Rhetoric or Reality? Examining China's Strategic Partnerships in the Middle East

November 2024, Article by Lena Kirchner

Abstract

         China's strategic interests in the Middle East and its growing interference are reshaping regional dynamics. China has deepened ties with Iran, particularly through the 25-year strategic partnership signed in 2021, and sees itself as a neutral mediator in the Israel-Palestine war. China has long-term economic and strategic military interests in the Middle East, which it discreetly pursues under the banner of greater connectivity and projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, they have sought to forge diplomatic relations with key players in the region, particularly those sidelined by the US, quietly expanding military and security influence. Analysts argue that China’s policy has, in the last five years, significantly shifted as it assumes a more assertive role. China is challenging the United States' historic hegemony in the Middle East, driving a wedge between the United States and its allies to prepare for a new, post-conflict order in the region.

Introduction

         Over the past months, China has sought to position itself as an alternative peace broker and potential mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most recently, in July 2024, China made international headlines by facilitating a unity declaration between Hamas, Fatah, and twelve other Palestinian factions [1]. This followed a series of failed attempts by various international actors to reconcile the antagonism within the Palestinian leadership: the 2017 agreement between Fatah and Hamas, brokered by Egypt, disintegrated due to disagreements over security and governance. Similarly, the reconciliation pact between 14 Palestinian factions signed in Algeria in 2022 promised elections, which similarly failed to materialize. Following several futile attempts to reconcile Palestinian factions, could the Beijing Declaration be a diplomatic triumph and step towards a united Palestinian leadership with common goals?

The Beijing Declaration calls for the establishment of an independent state of Palestine headed by an interim unity government with Jerusalem as its capital. The document commits Hamas and Fatah to “comprehensive Palestinian national unity that includes all Palestinian factions under the PLO framework” [2]. Although lauded by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi as a “historic moment for the cause of Palestine’s liberation,” [3] most analysts agree that the declaration mainly serves China’s long-term strategic interests in the region rather than propose a feasible pathway toward reconciliation.

Khaled Elgindy, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Middle East Institute and director of its Program on Palestine and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs, doubts that this declaration will rectify the previous failures of Palestinian governance and points to the series of fruitless agreements between Hamas and Fatah in the last decade. The Beijing Declaration does not change much, he argues: it lacks any implementation mechanism and seems to be more of a symbolic effort by Hamas and Fatah to appease China [4]. For Hamas, who the US and its allies regard as a terrorist group, China’s support is a source of political legitimacy and could open vital political and economic opportunities in the next few decades.

Even if the Beijing Declaration lacks substance, it must be analyzed in the broader context of China’s growing involvement in the Middle East. The Chinese government’s attempt to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict highlights how China’s interests in the region are expanding beyond traditional energy sources to encompass economic, geopolitical, and strategic considerations. China has, so far, positioned itself as a political mediator and benefactor with a noninterventionist approach. This appeals to many Middle Eastern countries that seek to diversify their international relations and to whom China's policy of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs is an appealing alternative to US or European initiatives, which are often tied to socio-economic and political commitments.

I. From Bilateral Bonds to Global Ambitions: China's Expanding Diplomatic Footprint in the Middle East

         China's recent diplomatic efforts highlight its strong commitment to strengthening ties with Middle Eastern nations. In 2022, Beijing hosted the inaugural China-Arab States Summit and the first summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council member states (GCC), signaling its intention to build deeper strategic partnerships in the region while broadening its focus beyond energy interests. China’s diplomatic interests in the region serve two general purposes: Firstly, China sees the region as an opportunity to enhance its image as a global power, presenting itself as a reliable partner distinct from the West. Secondly, the region offers vital markets, energy sources, and opportunities for potentially lucrative strategic geopolitical partnerships.

