow will limit access to safe drinking water throughout Egypt – a right firmly enshrined in regional and international conventions. As such, the GERD’s effects could potentially encroach upon a fundamental aspect of human security for the Egyptian people.

Furthermore, the reduced water flow will consequently shrink available agricultural land in the Nile Delta by up to 50%. According to Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, this will substantially affect Egypt’s agricultural economy, contributing to 14% of the nation’s GDP. In addition to shrinking agricultural land, the GERD is also expected to trigger a decline in biodiversity, akin to the ecological shifts observed following the construction of the Aswan Dam, which led to a noteworthy 50% decrease in fish species diversity. This loss of biodiversity is not only detrimental to the ecosystem but also further exacerbates the food security crisis, thereby augmenting the instability in the nation’s food supply. This issue plagues a nation already grappling with insecurity.

With downstream Egypt relying on the Nile for over 95% of its water, any reductions in the volume of water reaching the nation can be destructive. Water shortages will be an inevitable fate of the country, and farmers will be unable to maintain the food production needed to sustain the population, inducing food insecurity and instability. Egypt is already defined as being in water poverty under the UN definition, 400 cubic meters per person less than the poverty line, and this will only be exacerbated by the consequences of Ethiopia’s GERD.

Historical Background and Legal Disputes

Cairo has historically occupied a leading position in the region in relation to the upstream riparian Nile basin states. A combination of US support, greater resources, advantageous colonial mandates, and its own misguided paternalism has allowed Egypt to control the flow of the Nile. Thus, it can be said that Egypt’s critical response to the construction of the GERD results from Ethiopia’s rising power in the region. In this line of thinking, Egypt, formerly favoured by colonial powers in its control of the Nile, is losing its regional control and using water security as a facade for discourse against Ethiopia. 

Egypt held a form of hydro-hegemony in the region. Thus, due to Egypt's greater economic and military power, hegemonic stability maintained hydrological regional peace between the riparian states. However, Egypt was also granted a monopoly over the water of the Nile basin region, one of inequality and colonial injustice. This is illustrated in the Nile Treaty, a British proposal in 1901 that only permitted Ethiopia to construct Nile-related projects with the permission of the Egyptian state. Ethiopia refused to ratify the treaty, but Egypt considered it binding, and thus, the friction between the two states arose due to colonial Britain’s preferential treatment. 

Britain’s role in sustaining asymmetrical power dynamics is once again depicted in the 1929 agreements, proposed by Britain and signed by Egypt, that gave the Egyptian state exclusive rights to the water of the Nile, explicitly outlawing any projects that would reduce the water from flowing into the nation. The treaty applied today is the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement that, though it creates a duopoly between Egypt and Sudan, still maintains asymmetrical imbalances of water allocation between the two nations. The 2015 Declaration of Principles agreement, signed by Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt in Khartoum, establishes the Nile as a transboundary resource to facilitate development in all three states. However, the general framework agreement lacks depth and operational utility. Within the Nile Basin Initiative negotiations, which provided a normative framework to allow for a shift away from colonial agreements, Egypt chauvinistically continued to invoke its “historic rights” to maintain veto power over the Nile, depicting the balance of powers that existed between the Nile basin states. 

A New Regional Hegemon?

Considering the historical background, it is clear that Egypt was previously the regional power that held control over the Nile. However, Ethiopia, a growing economic force with a GDP rising at 5.6% annual growth compared to Egypt’s 3.3%, threatens Egypt’s control over the Nile basin states. The shift towards Ethiopia as a greater regional force is depicted by the relational power that Ethiopia now holds in the Horn of Africa. This can be seen through how Egypt’s former allies, Somalia and Djibouti, voted to reject an Arab League resolution in June 2020 that would delay Ethiopia filling the dam, forcibly supporting Ethiopia in the conflict. 