In the past few decades, China has predominantly conducted its diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region through bilateral relations, emphasizing direct relations with state actors rather than transnational organizations. By 1992, China had established formal diplomatic ties with every state in the region, with Israel being the last to formalize relations [5]. This marked the culmination of China’s steady outreach in the post-Cold War period. A notable aspect of China's approach is its "partnership diplomacy,”[6] a hierarchical framework that categorizes its relations based on strategic importance [7]. At the lower end are "friendly cooperative partnerships," which represent minimal strategic interest. At the top are "comprehensive strategic partnerships," reserved for key states like Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) [8]. These classifications signal China's prioritization of certain countries based on their economic, political, and geostrategic significance.

Recently, China has pushed for more cooperation on the multilateral front, seeking to position its Chinese-led forums and councils as an alternatives to Western-led institutions and liberal norms. This is evident in its establishment of transnational forums such as the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the China-GCC Strategic Dialogue, and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The CASCF, launched in Cairo in 2004, serves as a platform for fostering Sino-Arab relations and promoting the concept of a "China-Arab community of a shared future." Its most recent meeting in May 2024 produced the "Beijing Declaration and Action Implementation Plan for 2024-2026,”[9] reiterating commitments to cooperation and development. However, tangible outcomes from these forums have often been limited, and confined to declarations and Memorandums of Understanding. Critics argue that such initiatives reflect a broader pattern in China’s Middle East policy: a focus on symbolic gestures and public relations over substantive, transformative engagement.

China has also extended its influence through broader coalitions such as BRICS, which seeks to challenge Western-dominated global institutions. In 2023, BRICS formally invited Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to join the group, a move that underscored Beijing's effort to forge stronger ties with key regional players [10]. This expansion aligns with China's broader strategy of cultivating relationships that reinforce its image as a leader among emerging economies while reducing dependence on Western-dominated structures.

II. The $505 Billion Question: What’s Driving China’s Economic Surge in the Middle East?

         China's involvement in the Middle East is driven by three interrelated objectives: ensuring energy security, expanding economic investments, and enhancing political influence. Against shifting geopolitical dynamics, China has significantly enhanced its economic engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance of six Gulf states. Both China and the GCC contribute considerably to global GDP growth, with energy serving as a central pillar of their economies.

China’s increasing trade in the Middle East demonstrates its long-standing economic interests in the region. China is the top trading partner for over 120 countries, including various core economies in the Middle East [11]. In 2020, China replaced the EU as the GCC’s largest trading partner in terms of bilateral trade. Trade exchange between China and the GCC countries accounted for 11 percent of the GCC’s foreign trade in 2019, exceeding 180 billion dollars [12].

This marks a significant change from 1990 when Saudi Arabia and China first established diplomatic relations. At that time, trade between China and the GCC amounted to under $1.5 billion, accounting for only 1% of the Gulf's total trade volume [13]. and the UAE’s largest non-oil trading partner globally. The UAE is arguably China’s most critical economic partner and a strategic trade destination in the region: According to the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about 60% of Chinese trade is re-exported through the UAE to over 400 cities in the MENA region [14]. China’s trade with the MENA region amounted to $505 billion in 2022, a 76% increase over the past decade [15].

Ports, Power, and Partnerships: A New Silk Road Through the Suez

         Many of China’s energy and infrastructure projects in the region have been marketed as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a collection of development and investment initiatives, considered one of the “most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived” [16]. Initially, the BRI sought to link East Asia, Africa, and Europe through transport infrastructure, consisting of both land (“Belt”) and maritime routes (“Road”). Ten years on, the BRI has broadened its scope to encompass energy infrastructure, a “digital silk road” and cultural and political projects that enhance China’s soft power and expand to Latin American and Oceania countries.

The Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) is particularly significant to the Middle East, due to the region’s strategic position on many maritime routes and China’s dependency on energy imports. One such maritime route, for example, runs from the South China Sea via the Indian Ocean, through the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez Canal, terminating in Port Piraeus in Greece. Thus, in recent years, China has pushed the Middle East to the center of its Belt and Road Initiative: According to the China BRI Investment Report 2021, the majority of Chinese BRI investment projects in 2021 targeted the MENA region [17]. In 2022, Middle East countries expanded their cooperation with China and received about 23 percent of Chinese BRI engagement, an increase from 16.5% compared with the previous year. While the BRI is often presented as a transformative development strategy for the Middle East, its most evident beneficiaries to date have been countries critical to China's energy and maritime security, particularly the affluent Gulf states and Israel [18].

For example, the Red Sea Gateway Terminal, a joint venture between China’s COSCO Shipping Ports and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, was developed as the Jeddah Islamic Port and promised to increase its capacity significantly [19]. Moreover, in 2021, Israel inaugurated a new port terminal in Haifa Bay, operated by a state-owned firm from Shanghai [20], with the promise that it would accelerate trade and lower prices. In Egypt, China has significantly invested in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, a maritime corridor of central importance to global trade. China’s presence in Egypt's ports has grown noticeably in recent years, both through private and public acquisitions. A Chinese state-owned enterprise holds stakes in ports at both the northern and southern ends of the Suez Canal, while a private Chinese company manages two key ports along Egypt's Mediterranean coast and is currently developing a third at the Abu Qir Naval Base, which it will also operate in the future [21]. Despite the BRI’s relatively narrow focus, China’s expanding economic engagement in the region is likely to translate into a more prominent role in regional security matters over time. Egypt’s ports, for example, handle roughly 90% of global trade, 12% of which alone passes through the Suez Canal [22].

Apart from trade, analysts point to other aspects of China’s involvement and investment in the region. The opaque nature of Chinese agreements has raised concerns that China may be masking its military ambitions behind a facade of greater economic development and connectivity. Analysts have raised concerns about the “blurry lines” between China's commercial ports and its military goals [23]. Egypt has shifted its foreign policy approach since 2014, seeking closer ties with Russia and China, a move likely driven by a desire for foreign direct investment without the conditions often attached to Western loans, like those from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, it is unclear what relationship China’s commercial port operations have with its military ambitions. A 2019 visit by a Chinese warship to Alexandria, where Chinese companies own significant stakes, heightened these concerns [24]. The blurring of civil and military roles and the potential dual usage of commercial ports for military purposes has raised alarm bells in the US and Europe. Similar concerns were raised after China's People's Liberation Army Navy built a large military base at Djibouti in 2017 [25], Beijing’s first military base abroad, as well as after the massive $50 billion BRI project at Pakistan’s port of Gwadar was announced, intended as a central part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor but which currently sits empty, logging only 22 ships in its best year to date [26]. The Chinese Navy has used ports managed by Chinese companies for logistical support and maintenance, demonstrating how civilian infrastructure has been integrated into China’s military strategy, as outlined in its 2015 "Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection" [27] plan. This raises concerns over China’s growing global influence and the true nature of China’s investment schemes, particularly those promoted under the BRI banner.

Dual-Use Technologies and Regional Security

         Simultaneously, China’s transition to a technological superpower has attracted the interest of governments and companies in the Middle East. Many partners in the Middle East are interested in digitizing and diversifying their economies, while China seeks to strengthen its role as a high-tech power, claiming to use data as a tool to promote economic transformation and development. Nonetheless, concerns about the dual usage of sensitive data, strategic technology (such as AI and GPS tools) as well as surveillance technology have, again, raised questions about the true intentions of China’s policy and whether it is seeking technological advances for military purposes. Western officials have scrutinized Chinese investments in technological infrastructure in the Middle East, anxious that adopting Chinese technology could lead to the diffusion of Chinese norms and standards in a way, Chinese digitization with distinct Chinese characteristics. This is a point of concern for liberal democracies who fear that by exporting their technology and investing in sensitive technology in the region, China could promote its model of state surveillance, obtain access to sensitive information, and undermine national ecosystems and infrastructure [28]. However, a study by Carnegie Endowment of Saudi Arabia, which focused on local factors and sought to challenge “conventional narratives that view these transformations mainly through the prism of China’s rise”, found that, above all, technological developments in Saudi Arabia reflected the Saudi state’s objectives and strategies in its pursuit of “technoscientific self-strengthening”. Moreover, due to issues linked to capital flow, human resources, and Saudi elites, China is less of a dominant and assertive actor than often portrayed: China is only one of the various actors interested in Saudi Arabia’s state-driven technoscientific transformation of multilateral scope.