In an effort to regain its foothold in the region, Egypt has initiated several projects aimed at strengthening its influence, including funding the construction of three power plants in Eritrea, one in Somalia, and two in Djibouti. This can be seen as a clear attempt to provide these states with what Ethiopia will soon supply them – energy. However, Egypt cannot compete with Ethiopia, whose dam will generate 36,000 megawatts a year, according to the Center for Energy Affairs in Switzerland. The surplus of energy will make Ethiopia a regional energy exporter. Ethiopia has already signed agreements to export energy to neighbouring countries, including Sudan, which, once again, has historically been an Egyptian ally. The construction of this dam will allow Ethiopia to develop its geopolitical power and establish itself as a regional hegemony – what Egypt once was. As such, the construction of the GERD meant a decrease of power for Egypt, clearly illustrating why Egypt would oppose an agenda that would directly affect its control of the Nile basin and, thus, the Nile basin states. 

With Ethiopia’s rising regional power and increased control over the Nile basin, is it unlikely that Egypt’s concerns over the unilateral construction of the GERD – which will supply cheap power to various East African states and improve Ethiopia’s regional relations  – is a response to changing regional power dynamics rather than a matter of water and food security?

A Question of Identity

Egypt and Ethiopia share common features in their national identity – antiquity, cradles of humanity, and the Nile. The river has shaped their self-perceptions as nation-states, but therein lies a competition for the Nile as a source of national identity. 

Beyond the loss of power and material insecurity, Egypt faces a threat of non-material insecurity arising from the demonizing of a river that is socially entrenched – a resource that has been the centre of Egyptian civilization, history, and culture. Seen as the “giver of life,” the Nile has long been a part of Egypt’s cultural heritage. Links between the Nile and the two major Egyptian religions, Coptic Christianity and Islam, have further intertwined the nation’s identity to the river. Coptic Christians have established a number of pilgrimage sites along the basin, with the Nile’s annual inundation symbolizing God’s yearly mercy. Meanwhile, Muslim Egyptians share the belief that “the river was imbued with divine qualities from heaven.” A threat to the yearly floods, which the GERD imposes, is a threat to belief systems, endangering a national resource beyond material aspects. The lack of a sense of biographical continuity will affect the nation’s ontological security, leading to a loss of state and national identity.  

Meanwhile, for Ethiopia, the GERD symbolises unity and success in the face of acute poverty – a sovereignty project as victorious as the 1896 Battle of Adwa. Considered a “flag-bearing project,” the dam allows for the creation of a collective identity structured around the Nile. The GERD attempts to unify the population, legitimizing current state powers internally and externally. Creating such a national project was particularly necessary in the context of the Tigray War, a two-year conflict that divided the nation. When looking at toponymy, the use of the word ‘Renaissance’ in Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (previously named Millennium Dam) ties in with the idea of revival, the building of a strengthened Ethiopian identity, one that is centred on a prosperous Ethiopian nation. The public mobilization of the Ethiopian people in the construction of the dam assisted in the spreading of the glorification of the GERD to every part of society. With approximately 1/8th of the dam being voluntarily funded by the public (public processions, free air time on all mass media, SMS text campaigns), whilst more than 280,000 Ethiopians have physically visited the site, there has been a national attachment to the dam and subsequently, the river. Without funding from any downstream states, as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated, the dam is Ethiopia’s exertion that “we (Ethiopia) not only have a plan, but also have the capacity to assert our rights.” For a nation that suffers from acute poverty and is divided across ethnic, religious, and geographic borders, the dam is an emergent symbol of a united Ethiopia. 

The GERD invokes a loss of ontological security for Egypt and the creation of a sovereignty project that will amalgamate a divided Ethiopia. In this way, the Nile has become a battlefield of competing identities; a zero-sum game in which the winner is granted control of the Nile. 

Conclusion

As the GERD takes shape, it is clear that the dam will exacerbate water and food insecurity for the Egyptian population, worsening human security and instability. However, it not only raises concerns about material security but also shakes the core of Egypt’s identity, intensifying existing instabilities. Meanwhile, for Ethiopia, the GERD instigates a new wave of development with economic progress whilst cementing a national identity centred on the revival of a glorious Ethiopia. 