Beyond the Belt and Road initiative, China’s increasing military presence and arms sales in the Middle East have raised concerns about its covert military ambitions. China has supplied advanced weapons, including Dongfeng ballistic missiles and Wing Loong drones, to countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, alongside conducting military exercises with these nations. The military cooperation is framed by China's non-interference principle, but the growing number of Chinese-controlled ports and industrial parks across the Middle East could provide the PLA with indirect access to key strategic locations. For example, China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) conducts "technical stops" in ports operated by Chinese companies in the region, raising fears of civilian facilities being utilized for military purposes. The presence of the PLA Navy, combined with China’s expanding naval infrastructure, could lead to friction with the U.S. and its allies, who have a vested interest in preventing any shift in the balance of power in the Middle East.

Energy Giants, Unequal Partners: The Gulf-China Trade Imbalance

         Although China is a crucial trading partner for the Middle East, its trade relationships exhibit significant imbalances, particularly with Gulf countries and Iran. In the Gulf states, China’s economic influence is primarily based on imports of hydrocarbons, leaving these countries vulnerable to global shifts in energy demand. Energy trade forms the foundation of many of China’s relationships with the Middle East, with hydrocarbons and petrochemicals constituting 90% of the region’s exports to China. Notably, the Middle East supplies half of China’s oil imports [29]. While China is a major customer in the hydrocarbon market, it exports a diverse range of goods to the region. China has announced it will be carbon neutral before 2060 [30], exposing a potential long-term problem facing economies dependent on hydrocarbon exports. Thus, while this energy co-dependence has positioned China as a key player in the region, it exposes long-term risks that may disproportionately affect Middle Eastern states while causing less severe consequences for China.

In the case of Iran, China has helped circumvent international sanctions, typically buying its crude oil via a third country and refining it domestically [31]. These refineries are confined to domestic trade and thus not subject to the SWIFT financial network, avoiding US sanctions. Iran depends on its partnership with China, yet Chinese investments back into the country have been marginal and much lower than initially promised. In 2016, trade between the two countries was projected to reach 600 billion dollars by 2026 [32], however by 2022, trade between the two countries amounted to just over 15 billion dollars [33].

Additionally, China has not secured free trade agreements (FTAs) with any Middle Eastern country or regional organization to date [34], presenting a major hurdle to its broader economic integration. While negotiations have been ongoing since 2004 for a China-GCC FTA, political resistance — particularly from Saudi Arabia over concerns about "cheap Chinese imports" undermining its industrial ambitions — has stalled progress [35]. Economic imbalances, particularly in trade, risk undermining China’s efforts to develop deeper, more equitable partnerships in the region. Moreover, this pattern of vulnerability could potentially harm countries dependent on exports to China while also affecting China’s strategic interests in the region, causing the whole fragile system of bilateral relations to collapse.

III. Driving a Wedge: Redefining Alliances and Challenging U.S.Hegemony

         China’s economic and military ambitions have, until recently, been understood within its non-interventionist framework. However, analysts have observed a significant shift in China’s geopolitical strategy in the past year, as it attempts to achieve a leadership role in the Middle East. China seems to be preparing for a new post-conflict order in the Middle East and sees an opportunity to challenge the US’ historic hegemony. China’s response to the Gaza crisis, which has been unusually active, reveals its changing approach to the Middle East, its prioritization of the region in its overall foreign policy, and how its increased involvement could reshape Middle Eastern countries’ relations, both with each other and with great powers, such as the US and China.

Earlier this year, in March, China vetoed a resolution at the UN Security Council put forward by the US which called for “an immediate and sustained ceasefire” between Israel and Hamas- a demand repeatedly made by Chinese diplomats since October 7. However, China rejected the US proposal and saw an opportunity to attack the United States’ Middle East policy. The United States was playing a “game of words,” giving “a green light to continued killings,” [36] the Chinese representative to the UN, Zhang Jun, asserted, claiming to speak in the name of the international community [37]. In his six-day tour, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stopped in both Tunisia and Egypt to garner support for China’s involvement in the Gaza crisis. Even before the situation in Gaza escalated, Beijing regarded the Palestinian issue as an avenue for increased engagement in the Middle East, already offering itself as a “neutral” mediator between Israelis and Palestinians in April 2023. Jonathon Fulton and Michael Shuman, writing for the Atlantic Council, describe China’s shifting policy and advancement of its own political power and economic interests as a reflection of its larger “ideological vision for a new world order”[38].

According to these two scholars, during the Cold War, the bipolar structure of the international system significantly influenced China's approach to the Middle East. China’s policies were shaped by its shifting relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union and, thus, reflected its broader geopolitical alignments. Aligning with its broader global strategy of navigating Cold War dynamics, China’s engagement in the Middle East during this period was relatively constrained and cautious.

However, in the post-Cold War era, the emergence of unipolarity and U.S. dominance in the Middle East reshaped the regional landscape. The United States established and maintained a security framework that benefited its allies while marginalizing states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which had resisted American hegemony. This framework was characterized by defense agreements, military cooperation, arms sales, and a network of bases that created a stable security environment. For external powers like China, this US-led architecture offered an opportunity to expand its economic and diplomatic influence in the region without needing to make significant security commitments, allowing China to position itself as a non-interventionist partner. It is important to note that under this arrangement, the safety of Chinese expatriates, investments, and assets in the Middle East was effectively ensured by U.S. military supremacy.

Nonetheless, while China benefited from this stability, it did not necessarily align with U.S. policies, often expressing opposition to actions like the Iraq War and reflecting broader international concerns about American interventionism. However, China's criticisms remained cautious, avoiding confrontation with Washington. Thus, US dominance in the Middle East defined the parameters within which Beijing operated, rather than prompting China to adopt a balancing strategy or align itself with American interests. Fulton and Shuman place China’s Middle East strategy up until 2019 within the framework of “strategic hedging”, a scholarly term borrowed from international relations literature and formally defined as “an approach for a second-tier power that wants to develop a regional presence without disrupting a beneficial status quo.”[39] Rather than challenging the dominant power or alienating regional partners, a hedger carefully pursues its military goals and economic interests by positioning itself as a valuable partner for everyone, thereby expanding its political influence. Beijing maintained good relations with both Palestinian and Israeli representatives and upheld its bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, advancing mainly its economic goals without getting entangled in political rivalries and disputes and never was expected to step up into a leadership role.

According to Shuman and Fulton, the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) in 2019, previously negotiated by the Obama Administration to contain Iran’s nuclear program, marks a break from China’s hedging policy and its shift to a wedging policy. Having been involved in its negotiations, China viewed the US withdrawal from the JCPoA as undermining the signatories’ joint diplomatic efforts. In the words of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, the United States was “giving up on its international commitments” to “exert maximum pressure on Iran”. China, however, would stand with Iran “against unilateralism and bullying” [40]. Instead of quiet disagreement, this direct and aggressive criticism of the US by China exemplifies its policy transition from hedging to wedging. A wedge strategy is defined as a “state’s attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance at an acceptable cost.”[41] China’s response to the Gaza conflicts and other sensitive regional disputes can be viewed as its attempt to exploit regional concerns to cause frictions between the US and its allies in the Middle East, effectively driving a wedge between Middle Eastern countries and the US, thus undermining the historic US hegemony in the region. China’s diplomatic efforts in recent months have only solidified this assumption: After welcoming six Middle Eastern foreign ministers to China in January 2022, Wang Yi spoke about the Middle East, proclaiming the region “is suffering from long-existing unrest and conflicts due to foreign interventions(...). We believe the people of the Middle East are the masters of the Middle East. There is no ‘power vacuum,’ and there is no need for ‘patriarchy from outside.’”[42] Besides unsubtle jabs and forceful messaging by the state, it seems that China is also taking on a much more forceful approach in material terms: China’s Sinopharm company and the UAE’s G42 established a joint venture to produce COVID-19 vaccines, and in 2021, it was reported that China was building a secret military facility in the UAE. In the words of Jon B. Alterman, “China is working to untie the Middle East from the United States and to make the region and the world more receptive to China”[43].