It is evident that Egypt held historical control over the Nile’s flow, and thus held power over the Nile basin countries. The GERD invokes an evident infringement of such power. A large-scale construction project that will allow Ethiopia to supply energy to its people and a selection of other countries along the Horn of Africa, the GERD is an exertion of Addis Ababa’s power in the region, challenging Egypt’s long-standing hegemony. 

Therefore, this intricate issue encompasses more than just resource scarcity and human security; it reflects a broader landscape of a changing political landscape. The close examination of the involved stakeholders reveals that Egypt’s opposition to the GERD embodies a multifaceted struggle for regional power. As such, food and water insecurity and shifting power dynamics are inextricably linked, working hand-in-hand to create and exacerbate the tension between Egypt and Ethiopia. 

Bibliography

Ali, Abdolgader Mohamed. « Egypt and Ethiopia’s battle for influence in the Horn of Africa » , The New Arab. 2022. En ligne : https://www.newarab.com/analysis/egypt-and-ethiopias-power-struggle-horn-africa [consulté le ].

Ayferam, Gashaw. « The Nile Dispute : Beyond Water Security » , Blog Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2023. En ligne : https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/88842 [consulté le ].

El Tawil, Noha. Declaration of Principles on Renaissance Dam is « exclusive agreement » binding Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan together : Intl. Law expert. 2020. En ligne : https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/88909/Declaration-of-Principles-on-Renaissance-Dam-is-exclusive-agreement-binding [consulté le ].

Elmusa, Sharif. Sharing the Nile waters according to needs. 2014. En ligne : https://www.madamasr.com/en/2014/08/30/opinion/u/sharing-the-nile-waters-according-to-needs/ [consulté le ].

Gebretsadik, Heron Gezahegn. The Potential Water, Food, and Energy Security-Related Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – Gerd (Amharic : ታላቁ የኢትዮጵያ ሕዳሴ ግድብ) on the Lower Stream Riparian States and Egypt’s Distinct Concern: A Systematic Review and Qualitative Synthesis. 2022. En ligne : https://rsisinternational.org/virtual-library/papers/the-potential-water-food-and-energy-security-related-impacts-of-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd-amharic-%E1%89%B3%E1%88%8B%E1%89%81-%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A2%E1%89%B5%E1%8B%AE%E1%8C%B5/?category_id=624 [consulté le ].

Ibrahim, Shady. Ethiopian Renaissance Dam & Its implications on Egypt. 2019. En ligne : https://en.eipss-eg.org/ethiopian-renaissance-dam-its-implications-on-egypt/ [consulté le ].

Mbaku, John Mukum. The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. 2020. En ligne : https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/ [consulté le ].

Pemunta, Ngambouk Vitalis, Ngo Valery Ngo, Choumbou Raoul Fani Djomo, et al. « The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Egyptian National Security, and human and food security in the Nile River Basin » , Cogent Social Sciences. 1 janvier 2021, vol.7 no 1. En ligne : https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1875598 [consulté le ].

Steckler-Houle, Taryn. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its effect on Egypt. 2021. En ligne : https://borgenproject.org/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-and-egypt/ [consulté le ].

Tekuya, Mahemud Eshtu. « The Egyptian Hydro Hegemony In The Nile Basin : The Quest For Changing The Status Quo » , Journal of Water Law. 24 juin 2018, vol.26 no 1. En ligne : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326586269_The_Egyptian_Hydro_Hegemony_In_The_Nile_Basin_The_Quest_For_Changing_The_Status_Quo [consulté le ].

« Egypt angry as it says Ethiopia has resumed filling GERD » , Al Jazeera. 6 juillet 2021. En ligne : https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/6/egypt-angry-ethiopia-resumes-filling-gerd [consulté le ].

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, Benishangul-Gumuz. 2020. En ligne : https://www.water-technology.net/projects/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-africa/#:~:text=The%20Grand%20Renaissance%20dam%20will,high%20and%201%2C780m%20long. [consulté le ].

GDP growth (annual % ) - Ethiopia. En ligne : https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?locations=et [consulté le ]