The Gaza crisis has taken China’s wedging policy to a new level. A widely circulated essay by Professor Li Weijian of the Middle East Institute of Shanghai International Studies University claims that “much of the past chaos in the Middle East was caused by the West, especially the United States” [44]. Nonetheless, as the region faces increased instability and political uncertainty, this raises concern for China. While adopting an increasingly assertive foreign policy, China remains reliant on structures that it criticizes [45]. Its military presence in the region remains minimal, compared to the US, and its economic interests have been maintained under the framework of US security assurances.

The Soft Power Challenge: Can China Compete with U.S. Influence?

         In the region, China’s emergence is largely seen as positive: As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the world’s second-largest economy, many Middle Eastern states welcome China as an alternative to the US. Beijing is not critical of local governments and societies, while Western democracies have, in the past, tied their cooperation to human rights, media freedom, and gender equality, perceived as pushing for “Western ideals”. China, on the other hand, has only one condition: the “One-China” principle. As long as states recognize that there is only one sovereign state under the name China (Taiwan and Hong Kong belonging to this China in the official Chinese version), Beijing seems willing to cooperate and will even go as far as circumventing international sanctions, like with Iran [46]. Moreover, in terms of economic investment, Chinese multinationals are considered efficient, reliable, and cheaper than their competitors. Nonetheless, Fulton and Shuman argue that states in the Middle East do not wish to disengage with the US, and will certainly not blindly dispose of their long and deep relations with the US in favor of a still unfamiliar and unpredictable Chinese alliance. However, the more China “wedges”, the more strongly it will force itself and governments in the Middle East to take sides, something many do not wish to do so.

China has also made concerted efforts to project soft power through humanitarian aid, educational exchanges, and cultural promotion, with programs like the establishment of Confucius Institutes and medical aid during the COVID-19 pandemic improving China's image in the Middle East as a responsible and trustworthy partner. Nonetheless, it faces the challenge of countering skepticism in the region. Nonetheless, competition with the US for influence remains a challenge, especially given China's limited soft power initiatives compared to American educational, cultural, and political outreach. Furthermore, as China increases its involvement and takes on a more assertive role, governments and societies will begin scrutinizing Chinese initiatives more closely and questioning Chinese motives more sharply. Already positive perceptions of China are wavering. According to a report by the Arab Barometer in 2022, in a majority of the surveyed countries, respondents were “significantly less likely” to favor closer economic ties with China than in previous years, while support for stronger economic relations with the United States was on the rise [47]. The perception of China as a potential hegemonic power, compounded by its aggressive promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), may cause some Middle Eastern partners to view China with increased skepticism, wary of becoming too dependent on China’s economic model.

Conclusion

         China's expanding diplomatic and economic footprint in the Middle East underscores its ambition to transition from a bilateral actor to a global power with influence in one of the world's most geopolitically critical regions. China’s evolving strategy in the Middle East represents a significant shift in the global balance of power, signaling the emergence of a new multipolar order. By adopting a wedging policy, Beijing has sought to redefine the region’s traditional alignments and offer an alternative to Western hegemony, presenting itself as a pragmatic alternative to Western interventionism.

However, its efforts, while ambitious, are not without challenges. The persistence of trade imbalances, concerns over dual-use technologies, and questions about the long-term sustainability of energy-dependent partnerships highlight the fragility of China's approach. Moreover, Beijing's selective engagement and symbolic diplomacy also raise doubts about its commitment to fostering equitable, transformative relationships across the Middle East. As China’s economic and military presence deepens, it is likely to face greater scrutiny and resistance, not only from traditional Western powers but also from regional actors balancing competing interests.

Nonetheless, China’s rise in the Middle East challenge the traditional widely held perception of an Iron Curtain between the US and China, with countries falling either along one or the other side of the division. Governments in the Middle East may no longer have to choose between sides. They have the leverage of their strategic positioning and vital energy sources, and could therefore take advantage of a dynamic market of political and economic partnerships and alliances. This should serve as a wake-up call to US policymakers: Too often, the United States acts as if it has a monopoly, Arab Officials say [48].

However, it remains doubtful whether China is willing, or ready, to truly engage politically with the issues and challenges in the Middle East. As the failure of the Beijing declaration showed, symbolic agreements without true substance serve neither China, nor its potential partners.

Notes :

[1] Dominika Urhová, “Beijing Declaration: China’s Role in Post-War Middle East,” CEIAS, September 3, 2024,

[2] Beatrice Farhat, “‘The Beijing Declaration,’ China Brokers Hamas-Fatah Unity Deal: What We Know,” Al, July 23, 2024

[3] Turak, Natasha. “Palestinian Rivals Hamas and Fatah Sign Reconciliation Agreement in China.” Washington Post, July 23, 2024.

[4] Amy Mackinnon, “China Tries to Play Power Broker among Palestinians,” Foreign Policy, July 23, 2024.

[5] Bilateral treaties and agreements, accessed November 22, 2024, https://embassies.gov.il/chengdu/Relations/Pages/Bilateral-Treaties-and-Agreements.aspx.

[6] Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing , China’s strategic partnership diplomacy: Engaging with a changing world, April 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181324/China%E2%80%99s%20strategic%20partnership%20diplomacy_%20engaging%20with%20a%20changing%20world%20.pdf

[7] Jacob Mardell, “PRC Partnership Diplomacy in the New Era,” Jamestown, September 20, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/prc-partnership-diplomacy-in-the-new-era/

[8] Jon B. Alterman, “China and the Middle East,” CSIS, accessed November 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-middle-east.

[9] “Let Us Take Real Action to Build a China-Arab Community with a Shared Future,” 中华人民共和国 外交部], https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202405/t20240530_11366245.html.

[10] Le Monde with AP, “Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Argentina, Egypt and Ethiopia Set to Join the BRICS,” Le Monde.fr, August 24, 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/08/24/iran-saudi-arabia-egypt-uae-argentina-egypt-and-ethiopia-set-to-join-the-brics_6106146_4.html

[11] “China Is the Top Trading Partner to More than 120 Countries,” Wilson Center, January 17, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-top-trading-partner-more-120-countries.

[12 & 13] Expanding the china-GCC strategic partnership | in translation, https://english.alarabiya.net/in-translation/2021/01/04/Expanding-the-China-GCC-strategic-partnership.

[14] “Economic Cooperation,” UAE Embassy in Beijing-Economic Cooperation, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/Missions/Beijing/UAE-Relationships/Economic-Cooperation.

[15] Andy Sambidge, “GCC Chief Predicts China Free Trade Deal ‘Soon,’” AGBI, February 20, 2024, https://www.agbi.com/analysis/trade/2023/10/gcc-china-free-trade-deal/.

[16] “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

[17] Christoph NEDOPIL WANG https://greenfdc.org/author/christoph_nedopil_wang/ , “Christoph Nedopil Wang,” Green Finance & Development Center, April 3, 2024, https://greenfdc.org/brief-china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2021/?cookie-state-change=16804%2060976479%29

[18] The Middle East and China’s belt and road initiative, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse254-EN.pdf.

[19] Rakin Rahman, “Red Sea Gateway Terminal Completes 6 Million TEU Expansion,” Port Technology International, February 21, 2024, https://www.porttechnology.org/news/red-sea-gateway-terminal-completes-6-million-teu-expansion/.

[20] Israel inaugurates Chinese-run Haifa port terminal, in likely boost for economy | The Times of Israel, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-inaugurates-new-haifa-port-terminal-in-expected-boost-for-economy/.

[21] Brian Katulis, Emmanuel Cohen-Hadria, and Victor V. Motti, “China’s Growing Maritime Presence in Egypt’s Ports and the Suez Canal,” Middle East Institute, September 27, 2024, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-growing-maritime-presence-egypts-ports-and-suez-canal.

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

[24] “China Military,” ChinaMilitary, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/9592753.html.

[25] Michaël Tanchum, “China’s New Military Base in Africa: What It Means for Europe and America,” ECFR, December 14, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/.

[26] Kira Schacht, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Shows China’s Belt and Road Can Fail – DW – 05/13/2024,” dw.com, May 14, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-gwadar-port-shows-chinas-belt-and-road-can-fail/a-68992914.

[27] The origins of “Near seas defense and far seas protection,” https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.

[28] Al-Sudairi Mohammed , Steven Jiawei Hai, and Kameal Alahmad, “How Saudi Arabia Bent China to Its Technoscientific Ambitions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 1, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/08/how-saudi-arabia-bent-china-to-its-technoscientific-ambitions?lang=en.

[29] Keith Bradsher, “China’s Economic Stake in the Middle East: Its Thirst for Oil,” The New York Times, October 11, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-oil-saudi-arabia-iran.html.

[30] Carbon Brief Staff, “Guest Post: How China’s Energy System Can Reach Carbon Neutrality before 2055,” Carbon Brief, October 9, 2024.

[31] Iran’s petroleum exports to China and U.S. sanctions ,https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12267.

[32] Motevalli, Golnar. “China, Iran Agree to Expand Trade to $600 Billion in a Decade.” Bloomberg.com, January 23, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-23/china-iran-agree-to-expand-trade-to-600-billion-in-a-decade.

[33] Chinese exports to Iran valued at roughly 9.5 billion dollars; Iranian exports to China valued at roughly 5.7 billion dollars in 2022 Source: “Iran (IRN) and China (CHN) Trade,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/irn/partner/chn

[34] China FTA Network, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/engcc.shtml.

[35] China-Gulf Free Trade Talks Stall on saudi industrial agenda, sources say | Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-gulf-free-trade-talks-stall-saudi-industrial-agenda-sources-say-2024-05-14/

[36] Ambassador Zhang’s activities, speeches & remarks, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/dbtxx/czdbzjds/zjdshd/.

[37] March 23 EDITH M. LEDERER Associated Press | Saturday, “Russia and China Veto US Resolution Calling for Immediate Cease-Fire in Gaza,” Hawaii TribuneHerald Russia and China veto US resolution calling for immediate ceasefire in Gaza Comments, accessed November 22, 2024, https://www.hawaiitribune-herald.com/2024/03/23/nation-world-news/russia-and-china-veto-us-resolution-calling-for-immediate-cease-fire-in-gaza/.

[38] Costello, “China’s Middle East Policy Shift from ‘Hedging’ to ‘Wedging,’” Atlantic Council, September 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/.

[39] Brock Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 192–231

[40] Laura Zhou, “China, Iran Should Stand Together against ‘Unilateralism and Bullying’, Wang Yi Says,” South China Morning Post, January 1, 2020,

[41] Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011), 156.

[42] “Middle East Has No ‘Power Vacuum,’ Needs No ‘Foreign Patriarch’: Wang Yi,” Global Times, January 16, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246036.shtml.

[43] Jon B. Alterman, “The Middle East’s View of the ‘China Model,’” CSIS, accessed November 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/middle-easts-view-china-model.

[44] “李伟建:中东新形势及中国中东外交新机遇, (Li Weijian: New Situation in the Middle East and New Opportunities for China’s Middle East Diplomacy),” Weixin, February 13, 2024. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/eIEpOvfjpJz0X487M2RQlg

[45] Costello, “China’s Middle East Policy Shift from ‘Hedging’ to ‘Wedging,’” Atlantic Council, September 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/.

[46] Jcookson, “The Axis of Evasion: Behind China’s Oil Trade with Iran and Russia,” Atlantic Council, December 13, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-axis-of-evasion-behind-chinas-oil-trade-with-iran-and-russia/.

[47] Public Views of U.S.-China Competition in MENA,Arab Barometer, July 2022, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_US-China_Report-EN-1.pdf.

[48] Ibid

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